Tootfinder

Fantasy football beginner's guide to salary cap drafts https://www.espn.com/fantasy/football/story/_/id/45710068/2025-fantasy-football-how-draft-salary-cap-league-auction

Replaced article(s) found for cs.LG. https://arxiv.org/list/cs.LG/new/
[1/6]:
Adaptive Discretization against an Adversary: Lipschitz bandits, Dynamic Pricing, and Auction Tuning

Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing with Assumed Bid Cost Reverse Auction
Jowa Yangchin, Ningrinla Marchang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.07688 https…

Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing with Assumed Bid Cost Reverse Auction
Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS) is the mechanism wherein people can contribute in data collection process using their own mobile devices which have sensing capabilities. Incentives are rewards that individuals get in exchange for data they submit. Reverse Auction Bidding (RAB) is a framework that allows users to place bids for selling the data they collected. Task providers can select users to buy data from by looking at bids. Using the RAB framework, MCS system can be optimized for better user util…

Just a reminder... if you ever had your DNA tested through #23AndMe … all your DNS data is now up for sale to the highest bidder…
https://gizmodo.com/23andme-re-opens-d…

23andMe Re-Opens Data Auction With $305 Million Bid From Former CEO
Amy Wojcicki really wants her hands on that DNA.

Sotheby’s Auction of Sacred Gemstones Found Next to Buddha’s Ashes is Halted as India Intervenes https://www.goodnewsnetwork.org/sothebys-calls-last-minute-halt-to-sale-of-sacred-buddha-relics-after-india-intervenes…

Sotheby's Auction of Sacred Gemstones Found Next to Buddha’s Ashes is Halted as India Intervenes
India's foreign ministry said that the Peppé family had to right to sell the gem relics, since they were taken as a form of colonial plunder.

NGA: Non-autoregressive Generative Auction with Global Externalities for Advertising Systems
Zuowu Zheng, Ze Wang, Fan Yang, Wenqing Ye, Weihua Huang, Wenqiang He, Teng Zhang, Xingxing Wang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.05685

NGA: Non-autoregressive Generative Auction with Global Externalities for Advertising Systems
Online advertising auctions are fundamental to internet commerce, demanding solutions that not only maximize revenue but also ensure incentive compatibility, high-quality user experience, and real-time efficiency. While recent learning-based auction frameworks have improved context modeling by capturing intra-list dependencies among ads, they remain limited in addressing global externalities and often suffer from inefficiencies caused by sequential processing. In this work, we introduce the Non…

23andMe plans to hold a new auction for its DNA data, opening with a $305M bid led by Anne Wojcicki, after the ex-CEO challenged Regeneron's winning bid in May (Steven Church/Bloomberg)
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/20

Virtualizing RAN: Science, Strategy, and Architecture of Software-Defined Mobile Networks
Ryan Barker
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.09878 https://

Virtualizing RAN: Science, Strategy, and Architecture of Software-Defined Mobile Networks
Virtualising the Radio Access Network (RAN) is widely touted as the corner-stone of affordable 5G and a prerequisite for AI-native 6G. Yet current discourse often isolates spectrum policy, cloud engineering and organisational readiness into silos. This paper delivers an integrated analysis that spans science, technology, business strategy and culture. I first review spectrum-auction economics and show-via a comparative study of T-Mobile US and Verizon-that mid-band contiguity leveraged through …

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising
Yang Li, Yuchao Ma, Qi Qi
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.07418 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2507…

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising
Online advertising is a vital revenue source for major internet platforms. Recently, joint advertising, which assigns a bundle of two advertisers in an ad slot instead of allocating a single advertiser, has emerged as an effective method for enhancing allocation efficiency and revenue. However, existing mechanisms for joint advertising fail to realize the optimality, as they tend to focus on individual advertisers and overlook bundle structures. This paper identifies an optimal mechanism for jo…

An efficiency ordering of k-price auctions under complete information
Sumit Goel, Jeffrey Zeidel
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.05738 https://

An efficiency ordering of k-price auctions under complete information
We study $k$-price auctions in a complete information environment and characterize all pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes. In a setting with $n$ agents having ordered valuations, we show that any agent, except those with the lowest $k-2$ valuations, can win in equilibrium. As a consequence, worst-case welfare increases monotonically as we go from $k=2$ (second-price auction) to $k=n$ (lowest-price auction), with the first-price auction achieving the highest worst-case welfare.

