Tootfinder

Opt-in global Mastodon full text search. Join the index!

@frankel@mastodon.top
2026-08-09 16:54:35

Guest author Peter Firmstone continues his brilliant series of #Security baked into the #JVM, with his third post: two Subjects, one call
This part covers the two kinds of identity a call carries, how SPIFFE manages process credentials without keystores, and how three identity layers coexist on a singl…

Security Baked Into the JVM: two Subjects, one call
The constraint system stops a bad call before it leaves the JVM. The Safe Codebase Audit Pipeline stops bad code before a client ever loads it. What remains is identity: who is calling, and can you verify it? Most frameworks answer with a token check at the door. A filter validates a bearer token, sets a thread-local variable, and hopes that nothing downstream forgets to look at it. DirtyChai answers differently.

@michabbb@social.vivaldi.net
2026-08-23 00:09:16

🔐 Provider keys are AES-256-GCM encrypted in #SQLite and decrypted in memory per request — your apps only ever see one unified bearer token.
🔄 The catalog self-updates from a signed feed twice a day, verified against a pinned Ed25519 key, so new models and quota changes land without a git pull.

@frankel@mastodon.top
2026-08-23 16:15:59

Guest author Peter Firmstone continues to explore and analyze the theme of #Security Baked Into the #JVM.
Today's focus is on multi-Subject dispatch: how up to sixteen user Subjects cross a call on the #JERI…

Security Baked Into the JVM: sixteen Subjects on the wire
Alice calls the order service. The order service calls the ledger on her behalf. At the second hop, the ledger has to decide whose authority the debit is being made under. Most stacks answer badly. Forward Alice’s bearer token verbatim, and the ledger cannot tell her from the service that relayed it. Drop the token and the ledger sees a machine, with no record that a human started the chain. Neither option lets the ledger authorize the combination.