Crosslisted article(s) found for math.AT. https://arxiv.org/list/math.AT/new
[1/1]:
- RTD-Lite: Scalable Topological Analysis for Comparing Weighted Graphs in Learning Tasks
Eduard Tulchinskii, Daria Voronkova, Ilya Trofimov, Evgeny Burnaev, Serguei Barannikov
https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.11910 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csLG_bot/114182227105908009
- Hallucination Detection in LLMs with Topological Divergence on Attention Graphs
Alexandra Bazarova, et al.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.10063 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csCL_bot/114340822288698487
- Arithmetic Wu Formulas and the Generalized Hecke Theorem
Shachar Carmeli, Mark Shusterman, Sa'ar Zehavi
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.06008 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathNT_bot/116696438874436734
- $p$-adic Bi-Filtrations for Topological Machine Learning on Genomic Sequences
Tirtharaj Dash, Gunja Sachdeva
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.06117 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_qbioQM_bot/116696454797742926
- RedZeD: Computing persistent homology by Reduction to Zero Differentials
Chris Kapulkin, Nathan Kershaw
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.06310 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csCG_bot/116696326602622617
toXiv_bot_toot
Crosslisted article(s) found for cs.GT. https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new
[1/1]:
- Insurance of Agentic AI
Quanyan Zhu
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05449 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csAI_bot/116696535801623005
- Bitcoin After Block Rewards
Junhyuk Lee
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05503 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csCR_bot/116696457548098249
- Online Min-Cost Matching with General Arrivals
Josh Ascher, Eric Balkanski, Jason Chatzitheodorou, Vasilis Gkatzelis
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05546 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csDS_bot/116696483136717005
- Measuring Concentration of Power in Approval Voting Games
Takaaki Abe
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05655 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_econTH_bot/116696378312014137
- Learning to Contest: Decentralized Robust Fairness in Cooperative MARL via Cross-Attention
Can Savc{\i}
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.06162 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csMA_bot/116696376542763270
- Regret Minimization with Adaptive Opponents in Repeated Games
Mingyang Liu, Asuman Ozdaglar, Tiancheng Yu, Kaiqing Zhang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.06486
toXiv_bot_toot
Three paragraphs, from three different hotel reviews.
Can you tell which, if any, were AI‑generated?
🔸“The hotel is in a great location for everything. Lots of places to eat and drink. The hotel itself is always abuzz. The tavern located on the ground floor is definitely a must. Food, service, prices and atmosphere were great.”
🔸“A good hotel, though the room had the proportions of a well-appointed lift. Slept well, shower was excellent, staff were friendly. Breakfast was bus…
Replaced article(s) found for cs.PF. https://arxiv.org/list/cs.PF/new
[1/1]:
- A Virtual Processor brings back the Free Lunch
Haymo Kutschbach
https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.30507 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csPF_bot/116673689208814470
- CuTeGen: An LLM-Based Agentic Framework for Generation and Optimization of High-Performance GPU K...
Tara Saba, Zhiyang Chen, Jikai Jason Li, Anne Ouyang, Xujie Si, Fan Long
https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.01489 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csLG_bot/116339892022351655
- Do Transformers Need Three Projections? Systematic Study of QKV Variants
Ali Kayyam, Anusha Madan Gopal, M Anthony Lewis
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04032 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csLG_bot/116690742732268277
toXiv_bot_toot
Crosslisted article(s) found for math.CV. https://arxiv.org/list/math.CV/new
[1/1]:
- Delta-pulse solution in Zener viscoelastic model
Andrea Mentrelli, Juan Luis Gonzalez-Santander, Francesco Mainardi
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04024 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathph_bot/116690715796108102
- On the First Caustic of Elliptical Billiards
Aleksandra Uskova
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04132 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathDS_bot/116690728606418123
- Combinatorial and analytic aspects of independence polynomials of zero divisor graphs
Bilal Ahmad Rather
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04789 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathCO_bot/116690805845491494
- Median porosity is quasiconformally invariant
Tero Kilpel\"ainen, Antti V. V\"ah\"akangas
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05034 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathCA_bot/116690760260142089
toXiv_bot_toot
Replaced article(s) found for cs.GT. https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new
[1/1]:
- Breaking $1/\epsilon$ Barrier in Quantum Zero-Sum Games: Generalizing Metric Subregularity for Sp...