Hi there, it’s Ryan Busse.
I’ve spent my life protecting public lands.
I’ve hunted them, hiked them, raised my kids on them.
And now, I’m watching a MAGA-backed billionaire wrecking crew try to sell them off.
Donald Trump is back. And with the help of Congressional Republicans, he’s letting Elon Musk and DOGE gut protections and auction off your land to oil companies and developers.
𝗧𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗶𝘀𝗻’𝘁 𝗽𝗼𝗹𝗶𝗰𝘆—𝗶𝘁’𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗳𝘁. 𝗔𝗻𝗱 𝗼𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗶𝘁’𝘀 𝗴𝗼𝗻𝗲, 𝗶𝘁’𝘀 𝗴𝗼𝗻𝗲.
That’s why I…

I just gave to Public Land Warriors Fund (501c4)!
Show your support with a contribution.

I have been trying to find some Chili Rasboras for my new 16 gallon nanotank since before I even got the tank. They've been out of stock everywhere. I even signed up for text notifications on a couple of sites and when I got the text I was in the middle of a meeting, and by the time I escaped, they were out of stock again.
I went to a meeting of the Colorado Aquarium Society tonight and managed to snag six in the auction.
Here's a terrible picture of them being drip acclimated.
@… #rasbora

After the IPL auction, kid and I gave up hope on RCB for this year. But 4-5 games in started to realize what an exremely cleverly designed team this is. Team GMs are still not stars in India, but they will soon be: RCB's GM was clearly their MVP, their Theo Epstein.

Series D, Episode 07 - Assassin
VILA: Auction! You're joking.
DAYNA: All right, so Domo is a planet, the ninth is a date, but who or what is Cancer?
SOOLIN: I don't know.
TARRANT: He knows, though, [looking at Avon] don't you? You know about Cancer.
https://blake.torpidity.net/m/407/13

Blakes7Bot | Search
Companion site to the Blakes7Bot Twitter, Mastodon, and Bluesky accounts. Automated lines of Blakes 7 dialog. Includes a script search facility.

Several large pieces of furniture are being donated to an antique store in Orangeville. It operates as a non-profit, and all sales proceeds go to the local food bank. We had the option of sending it to auction, but the cost of shipping and auction fees would just barely cover what we would likely get. We've owned this furniture for 40 years, so it's time for someone else to enjoy them.
#Antiques #Donation

David Lynchs Nachlass hat sich scheinbar bei einer Auktion in die Winde zerstreut.
#Filmkultur

MAGA people are like petulant children.
"Senator Rand Paul tried to force the U.S. Postal Service to auction off its entire electric fleet, all 7,200 zero-emission trucks and over 14,000 charging stations currently being installed in post offices "

Distributionally Robust Auction Design with Deferred Inspection
Halil I. Bayrak, Martin Bichler
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.04767 https://

Distributionally Robust Auction Design with Deferred Inspection
Mechanism design with inspection has received increasing attention due to its applications in the field. For example, large warehouses have started to auction scarce capacity. This capacity shall be allocated in a way that maximizes the seller's revenue. In such mechanism design problems, the seller can inspect the true value of a buyer and his realized sales in the next period without cost. Prior work on mechanism design with deferred inspection is based on the assumption of a common prior dis…

Quantifying Institutional Gender Inequality in Contemporary Visual Art
Xindi Wang, Alexander J. Gates, Magnus Resch, Albert-Laszlo Barabasi
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.22103

Quantifying Institutional Gender Inequality in Contemporary Visual Art
From disparities in the number of exhibiting artists to auction opportunities, there is evidence of women's under-representation in visual art. Here we explore the exhibition history and auction sales of 65,768 contemporary artists in 20,389 institutions, revealing gender differences in the artist population, exhibitions and auctions. We distinguish between two criteria for gender equity: gender-neutrality, when artists have gender-independent access to exhibition opportunities, and gender-bala…

I'm baffled that this guy is a respected analyst. Yeah, an infinite number of AI agents will spend their money on content from human creators, making those humans infinitely rich. I see no flaws in this model.

