Tootfinder

It’s about this time of year I like to check my backups and download my archives.
One archive I download is the archive of my Mastodon posts. Pretty much the only one now I’ve left the corporate web really.
I also like to copy the contents of my public fediverse posts into my own diary within my vimwiki.
Keep it all in one place for easy and local search.
Here’s the script I use, it’s very short and just copies the content of every post in the archive into a new diary entry in the vimwiki diary.
If it finds something already there, it appends.
It checks if it’s already written this post into the diary to avoid duplicating it when you run it over and every again every month or year or whatever.
Paste it into a new text-file called toVimWiki.php, download and unzip your mastodon archive, and run the script with php, passing it the path to the archive’s outbox.json and the root diary directory.
My diary is honestly mostly just public posts these days. Ain’t much in it I won’t blab about on the internet for likes and lols.
#archive #mastodon #vimwiki #endOfYear

Selling Privacy in Blockchain Transactions
Georgios Chionas, Olga Gorelkina, Piotr Krysta, Rida Laraki
https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.08096 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.08096 https://arxiv.org/html/2512.08096
arXiv:2512.08096v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We study methods to enhance privacy in blockchain transactions from an economic angle. We consider mechanisms for privacy-aware users whose utility depends not only on the outcome of the mechanism but also negatively on the exposure of their economic preferences. Specifically, we study two auction-theoretic settings with privacy-aware users. First, we analyze an order flow auction, where a user auctions off to specialized agents, called searchers, the right to execute her transaction while maintaining a degree of privacy. We examine how the degree of privacy affects the revenue of the auction and, broadly, the net utility of the privacy-aware user. In this new setting, we describe the optimal auction, which is a sealed-bid auction. Subsequently, we analyze a variant of a Dutch auction in which the user gradually decreases the price and the degree of privacy until the transaction is sold. We compare the revenue of this auction to that of the optimal one as a function of the number of communication rounds. Then, we introduce a two-sided market - a privacy marketplace - with multiple users selling their transactions under their privacy preferences to multiple searchers. We propose a posted-price mechanism for the two-sided market that guarantees constant approximation of the optimal social welfare while maintaining incentive compatibility (from both sides of the market) and budget balance. This work builds on the emerging line of research that attempts to improve the performance of economic mechanisms by appending cryptographic primitives to them.
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