Yiheng Su, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Pucheng Xiong
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.21570 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csGT_bot/115286473303032501
- Shift Bribery over Social Networks
Ashlesha Hota, Susobhan Bandopadhyay, Palash Dey
https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.21200 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csGT_bot/115445182046770469
- Mechanism Design Without Disclosure: Committing to and Running Hidden Mechanisms
Ran Canetti, Amos Fiat, Yannai A. Gonczarowski
https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.05590 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_econTH_bot/109861924561524056
- Explaining a probabilistic prediction on the simplex with Shapley compositions
Paul-Gauthier No\'e, Miquel Perell\'o-Nieto, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois Bonastre, Peter Flach
https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.01382 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csLG_bot/112908172291910591
- Scheduling in Queueing Systems with Uncertain and Evolving Holding Costs
Caner Gocmen, Thodoris Lykouris, Deeksha Sinha, Wentao Weng
https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.21331 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csDS_bot/114584234235188224
toXiv_bot_toot
Crosslisted article(s) found for cs.OS. https://arxiv.org/list/cs.OS/new
[1/1]:
- CarbonSim: A Lifecycle-Aware Framework for Evaluating Carbon Tradeoffs in Hardware Upgrade Decisions
Kartik Hans, Kaiwen Zhao, Stephen Lee
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.06438 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csDC_bot/116696466987255241
toXiv_bot_toot
Replaced article(s) found for math.AT. https://arxiv.org/list/math.AT/new
[1/1]:
- Computing Projective Implicit Representations from Poset Towers
Tamal K. Dey, Florian Russold
https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.08755 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathAT_bot/114504985721296525
- Function-Rips complexes in persistent homotopy theory: Stability and persistent Latschev theorems
Steve Oudot, Lukas Waas
https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.23460 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathAT_bot/116288736270132154
- Tangent $\infty$-categories and Goodwillie calculus
Kristine Bauer, Matthew Burke, Michael Ching
https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.07819
- Left-exact Localizations of $\infty$-Topoi III: The Acyclic Product
Mathieu Anel, Georg Biedermann, Eric Finster, Andr\'e Joyal
https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.15573 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathCT_bot/110982381321460663
- 2-dimensional Lawvere theories, commutativity, and higher Day convolution
Tom\'a\v{s} Perutka
https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.14332 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathCT_bot/116085078820887632
- Generalized inverse diagrams in tribes
El Mehdi Cherradi
https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.17355 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathCT_bot/116102274845210395
toXiv_bot_toot
[2026-06-05 Fri (UTC), 9 new articles found for stat.ME Methodology]
toXiv_bot_toot
RE: https://mastodon.social/@meduza_bot/116517018166241458
If you ever had any doubt that genocide and war crimes are state policy in Nazi Russia, here it is, crystal clear.
[2026-06-05 Fri (UTC), 5 new articles found for cs.DB Databases]
toXiv_bot_toot
[2026-06-05 Fri (UTC), 4 new articles found for cs.MA Multiagent Systems]
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[2026-06-04 Thu (UTC), 1 new article found for q-fin.RM Risk Management]
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[2026-06-05 Fri (UTC), no new articles found for nlin.CG Cellular Automata and Lattice Gases]
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[2026-06-05 Fri (UTC), 4 new articles found for physics.app-ph Applied Physics]
toXiv_bot_toot
[2026-06-05 Fri (UTC), 14 new articles found for cond-mat.str-el Strongly Correlated Electrons]
toXiv_bot_toot
Cheeto Pedo
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Replaced article(s) found for cs.GT. https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new
[1/1]:
- Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness of the Envy-Cycle-Elimination Algorithm
Jugal Garg, Eklavya Sharma
https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.08986 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csGT_bot/113304502509503455
- Deterministic-Allocation and Anonymous Joint Advertising in E-commerce Platforms
Zhen Zhang, Luowen Liu, Wanzhi Zhang, Zitian Guo, Kun Huang, Qi Qi, Qianlong Xie, Xingxing Wang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.02435 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csGT_bot/114623889823025585
- Chance-Constrained Correlated Equilibria for Robust Noncooperative Coordination
Jaehan Im, Ufuk Topcu, David Fridovich-Keil
https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.14141 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csGT_bot/116243473506703974
- The Stability of Online Algorithms in Performative Prediction
Gabriele Farina, Juan Carlos Perdomo
https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.24207 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csLG_bot/116159080059392879
toXiv_bot_toot
Crosslisted article(s) found for math.CV. https://arxiv.org/list/math.CV/new
[1/1]:
- Curvature of hyperbolic complex manifolds
Kyle Broder, Herv\'e Gaussier
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05452 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathDG_bot/116696449910091240
- Higher order isomonodromic deformation of Higgs bundles and a characterization of the non-abelian...
Tianzhi Hu, Ruiran Sun, Jinbang Yang, Kang Zuo
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05794 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathAG_bot/116696396795096157
- Coherent sheaves on subvarieties in Hopf manifolds
Liviu Ornea, Misha Verbitsky
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.06072 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathAG_bot/116696407804953205
toXiv_bot_toot
Replaced article(s) found for math.AT. https://arxiv.org/list/math.AT/new
[1/1]:
- A Structural Characterization of the Hit Image in the Motivic Steenrod Algebra
Dang Vo Phuc
https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.00118 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathAT_bot/116005625417577351
- Groupoid Homology and Classifying-Space Homology Are Not Isomorphic: The Cantor Unit Groupoid
Luciano Melodia
https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.13375 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathAT_bot/116084981170423868
- Involutive Brauer groups and Poincar\'e rings
Viktor Burghardt, Noah Riggenbach, Lucy Yang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.25737 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathAG_bot/115298286154415732
toXiv_bot_toot
Crosslisted article(s) found for cs.GT. https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new
[1/1]:
- What Makes Majority Illusion Easy to Detect?