Hybrid Advertising in the Sponsored Search
Zhen Zhang, Weian Li, Yuhan Wang, Qi Qi, Kun Huang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.07711 https://

Hybrid Advertising in the Sponsored Search
Online advertisements are a primary revenue source for e-commerce platforms. Traditional advertising models are store-centric, selecting winning stores through auction mechanisms. Recently, a new approach known as joint advertising has emerged, which presents sponsored bundles combining one store and one brand in ad slots. Unlike traditional models, joint advertising allows platforms to collect payments from both brands and stores. However, each of these two advertising models appeals to distin…

TREASURED PUBLIC LANDS ON THE AUCTION BLOCK IN TRUMP’S ‘BIG BEAUTIFUL BILL’
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/public-land-highest-bidder-trump-big-beautiful-bill-1235369151/

Treasured Public Lands on the Auction Block in Trump's 'Big Beautiful Bill' (Tim Dickinson/Rolling Stone)
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/public-land-highest-bidder-trump-big-beautiful-bill-1235369151/
http://www.memeorandum.com/250620/p77#a250620p77

"The British used parts of North America as a penal colony. Convicts were transported by private companies and sold by auction to plantation owners. Between 1718 and 1776, it is estimated that 30,000-50,000 convicts were transported for penal labor to at least nine of the continental colonies." -- https://

Penal labor in the United States - Wikipedia

A Transformer-Based Neural Network for Optimal Deterministic-Allocation and Anonymous Joint Auction Design
Zhen Zhang, Luowen Liu, Wanzhi Zhang, Zitian Guo, Kun Huang, Qi Qi, Qiang Liu, Xingxing Wang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.02435

A Transformer-Based Neural Network for Optimal Deterministic-Allocation and Anonymous Joint Auction Design
With the advancement of machine learning, an increasing number of studies are employing automated mechanism design (AMD) methods for optimal auction design. However, all previous AMD architectures designed to generate optimal mechanisms that satisfy near dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) fail to achieve deterministic allocation, and some also lack anonymity, thereby impacting the efficiency and fairness of advertising allocation. This has resulted in a notable discrepancy between…

SoK: Current State of Ethereum's Enshrined Proposer Builder Separation
Maxwell Koegler
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.18189 https://a…

SoK: Current State of Ethereum's Enshrined Proposer Builder Separation
Initially introduced to Ethereum via Flashbots' MEV-boost, Proposer-Builder Separation allows proposers to auction off blockspace to a market of transaction orderers, known as builders. PBS is currently available to validators through the aforementioned MEV-boost, but its unregulated and relay-dependent nature has much of the Ethereum community calling for its enshrinement. Providing a protocol-integrated PBS marketspace and communication channel for payload outsourcing is termed PBS enshrineme…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.03674 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csDS_…

Learning Safe Strategies for Value Maximizing Buyers in Uniform Price Auctions
We study the bidding problem in repeated uniform price multi-unit auctions from the perspective of a single value-maximizing buyer who aims to maximize their cumulative value over $T$ rounds while adhering to return-on-investment (RoI) constraints in each round. Buyers adopt $m$-uniform bidding format, where they submit $m$ bid-quantity pairs $(b_i, q_i)$ to demand $q_i$ units at bid $b_i$. We introduce safe bidding strategies as those that satisfy RoI constraints in every auction, regardless o…

"Brazil to auction oil exploration rights months before hosting Cop30"
#Brazil #Climate #ClimateChange #COP30

Pricing the Right to Renege in Search Markets: Evidence from Trucking
Richard Faltings
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.01650 https://arxiv…

Pricing the Right to Renege in Search Markets: Evidence from Trucking
In many markets, advance interim contracts include an explicit right to renege, granting one party the option to switch to more efficient matches that emerge later in the search process. This paper studies the formation and welfare implications of such interim contracts, leveraging novel data from a brokerage firm in the trucking industry. The broker allocates advance shipment contracts to carriers through a dynamic auction mechanism and penalizes cancellations through a reputational mechanism.…

"The Senate’s version of Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill would see the General Services Administration take possession of the nearly 7,200 new postal EVs and associated infrastructure and put the assets up for auction."
Megabill Would Trash $10B In New USPS Electric Trucks - Joe.My.God.
https://www.joemygod.com/2025/06/megabill-would-trash-10b-in-new-usps-electric-trucks/

War Hero Codebreaker Alan Turing’s Papers Found in Loft And Saved From Shredder to Fetch Record $625,000 https://www.goodnewsnetwork.org/alan-turing-papers-found-in-loft-and-saved-from-shredder-fetch-record-625k/

Alan Turing Papers Found in Loft And Saved From Shredder to Fetch a Record $625,000
A treasure of scientific papers by codebreaking war hero Alan Turing fetched $625k at auction after being found in loft and nearly shredded.

