Orthrus: Dual-Loop Automated Framework for System-Technology Co-Optimization
Yi Ren, Baokang Peng, Chenhao Xue, Kairong Guo, Yukun Wang, Guoyao Cheng, Yibo Lin, Lining Zhang, Guangyu Sun
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.13029
Viscosity CBFs: Bridging the Control Barrier Function and Hamilton-Jacobi Reachability Frameworks in Safe Control Theory
Dylan Hirsch, Jaime Fern\'andez Fisac, Sylvia Herbert
https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.09929
Beyond Revenue and Welfare: Counterfactual Analysis of Spectrum Auctions with Application to Canada's 3800MHz Allocation
Sara Jalili Shani, Kris Joseph, Michael B. McNally, James R. Wright
https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.08106 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.08106 https://arxiv.org/html/2512.08106
arXiv:2512.08106v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Spectrum auctions are the primary mechanism through which governments allocate scarce radio frequencies, with outcomes that shape competition, coverage, and innovation in telecommunications markets. While traditional models of spectrum auctions often rely on strong equilibrium assumptions, we take a more parsimonious approach by modeling bidders as myopic and straightforward: in each round, firms simply demand the bundle that maximizes their utility given current prices. Despite its simplicity, this model proves effective in predicting the outcomes of Canada's 2023 auction of 3800 MHz spectrum licenses. Using detailed round-by-round bidding data, we estimate bidders' valuations through a linear programming framework and validate that our model reproduces key features of the observed allocation and price evolution. We then use these estimated valuations to simulate a counterfactual auction under an alternative mechanism that incentivizes deployment in rural and remote regions, aligning with one of the key objectives set out in the Canadian Telecommunications Act. The results show that the proposed mechanism substantially improves population coverage in underserved areas. These findings demonstrate that a behavioral model with minimal assumptions is sufficient to generate reliable counterfactual predictions, making it a practical tool for policymakers to evaluate how alternative auction designs may influence future outcomes. In particular, our study demonstrates a method for counterfactual mechanism design, providing a framework to evaluate how alternative auction rules could advance policy goals such as equitable deployment across Canada.
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Towards Modular and Accessible AUV Systems
Mingxi Zhou, Farhang Naderi, Yuewei Fu, Tony Jacob, Lin Zhao, Manavi Panjnani, Chengzhi Yuan, William McConnell, Emir Cem Gezer
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.24864
Can AI agents understand spoken conversations about data visualizations in online meetings?
Rizul Sharma, Tianyu Jiang, Seokki Lee, Jillian Aurisano
https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.00245
SegDINO3D: 3D Instance Segmentation Empowered by Both Image-Level and Object-Level 2D Features
Jinyuan Qu, Hongyang Li, Xingyu Chen, Shilong Liu, Yukai Shi, Tianhe Ren, Ruitao Jing, Lei Zhang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.16098
STAR: Speech-to-Audio Generation via Representation Learning
Zeyu Xie, Xuenan Xu, Yixuan Li, Mengyue Wu, Yuexian Zou
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.17164 https://
Are Final Market Prices Sufficient for Information Aggregation? Evidence from Last-Minute Dynamics in Parimutuel Betting
Hiroaki Hanyu, Shunsuke Ishii, Suguru Otani, Kazuhiro Teramoto
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.14645