\v{S}imon Schierreich, Ildik\'o Schlotter
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04260 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csSI_bot/116690783627045886
- Episodic Memory Temporal Consistency for Cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
Zicheng Zhao, Yu Lan, Chengzhengxu Li, Zhaohan Zhang, Xiaoming Liu
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04492 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csLG_bot/116690908870948973
- Mean-based algorithms: A lower bound and regret
Julius Durmann, Amelie Kleber
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04931 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csLG_bot/116690917521805951
toXiv_bot_toot
[2026-06-04 Thu (UTC), 1 new article found for cs.OS Operating Systems]
toXiv_bot_toot
[2026-06-04 Thu (UTC), 6 new articles found for cs.DB Databases]
toXiv_bot_toot
[2026-06-04 Thu (UTC), 3 new articles found for cs.MA Multiagent Systems]
toXiv_bot_toot
[2026-06-05 Fri (UTC), 2 new articles found for q-fin.RM Risk Management]
toXiv_bot_toot
[2026-06-04 Thu (UTC), no new articles found for nlin.CG Cellular Automata and Lattice Gases]
toXiv_bot_toot
[2026-06-04 Thu (UTC), 2 new articles found for physics.app-ph Applied Physics]
toXiv_bot_toot
Ku Klux Yam
bot by @…
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Replaced article(s) found for math.CV. https://arxiv.org/list/math.CV/new
[1/1]:
- On the boundary behavior of bounded analytic functions in the unit disc
Spyros Pasias
https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.10870 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathCV_bot/110393970084886216
- Criteria for a fiberwise Fujiki/Kahler family to be locally Moishezon/projective
Jian Chen
https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.07548 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathAG_bot/114142673223188294
toXiv_bot_toot
Crosslisted article(s) found for math.AT. https://arxiv.org/list/math.AT/new
[1/1]:
- Forman--Ricci Curvature for Irregular Convex Mosaics
Abhyudaya Gupta, Sayak Mukherjee, Kuldeep Saha
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04007 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_condmatsoft_bot/116690768487944299
toXiv_bot_toot
[2026-06-05 Fri (UTC), no new articles found for cs.OS Operating Systems]
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Replaced article(s) found for math.CV. https://arxiv.org/list/math.CV/new
[1/1]:
- On Geometric properties and Coefficient bounds for $\mathcal{S}^*_{B}$
S. Sivaprasad Kumar, Arya Tripathi
https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.10513 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathCV_bot/116215307493892203
- Improved bounds on the number of holomorphic maps between compact Riemann surfaces
Masaharu Tanabe
https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.21137 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathCV_bot/116611467894749438
toXiv_bot_toot
Mango Zedong
bot by @…
No laws were broken in the making of this bot: please don't extraordinarily rendition me to a black site.
#satire #potus45
[2026-06-04 Thu (UTC), 4 new articles found for math.AT Algebraic Topology]
toXiv_bot_toot
GNStor: Design of GPU-Native High-Performance Remote All-Flash Array
Shushu Yi, Wenbo Wu, Guoci Chen, Junrong Zhu, Shengwen Liang, Mao Bo, Chenying Huan, Chen Tian, Jie Zhang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04908 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.04908 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.04908
arXiv:2606.04908v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: GPU has become the leading computing device for a wide range of data-intensive applications, which tightly collaborates with remote all-flash array (AFA) to accommodate ever-expanding datasets, facilitate multi-client data sharing, and guarantee fault tolerance. Although GPU is the center of computation, all I/O processes in existing GPU-AFA systems are still CPU-centric. CPU orchestrates remote I/O requests and executes a centralized AFA engine to take charge of AFA-level functionalities (e.g., access control and metadata persistence). This design disparity suffers from substantial CPU-GPU interaction overhead and I/O traffic amplification, compromising end-to-end I/O performance.
In this work, we present \emph{GNStor}, a GPU-native AFA system that enables GPU to directly access remote AFA without CPU intervention in the I/O path, thereby fully exploiting the performance of AFA. Specifically, GNStor first proposes a GPU-centric NVMe over RDMA (NoR) software stack (named \emph{GNoR}), paving a fast path for GPUs to directly initiate NoR I/O requests to SSDs within remote AFA. GNoR employs an atomic-operation-based I/O orchestration design and follows the single-instruction-multiple-thread (SIMT) execution model of GPU, fully exploiting the massive parallelism of GPU architectures. To facilitate essential AFA functionalities in a CPU-bypass I/O path, GNStor further designs \emph{deEngine}, a decentralized AFA engine that seamlessly decomposes and integrates AFA-level tasks into each SSD firmware, thereby achieving efficient AFA access at low cost. Evaluation results show that GNStor achieves 3.2$\times$ higher I/O throughput and reduces application execution time by 31.1\%, compared to state-of-the-art AFA systems.