Optimal Auction Design for Dynamic Stochastic Environments: Myerson Meets Naor
Yeon-Koo Che, Andrew B. Choi
https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.22862 https://

Optimal Auction Design for Dynamic Stochastic Environments: Myerson Meets Naor
Allocation of goods and services often involves both stochastic supply and stochastic demand. Motivated by applications such as cloud computing, gig platforms, and blockchain auctions, we study the design of optimal selling mechanisms in an environment where buyers with private valuations arrive stochastically and are assigned goods that also arrive stochastically, and either buyers or goods can be held in a queue at costs until allocation. The optimal mechanism dynamically leverages competitiv…

Shill Bidding Prevention in Decentralized Auctions Using Smart Contracts
M. A. Bouaicha, G. Destefanis, T. Montanaro, N. Lasla, L. Patrono
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.00282

Shill Bidding Prevention in Decentralized Auctions Using Smart Contracts
In online auctions, fraudulent behaviors such as shill bidding pose significant risks. This paper presents a conceptual framework that applies dynamic, behavior-based penalties to deter auction fraud using blockchain smart contracts. Unlike traditional post-auction detection methods, this approach prevents manipulation in real-time by introducing an economic disincentive system where penalty severity scales with suspicious bidding patterns. The framework employs the proposed Bid Shill Score (BS…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.22862 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_eco…

Optimal Auction Design for Dynamic Stochastic Environments: Myerson Meets Naor
Allocation of goods and services often involves both stochastic supply and stochastic demand. Motivated by applications such as cloud computing, gig platforms, and blockchain auctions, we study the design of optimal selling mechanisms in an environment where buyers with private valuations arrive stochastically and are assigned goods that also arrive stochastically, and either buyers or goods can be held in a queue at costs until allocation. The optimal mechanism dynamically leverages competitiv…

Learning to Coordinate Bidders in Non-Truthful Auctions
Hu Fu, Tao Lin
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.02801 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.02…

Learning to Coordinate Bidders in Non-Truthful Auctions
In non-truthful auctions such as first-price and all-pay auctions, the independent strategic behaviors of bidders, with the corresponding equilibrium notion -- Bayes Nash equilibria -- are notoriously difficult to characterize and can cause undesirable outcomes. An alternative approach to designing better auction systems is to coordinate the bidders: let a mediator make incentive-compatible recommendations of correlated bidding strategies to the bidders, namely, implementing a Bayes correlated …

Bidder Feedback in First-Price Auctions for Video Advertising
S\'ebastien Lahaie, Benjamin Schaeffer, Yuanjun Zhou
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.17058 htt…

Bidder Feedback in First-Price Auctions for Video Advertising
In first-price auctions for display advertising, exchanges typically communicate the "minimum-bid-to-win" to bidders after the auction as feedback for their bidding algorithms. For a winner, this is the second-highest bid, while for losing bidders it is the highest bid. In this paper we investigate the generalization of this concept to general combinatorial auctions, motivated by the domain of video advertising. In a video pod auction, ad slots during an advertising break in a video stream are …

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.14485 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csGT_…

On Sybil-proof Mechanisms
We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only non-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and Sybil-proof direct mechanism is a second price auction with symmetric tie-breaking. Thus, if there is private information, lotteries or other mechanisms that do not always allocate to a highest-value bidder are not Sybil-proof or not incentive compatible. Moreover, we show that our main (im)possibility result extends beyond linear valuations, but not to multi-unit object…

Smoothness Meets Autobidding: Tight Price of Anarchy Bounds for Simultaneous First-Price Auctions
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Twan Kroll, Stefano Leonardi, Guido Sch\"afer, Artem Tsikiridis
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.20908

Smoothness Meets Autobidding: Tight Price of Anarchy Bounds for Simultaneous First-Price Auctions
Online advertising systems have recently transitioned to autobidding, enabling advertisers to delegate bidding decisions to automated agents. Each advertiser directs their agent to optimize a valuation-dependent objective subject to return-on-investment (ROI) or budget constraints. Given their relevance, there has been a surge in literature studying the liquid welfare price of anarchy (POA) of core auction formats in autobidding, among which simultaneous first-price auctions (FPA). These models…