Tootfinder

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.14821 has been replaced.
link: https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=a

Mysticeti: Reaching the Limits of Latency with Uncertified DAGs
We introduce Mysticeti-C the first DAG-based Byzantine consensus protocol to achieve the lower bounds of latency of 3 message rounds. Since Mysticeti-C is built over DAGs it also achieves high resource efficiency and censorship resistance. Mysticeti-C achieves this latency improvement by avoiding explicit certification of the DAG blocks and by proposing a novel commit rule such that every block can be committed without delays, resulting in optimal latency in the steady state and under crash fai…

Sophos has done quite an extensive investigation into this malware operation and provided over 450 #IOCs to hunt for. I also find they are abusing WebDAV servers (those servers with <at>80 in the URL). WebDAV is an uncommonly used protocol these days. If you can, try to block access to all WebDAV servers except those that are used by your organization.
#threatintel #cybersecurity
From: @…
https://infosec.exchange/@SophosXOps/112351480339066844

Dear Fediverse: It’s OK to disagree, vehemently, with the notion that enabling cross-protocol interaction with Bluesky might be good. (Once we understand what it looks like, which we don’t.)
But if you do that by vomiting juvenile troll-flavored slime and asserting that those who like the idea all want to strip-mine the Fediverse for profit, well I for one am just gonna block you.
I love the Fediverse because (a) I hardly ever need to block people and (b) it’s so easy to do when…

Sophos has done quite an extensive investigation into this malware operation and provided over 450 #IOCs to hunt for. I also find they are abusing WebDAV servers (those servers with <at>80 in the URL). WebDAV is an uncommonly used protocol these days. If you can, try to block access to all WebDAV servers except those that are used by your organization.
#threatintel #cybersecurity
From: @…
https://infosec.exchange/@SophosXOps/112351480339066844

Bounds of Block Rewards in Honest PinFi Systems
Qi He, Yunwei Mao, Ju Li
https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.02174 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2404.…

Bounds of Block Rewards in Honest PinFi Systems
PinFi is a class of novel protocols for decentralized pricing of dissipative assets, whose value naturally declines over time. Central to the protocol's functionality and its market efficiency is the role of liquidity providers (LPs). This study addresses critical stability and sustainability challenges within the protocol, namely: the propensity of LPs to prefer selling in external markets over participation in the protocol; a similar inclination towards selling within the PinFi system rather …

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.01791 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csDC_…

Moonshot: Optimizing Chain-Based Rotating Leader BFT via Optimistic Proposals
Existing chain-based rotating-leader BFT SMR protocols for the partially synchronous network model with constant commit latencies incur block periods of at least $2δ$ (where $δ$ is the message transmission latency). While a protocol with a block period of $δ$ exists under the synchronous model, its commit latency is linear in the size of the system. To close this gap, we present the first chain-based BFT SMR protocols with $δ$ delay between the proposals of consecutive honest leaders and …

Block-MDS QC-LDPC Codes for Information Reconciliation in Key Distribution
Lev Tauz, Debarnab Mitra, Jayanth Shreekumar, Murat Can Sarihan, Chee Wei Wong, Lara Dolecek
https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.00192

Block-MDS QC-LDPC Codes for Information Reconciliation in Key Distribution
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a popular protocol that provides information theoretically secure keys to multiple parties. Two important post-processing steps of QKD are 1) the information reconciliation (IR) step, where parties reconcile mismatches in generated keys through classical communication, and 2) the privacy amplification (PA) step, where parties distill their common key into a new secure key that the adversary has little to no information about. In general, these two steps have be…