toXiv_bot_toot
Uncle Scam
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[2026-06-05 Fri (UTC), 9 new articles found for cs.GT Computer Science and Game Theory]
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[2026-06-05 Fri (UTC), no new articles found for math.AT Algebraic Topology]
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[2026-06-05 Fri (UTC), 1 new article found for math.CV Complex Variables]
toXiv_bot_toot
[2026-06-05 Fri (UTC), 9 new articles found for cs.GT Computer Science and Game Theory]
toXiv_bot_toot
Donorrhea
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[2026-06-04 Thu (UTC), 4 new articles found for math.AT Algebraic Topology]
toXiv_bot_toot
[2026-06-04 Thu (UTC), 2 new articles found for math.CV Complex Variables]
toXiv_bot_toot
[2026-06-05 Fri (UTC), no new articles found for math.AT Algebraic Topology]
toXiv_bot_toot
The Lyin' King
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Constant Approximation for Hylland--Zeckhauser Equilibria
Yonglei Yan, Zhengyang Liu
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.06317 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.06317 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.06317
arXiv:2606.06317v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We present a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a $1/e$-approximate Hylland--Zeckhauser (HZ) equilibrium. This establishes the \emph{first} efficient approximation guarantee for HZ equilibria in settings with multi-valued utilities. Our main technical contribution is a novel utility stratification technique that reduces the original multi-valued market to a structured bi-valued instance. This reduction allows us to efficiently compute the approximation by leveraging the exact algorithm of Vazirani and Yannakakis.
toXiv_bot_toot
The Hochschild Homology of Reedy Categories
Alexandra Ballow
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04297 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.04297 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.04297
arXiv:2606.04297v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We calculate the Hochschild homology of generalized Reedy categories, such as the simplex category, the category of finite sets, the category of finite-dimensional categories, and the PROP associated to an operad.
toXiv_bot_toot
Revenue Guarantees of No-Swap-Regret Dynamics in First Price Auctions
Anders Bo Ipsen, Stratis Skoulakis
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.06085 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.06085 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.06085
arXiv:2606.06085v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We study the revenue of approximate correlated equilibrium in discrete first price auctions - the set of allowable bids is $\mathcal{B} = \{0, 1/k, \dots, 1 - 1/k, 1\}$ for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$. We show that the revenue of any $\epsilon$-approximate correlated equilibrium is at least $v_2 - \Theta(1/k)- \Theta(\epsilon k^2)$, where $v_2 \geq 0$ is the second-highest valuation. Our results establish the first polynomial convergence rates on the revenue generated by no-swap regret bidders in first-price auctions.
For instance, if bidders admit the optimal swap regret of $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{k T})$, then the time-averaged revenue is at least $v_2 - \Theta(1/k) - \Theta(\epsilon)$ after $\mathcal{O}(k^5/\epsilon^2)$ rounds.
toXiv_bot_toot
Extension of Lohwater-Pommerenke's Theorem for strongly-normal Maps
Gopal Datt, Rahul Gogoi
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04800 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.04800 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.04800
arXiv:2606.04800v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We introduce strong normality for holomorphic curves and logharmonic mappings, extending classical normality concepts. We establish an extension of the rescaling characterization due to Lohwater and Pommerenke for not strongly-normal maps. In addition, we also study the Bloch mappings, little-Bloch mappings and prove Zalcman-Pang type rescaling results for them. The framework is further extended to strongly $\varphi$-normal mappings, yielding a unified treatment across these settings.
toXiv_bot_toot
Don the Con
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Slices of the special linear algebraic cobordism spectrum
Ahina Nandy, Oliver R\"ondigs, Egor Zolotarev
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05020 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.05020 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.05020
arXiv:2606.05020v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Let $F$ be a field of exponential characteristic $e$. We compute the slices of $\mathbf{MSL}[e^{-1}]$, where $\mathbf{MSL}$ is the special linear algebraic cobordism spectrum defined by Panin and Walter. The answer is expressed in terms of the second page of the Adams-Novikov spectral sequence for the special unitary cobordism spectrum, which was explicitly determined by Novikov. Its applicability is demonstrated by computations with the slice spectral sequence for $\mathbf{MSL}$, which determine the first few Milnor-Witt stems of its homotopy groups (up to the third) in terms of very effective hermitian $K$-theory. We also establish a decomposition of the rational special linear algebraic cobordism spectrum over an arbitrary qcqs scheme.
toXiv_bot_toot
Fairness and Strategy-Proofness in Automated Market Makers
Frank M. V. Feys
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04959 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.04959 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.04959
arXiv:2606.04959v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: No deployed automated market maker lets its liquidity providers vote on the trading function. We show this is structural, not an oversight. On the weighted-product family with $n \geq 3$ assets, no aggregation rule is at once fair and strategy-proof. Arrovian fairness forces a unique form, the weighted Aitchison centroid, the weighted geometric mean of the providers' preferred pools. But fairness forces mean-type aggregation and strategy-proofness forces median-type, and the only rule that is both is a single-provider dictator. The obstruction is sharp: it vanishes at $n = 2$, where a fair strategy-proof rule exists. Under the Frongillo--Papireddygari--Waggoner equivalence, the centroid is Genest's logarithmic opinion pool, and the impossibility transfers to externally Bayesian pooling.
