Tootfinder

Replaced article(s) found for math.OC. https://arxiv.org/list/math.OC/new
[1/1]:
- DRAG: Distributed Resource Allocation Games over Multiple Interacting Coalitions
Jialing Zhou, Guanghui Wen, Yuezu Lv, Tao Yang, Guanrong Chen

$k$-Fair Coalitions in Graphs
Abbas Jafari, Saeid Alikhani
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.11358 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2509.11358…

$k$-Fair Coalitions in Graphs
Let $G = (V,E)$ be a simple graph. A subset $S \subseteq V$ is called a $k$-fair dominating set if every vertex not in $S$ has exactly $k$ neighbors in $S$. Two disjoint sets $A, B \subseteq V$ form a $k$-fair coalition of $G$ if neither $A$ nor $B$ is a $k$-fair dominating set and the union $A \cup B$ is a $k$-fair dominating set of $G$. A partition $π= \{V_1, V_2, \ldots, V_m\}$ of $V$ is called a $k$-fair coalition partition, if every set $V_i\inπ$, either $V_i$ is a $k$-fair dominating se…

[disclaimer: not a political scientist, just riffing here]
Plurality voting forces a two-party system. There will always be two parties (or if a third forms, the system will rapidly collapse back to two; this happened twice in US history).
The role of the two parties can change, however. Parties are coalitions, and coalitions are heterogeneous. There are lots of ways to draw lines through the myriad political interests to form two coalitions of roughly equal size. And those lines can shift.
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Online Multi-Robot Coordination and Cooperation with Task Precedence Relationships
Walker Gosrich, Saurav Agarwal, Kashish Garg, Siddharth Mayya, Matthew Malencia, Mark Yim, Vijay Kumar
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.15052

Online Multi-Robot Coordination and Cooperation with Task Precedence Relationships
We propose a new formulation for the multi-robot task allocation problem that incorporates (a) complex precedence relationships between tasks, (b) efficient intra-task coordination, and (c) cooperation through the formation of robot coalitions. A task graph specifies the tasks and their relationships, and a set of reward functions models the effects of coalition size and preceding task performance. Maximizing task rewards is NP-hard; hence, we propose network flow-based algorithms to approximat…

The fascist coalition was never going to hold. It couldn't. Fascists want everyone to be exactly the same. That's their whole thing. Leftists want diversity, so we can actually form coalitions. Fascists will always reach a point where they have to kill all the other fascists who aren't exactly like them.
Project 2025 betrayed this. It wasn't consistent. It was a jumble of different ideas that couldn't actually be implemented together. Someone gets left out. The Groypers haven't been getting what they want. Things have been moving too slowly for them. So now we get to see what happens. If they keep accelating, Trump could be forced to choose between cracking down on the far right (and destroying his coalition completely) or letting his people get killed. I hope that's a choice he has to make.
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While Rome burns, go build things that help people and get other people involved in it. The way we win is by not getting involved in that mess, but rather just clearly demonstrating that we can make things better.

Replaced article(s) found for cs.LO. https://arxiv.org/list/cs.LO/new
[1/1]:
- Semiframes: the algebra of semitopologies and actionable coalitions
Murdoch J. Gabbay

Pooling Probabilistic Forecasts for Cooperative Wind Power Offering
Honglin Wen, Pierre Pinson
https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.12382 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2510.…

Pooling Probabilistic Forecasts for Cooperative Wind Power Offering
Wind power producers can benefit from forming coalitions to participate cooperatively in electricity markets. To support such collaboration, various profit allocation rules rooted in cooperative game theory have been proposed. However, existing approaches overlook the lack of coherence among producers regarding forecast information, which may lead to ambiguity in offering and allocations. In this paper, we introduce a ``reconcile-then-optimize'' framework for cooperative market offerings. This …

The core in the housing market model with fractional endowments
Jingsheng Yu, Jun Zhang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.11151 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2508.11151…

The core in the housing market model with fractional endowments
We explore the core concept in a generalization of the housing market model where agents own fractional endowments while maintaining ordinal preferences. Recognizing that individuals are easier than coalitions to block an allocation, we adopt a definition in which individuals block an allocation if their received assignments do not first-order stochastically dominate their endowment, while a non-singleton coalition blocks an allocation if they can reallocate their endowments to obtain new assig…

