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Perceptual Rationality: An Evolutionary Game Theory of Perceptually Rational Decision-Making
Mohammad Salahshour
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.17724 https://

Perceptual Rationality: An Evolutionary Game Theory of Perceptually Rational Decision-Making
Understanding how biological organisms make decisions is of fundamental importance in understanding behavior. Such an understanding within evolutionary game theory so far has been sought by appealing to bounded rationality. Here, we present a perceptual rationality framework in the context of group cooperative interactions, where individuals make rational decisions based on their evolvable perception of the environment. We show that a simple public goods game accounts for power law distributed …

Secondary Bounded Rationality: A Theory of How Algorithms Reproduce Structural Inequality in AI Hiring
Jia Xiao
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.09233 https://…

Secondary Bounded Rationality: A Theory of How Algorithms Reproduce Structural Inequality in AI Hiring
AI-driven recruitment systems, while promising efficiency and objectivity, often perpetuate systemic inequalities by encoding cultural and social capital disparities into algorithmic decision making. This article develops and defends a novel theory of secondary bounded rationality, arguing that AI systems, despite their computational power, inherit and amplify human cognitive and structural biases through technical and sociopolitical constraints. Analyzing multimodal recruitment frameworks, we …

Strategically Robust Game Theory via Optimal Transport
Nicolas Lanzetti, Sylvain Fricker, Saverio Bolognani, Florian D\"orfler, Dario Paccagnan
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.15325

Strategically Robust Game Theory via Optimal Transport
In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation, bounded rationality. While it may be possible to guide the agents' decisions by modeling each source, their joint presence makes this task particularly daunting. Toward this goal, it is natural for agents to seek protection against deviations around the emergent be…

Game-Theoretic Modeling of Vehicle Unprotected Left Turns Considering Drivers' Bounded Rationality
Yuansheng Lian, Ke Zhang, Meng Li, Shen Li
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.03002 …

Game-Theoretic Modeling of Vehicle Unprotected Left Turns Considering Drivers' Bounded Rationality
Modeling the decision-making behavior of vehicles presents unique challenges, particularly during unprotected left turns at intersections, where the uncertainty of human drivers is especially pronounced. In this context, connected autonomous vehicle (CAV) technology emerges as a promising avenue for effectively managing such interactions while ensuring safety and efficiency. Traditional approaches, often grounded in game theory assumptions of perfect rationality, may inadequately capture the co…

Quantifying Bounded Rationality: Formal Verification of Simon's Satisficing Through Flexible Stochastic Dominance
Jingyuan Li, Zhou Lin
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.07052

Quantifying Bounded Rationality: Formal Verification of Simon's Satisficing Through Flexible Stochastic Dominance
This paper introduces Flexible First-Order Stochastic Dominance (FFSD), a mathematically rigorous framework that formalizes Herbert Simon's concept of bounded rationality using the Lean 4 theorem prover. We develop machine-verified proofs demonstrating that FFSD bridges classical expected utility theory with Simon's satisficing behavior through parameterized tolerance thresholds. Our approach yields several key results: (1) a critical threshold $\varepsilon < 1/2$ that guarantees uniqueness of …