toXiv_bot_toot
Mango Zedong
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A Complete Characterization of Finite-Order Entire Solutions to Fermat-Type Partial Differential-Difference Systems in $\mathbb{C}^n$
Sujoy Majumder, Jhilik Banerjee, Abhijit Banerjee
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05240 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.05240 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.05240
arXiv:2606.05240v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: The primary objective of this paper is to determine the explicit existence form and structure of finite-order entire solutions in $\mathbb{C}^n$ of the following system of Fermat-type partial differential-difference equations: \[\begin{cases} \left(\frac{\partial f_1\left(z\right)}{\partial z_1}\right)^{n_1} (f_2 \left(z c\right)-f_1(z) )^{m_1}= 1,
\medskip \left(\frac{\partial f_2\left(z\right)}{\partial z_1}\right)^{n_2} (f_1 \left(z c \right)-f_2(z) )^{m_2}= 1, \end{cases}\]
for different choices of the positive integers $n_1$, $n_2$, $m_1$, and $m_2$, where $c=(c_1,c_2,\ldots,c_n)$. We characterize the precise structure of finite-order transcendental entire solutions and extend the results of Xu et al. \cite{XLL1} from the setting of $\mathbb{C}^2$ to the more general space $\mathbb{C}^m$. In addition, several examples are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness and sharpness of the main results.
toXiv_bot_toot
Left exact monoidal localizations from tidy maps
Mathieu Anel, Georg Biedermann, Eric Finster, Andr\'e Joyal
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04263 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.04263 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.04263
arXiv:2606.04263v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We put Goodwillie's calculus of functors and Weiss' orthogonal calculus in a unified framework. We do so in two ways. On the one hand, the relevant categories are all symmetric monoidal and controlled by their compact objects. We introduce the notion of tidy map as a means to generate symmetric monoidal localizations in this setting. These localizations are always left exact. Then we show that both the Goodwillie and Weiss towers are generated by such maps. On the other hand, the relevant categories are also topoi, for which there is a general theory of completion towers of left exact localizations. We had shown in a previous work that the Goodwillie tower is an instance a such a tower. We show here that the Weiss tower is a completion tower as well, and therefore that the general theory applies to orthogonal calculus.
toXiv_bot_toot
Simultaneous EF1 and approximate MMS allocations for submodular valuations
Uriel Feige, Assaf Fine
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.06451 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.06451 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.06451
arXiv:2606.06451v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: There are two common classes of fairness notions that are considered when allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents of equal entitlements. One is that of share-based fairness notions, with the maximin share (MMS) and its relaxations to $\rho$-MMS being prominent representatives of this class. The other is that of comparison-based fairness notions, with envy-freeness (EF) and its relaxations such as EF1 being prominent representatives of this class. In general, no class offers good guarantees for the other class. In this work, we design allocations that simultaneously satisfy notions from both classes, and specifically, are $\rho$-MMS for constant $\rho$ and EF1 (in fact, also EFL). Such results were previously known when agents have additive valuations, and we prove such results for the more general class of submodular valuations.
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On the fundamental solutions of two nonlocal parabolic equations related to logarithmic Laplacians
Bart Rosenzweig, Jonathan Stanfill
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04225 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.04225 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.04225
arXiv:2606.04225v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We answer in the affirmative a question posed by V. Maz'ya of whether one can continue as a meromorphic function of $t$ the series representation of the fundamental solution of a certain nonlocal parabolic equation associated to a logarithmic Laplacian on the circle, which arises in the study of boundary value problems associated to the ordinary Laplacian on domains with thin cavities. The $a\ln(n) O(1)$ growth of the eigenvalues of the integral operator, together with explicit formulas for the eigenfunctions and the subleading asymptotic behavior of the eigenvalues, allows us to show that the fundamental solution is reminiscent of a sum of shifted Riemann zeta functions or polylogarithms, depending on the spatial variable. We show an analogous result for an operator related to a different logarithmic Laplacian on the interval, whose structure is similar. Along the way we are led to prove and to conjecture a number of curious identities involving Bell polynomials and Bernoulli numbers related to the exponential of the digamma function which are of independent interest.
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Universal Assembly and Cellular Loop Spaces on Regular CW Complexes
Serhii Dylda, Tibor Macko
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05051 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.05051 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.05051
arXiv:2606.05051v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We develop a regular CW analogue of the classical assembly formalism for chain complexes appearing in algebraic surgery theory. From the cell poset, we construct combinatorial path and loop objects using fences of comparable cells and prove that their classifying spaces recover the homotopy types of the ordinary based path and loop spaces. The resulting loop object carries a natural monoid structure, giving rise to a DG algebra defined directly from the cellular structure.
For complexes of cellular cosheaves, we introduce a universal assembly functor to modules over the group ring of the fundamental group and study the localization determined by global equivalences. The associated homotopy category is identified with a Verdier quotient of the derived category of cellular cosheaves, and its fibrant objects are precisely the homotopy locally constant complexes. A single elementary cosheaf becomes a compact generator after localization, and its derived endomorphism DG algebra is identified with singular chains on the cellular loop space. Consequently, the localized theory admits a Morita description in terms of DG modules over the loop DG algebra. The formalism provides a regular CW counterpart of the classical delta-set approach to assembly in algebraic surgery theory due to Ranicki and Weiss.
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A Unified Framework for Uniform-Price Resource Allocation Mechanisms
Ioannis Caragiannis, Dimitris Fotakis, Stratis Skoulakis
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.06151 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.06151 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.06151
arXiv:2606.06151v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Mechanisms for allocating a divisible resource among strategic agents have been widely studied. The prominent paradigm is the proportional (Kelly) mechanism, which elicits a scalar bid per agent, allocates the resource proportionally, and charges payments equal to the bids. Follow-up mechanisms improve social welfare, but sacrifice simplicity by introducing complex allocation rules or unintuitive payments.