Fostering cultural change in research through innovative knowledge sharing, evaluation, and community engagement strategies
Junsuk Rho, Jinn-Kong Sheu, Andrew Forbes, Din Ping Tsai, Andrea Al\'u, Wei Li, Mark Brongersma, Joonhee Choi, Javier Garcia de Abajo, Laura Na Liu, Alexander Szameit, Tracy Schloemer, Andreas Tittl, Mario Chemnitz, Cheng Wang, Jiejun Zhang, Yuri Kivshar, Tie Jun Cui, Ren-Min Ma, Cheng-Wei Qiu, Cuicui Lu, Yao-Wei Huang, Miguel Angel Solis Prosser, Ileana-Crist…

Fostering cultural change in research through innovative knowledge sharing, evaluation, and community engagement strategies
Scientific research needs a new system that appropriately values science and scientists. Key innovations, within institutions and funding agencies, are driving better assessment of research, with open knowledge and FAIR (findable, accessible, interoperable, and reusable) principles as central pillars. Furthermore, coalitions, agreements, and robust infrastructures have emerged to promote more accurate assessment metrics and efficient knowledge sharing. However, despite these efforts, the system…

Replaced article(s) found for math.GN. https://arxiv.org/list/math.GN/new
[1/1]:
- Semiframes: the algebra of semitopologies and actionable coalitions
Murdoch J. Gabbay

As for the podcasters themselves, who I’m quite sure are not having any kind of moral awakening here but rather are just sensing their market shifting from under them (again, rats sinking ship):
I’ll happily accept any genuine help taking down the fash — that is how coalitions work — and that doesn’t mean I’m trusting or forgiving anyone.

Scalable Sample-to-Population Estimation of Hyperbolic Space Models for Hypergraphs
Cornelius Fritz, Yubai Yuan, Michael Schweinberger
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.07031 https://

Scalable Sample-to-Population Estimation of Hyperbolic Space Models for Hypergraphs
Hypergraphs are useful mathematical representations of overlapping and nested subsets of interacting units, including groups of genes or brain regions, economic cartels, political or military coalitions, and groups of products that are purchased together. Despite the vast range of applications, the statistical analysis of hypergraphs is challenging: There are many hyperedges of small and large sizes, and hyperedges can overlap or be nested. We develop a novel statistical approach to hypergraphs…

An Overlapping Coalition Game Approach for Collaborative Block Mining and Edge Task Offloading in MEC-assisted Blockchain Networks
Licheng Ye, Zehui Xiong, Lin Gao, Dusit Niyato
https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.06031

An Overlapping Coalition Game Approach for Collaborative Block Mining and Edge Task Offloading in MEC-assisted Blockchain Networks
Mobile edge computing (MEC) is a promising technology that enhances the efficiency of mobile blockchain networks, by enabling miners, often acted by mobile users (MUs) with limited computing resources, to offload resource-intensive mining tasks to nearby edge computing servers. Collaborative block mining can further boost mining efficiency by allowing multiple miners to form coalitions, pooling their computing resources and transaction data together to mine new blocks collaboratively. Therefore…

A Note on Edge Coalitions in Graphs
Nazli Besharati, Azam Sadat Emadi, Iman Masoumi
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.19871 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.19871

A Note on Edge Coalitions in Graphs
Haynes et al. (2020) introduced and investigated the concept of coalition in graphs \cite{hhhmm1}. Their study examined this concept from a vertex-based perspective, whereas in this paper, we extend the investigation to an edge-based perspective of graphs. \\ An edge coalition in a graph $G=(V,E)$ consists of two disjoint sets of edges $E_1$ and $E_2$, neither of which individually forms an edge dominating set, but whose union $E_1\cup E_2$ is an edge dominating set. An edge coalition partition…

Feminist Coalitions that Erode the Patriarchy: New Realities for Old Problems
https://ift.tt/Z8eGMgE
updated: Thursday, July 24, 2025 - 2:24pmfull name / name of organization: Northeast Modern Language…
via Input 4 RELCFP