We introduce a unified framework for designing simple resource allocation mechanisms with proportional-style allocations and uniform pricing. Our framework yields a family of mechanisms that interpolate between the Kelly mechanism and the first-price auction. These mechanisms strictly improve upon Kelly's efficiency guarantees, even achieving full efficiency in equilibrium, while also providing revenue guarantees relative to the VCG mechanism.
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Gradient Dynamics in First-Price Auctions: Iterative Strategy Elimination via Cubic Potentials
Mete \c{S}eref Ahunbay, Weiqiang Zheng, Tao Lin
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05108 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.05108 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.05108
arXiv:2606.05108v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We show that in discretised first-price auctions with complete information, if the buyers learn to bid with online gradient ascent, in time-average the outcome is (almost) the efficient outcome of the second-price auction. Our proof rests on two novel innovations in the analysis of online gradient ascent in normal-form games, which may be useful in a wider range of applications. First, we develop a potential-function-based argument for the analysis of gradient ascent in normal-form games, allowing us to deduce that certain strategies will not be played in time-average. We provide sufficient conditions which ensure this argument can be applied iteratively, resulting in a procedure reminiscent of iterative elimination of dominated strategies. Second, we develop a novel class of cubic "candidate potential functions", classifying a family of quadratic strategy modifications on the probability simplex against which online gradient ascent incurs no regret.
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Crosslisted article(s) found for math.AT. https://arxiv.org/list/math.AT/new
[1/1]:
- Learning Coherent Representations: A Topological Approach to Interpretability
Sigurd Gaukstad, Melvin Vaupel, Valdemar Karg{\aa}rd Olsen, Erik Hermansen, Benjamin Dunn
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.02841 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csLG_bot/116685218459587971
- A Complete Classification of 2-Linear Neighborhood Complexes
Mohammed Rafiq Namiq
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.03573 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathCO_bot/116685180708472790
- Modular inequalities and Alexander polynomials of pencil type conic-line arrangements
Anca Macinic
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.03706 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_mathAG_bot/116685145120981590
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Metric Facility Assignment with Partial Information
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Hasti Karimi, Emma Rewinski, Maziar Shamsipour, Alexandros A. Voudouris
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05905 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.05905 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.05905
arXiv:2606.05905v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We study an assignment problem where a set of agents and a set of facilities lie on a line metric. The goal is to compute an assignment of agents to facilities to approximately minimize the social cost (the total distance of agents from their assigned facilities) given only partial information regarding the metric. Unlike previous work which focused solely on algorithms with access to the ordinal preferences of the agents over the facilities (ORD), we also consider the value of information regarding approval preferences (APP), and inter-facility distances (DIST). For different combinations of these three information types, we establish tight bounds on the distortion of deterministic algorithms, showing that it is possible to improve over the optimal bound of $3$ that can be achieved using only ORD information. Among other results, we show a tight bound of $1 \sqrt{2}$ for APP DIST which holds even for general metrics, and a tight bound of $2$ for ORD APP DIST.
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Extending the El Farol Bar Game with Partial Observability and Incentive Design
Iosif Polenakis, Kalliopi Kastampolidou, Theodore Andronikos
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04753 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.04753 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.04753
arXiv:2606.04753v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: The El Farol Bar game is a classic model of coordination under uncertainty, traditionally treating the venue as a passive constraint. In this work, we re-conceptualize the problem by modeling the bar as a strategic player equipped with AI-driven learning capabilities. We extend the original framework to include partial observability, i.e., agents observe only subsets of past attendees, and transform the bar from a passive capacity threshold into an active mechanism designer that adjusts pricing policies to balance revenue, utilization, and sustainability constraints. Agents employ AI-based learning to form beliefs and adapt attendance strategies under incomplete information, while the bar uses policy learning to optimize dynamic pricing. The resulting two-sided learning system frames coordination as a co-evolutionary process between boundedly rational agents and an adaptive institution, offering insights into congestion management, resource allocation, and mechanism design in complex adaptive systems.
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DNQ: Deep Nash Q-Network for Partially Observable n-Player Games
Qintong Xie, Edward Koh, Xavier Cadet, Peter Chin
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.06480 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.06480 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.06480
arXiv:2606.06480v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Many real-world competitive systems require multiple decision-makers to act simultaneously under shared constraints, limited information, and repeated interaction, as in auctions, resource allocation, and security competition. We study multi-turn simultaneous bidding as a controlled testbed for such problems and propose DNQ, a solver-in-the-loop equilibrium supervision framework for training bidding agents. DNQ alternates between trajectory collection, critic-based payoff estimation, equilibrium computation, and policy imitation. At each visited state, a shared critic predicts either pairwise payoff matrices or an exact N-player payoff tensor, an external solver computes equilibrium strategies, and the agents are trained by minimizing the KL divergence between their masked policies and the solver-derived equilibrium targets. We focus on a scalable pairwise formulation that greatly reduces equilibrium-solving cost and training time compared with the exact formulation, while the shared critic amortizes payoff learning across agents and states. Experiments compare the pairwise and exact variants using critic loss, policy entropy, bidding resource usage, and training cost, showing that the pairwise method scales to larger numbers of agents, whereas the exact method becomes computationally impractical as the joint game grows. These results illustrate the trade-off between strategic fidelity and scalability in repeated competitive environments.
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Replaced article(s) found for math.AT. https://arxiv.org/list/math.AT/new
[1/1]:
- Computing Projective Implicit Representations from Poset Towers
Tamal K. Dey, Florian Russold
Velveeto Corleone
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Non-obvious Manipulability in the Additively Separable Group Activity Selection Problem
Maria Fomenko (Gran Sasso Science Institute), Giovanna Varricchio (University of Calabria)
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05048 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.05048 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.05048
arXiv:2606.05048v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: In this work, we study the additively separable Group Activity Selection Problem (AS-GASP) in an imperfect information setting, where agents have private preferences over activities and weights over other agents. Our goal is to design mechanisms that assign agents to activities based on their declared preferences and weights, with the objective of maximizing social welfare while ensuring truthful reporting. We, therefore, focus on the notion of non-obvious manipulability (NOM), a form of resilience to manipulation. We first investigate the relationship between NOM and social welfare optimality. In this regard, our main result shows that, when preferences and weights are arbitrary or non-negative, any optimal mechanism is non-obviously manipulable. In contrast, when either preferences or weights are binary, we show that optimality and NOM may be incompatible. We then turn to computational aspects. While it is known that computing an optimal outcome for the AS-GASP is NP-hard even in restricted settings, we establish a strong inapproximability result showing that no polynomial-time algorithm can guarantee a bounded approximation ratio when preferences and weights may take arbitrary values. In turn, when preferences are non-negative, we show that a bounded approximation is possible, and we present two asymptotically optimal approximation mechanisms that are also guaranteed to satisfy NOM.
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Crosslisted article(s) found for math.AT. https://arxiv.org/list/math.AT/new
[1/1]:
- RTD-Lite: Scalable Topological Analysis for Comparing Weighted Graphs in Learning Tasks
Eduard Tulchinskii, Daria Voronkova, Ilya Trofimov, Evgeny Burnaev, Serguei Barannikov
Regret Minimization in Single-Dimensional Contract-Design with Binary Actions
Riccardo Poiani, Martino Bernasconi, Andrea Celli
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.06125 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.06125 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.06125
arXiv:2606.06125v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme (i.e., a contract) in order to induce an agent to take a costly action leading to a favorable outcome. We consider the online extension of the classical (one-shot) principal-agent problem, in which the principal repeatedly interacts with agents by proposing contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agents and, crucially, does not observe their actions. As a result, the principal must learn an optimal contract using only the realized outcomes observed at each round. We focus on the setting with binary actions and single-dimensional agent types, where the agent's private type represents their cost per unit-of-effort. For adversarial-type sequences, we provide tight $\Theta(T^{2/3})$ regret guarantees. Remarkably, this rate is completely independent of the number of outcomes $m$. The upper bound is based on two key components: 1) a reduction to a one-dimensional threshold optimization problem and 2) a non-uniform discretization to handle the non-Lipschitz nature of the problem. Moreover, in the case of a single (fixed) hidden type, we show that it is possible to improve the rates and provide a tight $\widetilde{\Theta}(\sqrt{T})$ regret bound. Our algorithm is based on an explore-then-commit strategy where we first approximately learn the hidden type via a stochastic binary search, and then we commit to a ``robustified'' near-optimal contract.
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Replaced article(s) found for math.AT. https://arxiv.org/list/math.AT/new
[1/1]:
- A Structural Characterization of the Hit Image in the Motivic Steenrod Algebra
Dang Vo Phuc
Improved Approximation Guarantees for Groupwise Maximin Share Fairness
Georgios Amanatidis, Anna Korfiati, Evangelos Markakis, Christodoulos Santorinaios
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04731 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.04731 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.04731
arXiv:2606.04731v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of $n$ agents with additive valuation functions. We focus on the very demanding notion of \textit{groupwise maximin share fairness} (GMMS), which requires that each agent $i$ receives value comparable to their maximin share, where the latter is computed \textit{with respect to any subset of agents that contains $i$}. We show that it is possible to compute $(\phi-1)$-approximate GMMS allocations in polynomial time, where $\phi \approx 1.618$ is the golden ratio). This improves on the previously known guarantee of $4/7$ of Chaudhury et al. [SICOMP; 2021] and Amanatidis et al. [TCS; 2020]. We propose a simple algorithm that maintains the same main properties as the Draft-and-Eliminate algorithm of Amanatidis et al. [TCS, 2020] and we improve on the approximation guarantee analysis by carefully bounding the relevant value within any subinstance induced by the restriction of our allocation to a subset of agents. Our analysis is asymptotically tight for algorithms that share these properties and has the additional benefit of giving improved guarantees for restricted settings; in particular, when the agents agree on the top $n$ goods or when the number of agents is small. To illustrate the challenges of going beyond the guarantees of our algorithm, we also present a variant with an improved approximation of $(\sqrt{10}-1)/3 \approx 0.72$ for the case of three agents. To achieve this improvement we partially characterize the maximin share guarantees of short picking sequences for a small number of goods.
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Crosslisted article(s) found for math.AT. https://arxiv.org/list/math.AT/new
[1/1]:
- Forman--Ricci Curvature for Irregular Convex Mosaics
Abhyudaya Gupta, Sayak Mukherjee, Kuldeep Saha
Exploring cooperation mechanisms via reinforcement learning in network common-pool resource games
Yihang Qin, Lin Wang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05867 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.05867 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.05867
arXiv:2606.05867v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Sustaining cooperation in resource-constrained populations requires allocation mechanisms that balance individual incentives, resource sustainability, and distributional fairness. This paper proposes a network common-pool resource game in which individuals are embedded in complex networks, participate in multiple overlapping local resource pools, and face endogenous resource constraints during strategy evolution. Within this framework, we first examine two representative allocation mechanisms, equal allocation and proportional allocation. The results show that equal allocation produces fair but inefficient outcomes by weakening contribution incentives, whereas proportional allocation can temporarily promote cooperation but amplifies accumulated advantages and leads to severe inequality. To overcome these limitations, we develop a graph neural network-based reinforcement learning framework in which a learned social planner allocates local pool resources without directly controlling individual strategies. Simulation results under four representative network topologies show that the learned planner sustains higher cooperation levels and average accumulated resources, and reduces inequality compared with the baselines. Furthermore, we interpret the learned policy and distill it into two simpler mechanisms: a resource-dependent mixture mechanism for regular networks and a degree-conditioned mixture mechanism for heterogeneous networks. These mechanisms reveal that effective allocation should adapt to both local resource states and structural positions, providing an interpretable route from reinforcement learning policy search to mechanism design in networked resource-sharing systems.
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Universal Assembly and Cellular Loop Spaces on Regular CW Complexes
Serhii Dylda, Tibor Macko
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05051 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.0…
Welfare Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Improved Approximation Guarantees Beyond the Fixed Price Barrier
Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel Shaulker
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04890 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.04890 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.04890
arXiv:2606.04890v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We study the setting of welfare maximization in bilateral trade, where the values of both the buyer and the seller are drawn from independent distributions. Our goal is to maximize social welfare. In this setting, fixed price mechanisms have been extensively studied. In a fixed price mechanism, there is a price $p$ that depends only on the distributions of the buyer and the seller. Trade occurs if and only if the buyer's value is at least $p$ and the seller's value is at most $p$. A long line of work has culminated in determining almost exactly the approximation ratios achievable by fixed price mechanisms: there exists a fixed price mechanism that obtains at least a $0.72$ fraction of the social welfare, but no fixed price mechanism can guarantee more than a $0.7381$ fraction of it [Cai and Wu, STOC'23; Liu, Ren, and Wang, STOC'23]. No other incentive-compatible mechanism is known to beat the performance of fixed-price mechanisms in this setting.
This paper shows how to achieve a larger fraction of the optimal welfare with other classes of mechanisms. Specifically, we study the buyer-offering mechanism with a reserve price. In this mechanism, the buyer observes its value and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller, where the offer is at least the reserve price. Beyond its simplicity, this natural mechanism is attractive because the seller always has a dominant strategy: accept the offer if its value is at most the offer, and otherwise reject it. We show that there always exists a reserve price that guarantees a $0.746$ fraction of the social welfare. This not only improves upon the best previously known approximation guarantee for the problem, but also demonstrates that fixed-price mechanisms are not optimal in this setting.
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Should Demand Models Incorporate Competitor Prices? Oblivious Learning and Algorithmic Collusion
Yuhang Wu, Assaf Zeevi
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05363 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.05363 https://arxiv.org/html/2606.05363
arXiv:2606.05363v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: On a platform with many sellers, should a pricing algorithm explicitly model competitors' prices when learning demand? Classical learning arguments suggest an affirmative answer: ignoring competitors induces model misspecification and inefficiency. In contrast, recent work on algorithmic collusion suggests that strategic obliviousness -- deliberately ignoring competitor prices -- may facilitate collusive outcomes and improve profits. We study this modeling choice in a stylized competitive market with unknown noisy demand, in which multiple sellers repeatedly set prices and estimate demand via iterated least squares, and either incorporate competitors' prices into their demand models (informed) or ignore them (oblivious). We first show that, relative to a monopolist, an oblivious seller in a competitive market must explore more aggressively to compensate for the loss of dynamic competitor information. Building on this insight, we characterize market dynamics when all sellers are oblivious and show that prices converge to the competitive outcome under sufficient exploration, while a continuum of pseudo-equilibria arises when exploration decays. Analyzing the resulting price trajectories, we uncover an excursion phenomenon that gives rise to transient collusive patterns that dissipate as learning progresses. In markets with both oblivious and informed sellers, the informed strictly out-earn the oblivious. Read as a strategy game, the modeling choice has a unique Nash equilibrium: the all-informed market, in which prices converge to the competitive outcome efficiently. Overall, our results indicate that collusive patterns are not robust and are not sustained by oblivious modeling; therefore, incorporating competitor information, together with sufficient price exploration, remains a reliable strategy for sellers in competitive markets.
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Slices of the special linear algebraic cobordism spectrum
Ahina Nandy, Oliver R\"ondigs, Egor Zolotarev
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05020 https://arxiv…
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Left exact monoidal localizations from tidy maps
Mathieu Anel, Georg Biedermann, Eric Finster, Andr\'e Joyal
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04263 https://a…
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