Tootfinder

Counterfactual Explanation of Shapley Value in Data Coalitions
Michelle Si, Jian Pei
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.01267 https://arxiv.o…

Counterfactual Explanation of Shapley Value in Data Coalitions
The Shapley value is widely used for data valuation in data markets. However, explaining the Shapley value of an owner in a data coalition is an unexplored and challenging task. To tackle this, we formulate the problem of finding the counterfactual explanation of Shapley value in data coalitions. Essentially, given two data owners $A$ and $B$ such that $A$ has a higher Shapley value than $B$, a counterfactual explanation is a smallest subset of data entries in $A$ such that transferring the sub…

[disclaimer: not a political scientist, just riffing here]
Plurality voting forces a two-party system. There will always be two parties (or if a third forms, the system will rapidly collapse back to two; this happened twice in US history).
The role of the two parties can change, however. Parties are coalitions, and coalitions are heterogeneous. There are lots of ways to draw lines through the myriad political interests to form two coalitions of roughly equal size. And those lines can shift.
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Enriching the Felsenthal index with a priori unions for decision-making processes
Alicia Mascare\~nas-Pazos, Silvia Lorenzo-Freire, Jose Maria Alonso-Meijide
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.01621

Enriching the Felsenthal index with a priori unions for decision-making processes
Within the domain of game theory, power indexes are defined as functions that quantify the influence of individual participants in collective decision-making processes. Felsenthal [D. Felsenthal. A Well-Behaved Index of a Priori P-Power for Simple N-Person Games. Homo Oeconomicus, 33, 2016] proposed a power index with a focus on least size winning coalitions, i.e., those coalitions capable of determining the final outcome and with the smallest number of players among all winning coalitions. How…

A Note on Edge Coalitions in Graphs
Nazli Besharati, Azam Sadat Emadi, Iman Masoumi
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.19871 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.19871

A Note on Edge Coalitions in Graphs
Haynes et al. (2020) introduced and investigated the concept of coalition in graphs \cite{hhhmm1}. Their study examined this concept from a vertex-based perspective, whereas in this paper, we extend the investigation to an edge-based perspective of graphs. \\ An edge coalition in a graph $G=(V,E)$ consists of two disjoint sets of edges $E_1$ and $E_2$, neither of which individually forms an edge dominating set, but whose union $E_1\cup E_2$ is an edge dominating set. An edge coalition partition…

“We know from history that authoritarian regimes aim to fracture coalitions and weaken solidarity among groups that, together, represent a formidable force.”
https://newsone.com/5732513/black-radical-project/

Protecting The Black Radical Project: A Call For Courage, Unity And Discipline In 2025
Black people must enforce a disciplined understanding within broader economic, cultural, social and political coalitions, writes Eric Ward.

Long Coalition Leads to Shrink? The Roles of Tipping and Technology-Sharing in Climate Clubs
Lei Zhu, Zhihao Yan, Hongbo Duan, Yongyang Cai, Xiaobing Zhang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.16162

Long Coalition Leads to Shrink? The Roles of Tipping and Technology-Sharing in Climate Clubs
Global cooperation is posited as a pivotal solution to address climate change, yet significant barriers, like free-riding, hinder its realization. This paper develops a dynamic game-theoretic model to analyze the stability of coalitions under multiple stochastic climate tippings, and a technology-sharing mechanism is designed in the model to combat free-ridings. Our results reveal that coalitions tend to shrink over time as temperatures rise, owing to potential free-ridings, despite a large siz…

Coalitions on the Fly in Cooperative Games
Yao Zhang, Indrajit Saha, Zhaohong Sun, Makoto Yokoo
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.11883 https://

Coalitions on the Fly in Cooperative Games
In this work, we examine a sequential setting of a cooperative game in which players arrive dynamically to form coalitions and complete tasks either together or individually, depending on the value created. Upon arrival, a new player as a decision maker faces two options: forming a new coalition or joining an existing one. We assume that players are greedy, i.e., they aim to maximize their rewards based on the information available at their arrival. The objective is to design an online value di…

Feminist Coalitions that Erode the Patriarchy: New Realities for Old Problems
https://ift.tt/Z8eGMgE
updated: Thursday, July 24, 2025 - 2:24pmfull name / name of organization: Northeast Modern Language…
via Input 4 RELCFP

On-The-Fly Symbolic Algorithm for Timed ATL with Abstractions
Nicolaj {\O}. Jensen, Kim G. Larsen, Didier Lime, Ji\v{r}\'i Srba
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.07802

On-The-Fly Symbolic Algorithm for Timed ATL with Abstractions
Verification of real-time systems with multiple components controlled by multiple parties is a challenging task due to its computational complexity. We present an on-the-fly algorithm for verifying timed alternating-time temporal logic (TATL), a branching-time logic with quantifiers over outcomes that results from coalitions of players in such systems. We combine existing work on games and timed CTL verification in the abstract dependency graph (ADG) framework, which allows for easy creation of…

Microgrids Coalitions for Energy Market Balancing
Viorica Chifu, Cristina Bianca Pop, Tudor Cioara, Ionut Anghel
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.06058 https://

Microgrids Coalitions for Energy Market Balancing
With the integration of renewable sources in electricity distribution networks, the need to develop intelligent mechanisms for balancing the energy market has arisen. In the absence of such mechanisms, the energy market may face imbalances that can lead to power outages, financial losses or instability at the grid level. In this context, the grouping of microgrids into optimal coalitions that can absorb energy from the market during periods of surplus or supply energy to the market during perio…

AI-Generated Compromises for Coalition Formation
Eyal Briman, Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.06837 https://ar…

AI-Generated Compromises for Coalition Formation
The challenge of finding compromises between agent proposals is fundamental to AI subfields such as argumentation, mediation, and negotiation. Building on this tradition, Elkind et al. (2021) introduced a process for coalition formation that seeks majority-supported proposals preferable to the status quo, using a metric space where each agent has an ideal point. A crucial step in this process involves identifying compromise proposals around which agent coalitions can unite. How to effectively f…

Attraction of the core and the cohesion flow
Dylan Laplace Mermoud
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.02918 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.02918

Attraction of the core and the cohesion flow
We adopt a continuous-time dynamical system approach to study the evolution of the state of a game driven by the willingness to reduce the total dissatisfaction of the coalitions about their payment. Inspired by the work of Grabisch and Sudhölter about core stability, we define a vector field on the set of preimputations from which is defined, for any preimputation, a cohesion curve describing the evolution of the state. We prove that for each preimputation, there exists a unique cohesion curv…

Minimal balanced collections and their applications to core stability and other topics of game theory
Dylan Laplace Mermoud, Michel Grabisch, Peter Sudh\"olter
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.05898

Minimal balanced collections and their applications to core stability and other topics of game theory
Minimal balanced collections are a generalization of partitions of a finite set of n elements and have important applications in cooperative game theory and discrete mathematics. However, their number is not known beyond n = 4. In this paper we investigate the problem of generating minimal balanced collections and implement the Peleg algorithm, permitting to generate all minimal balanced collections till n = 7. Secondly, we provide practical algorithms to check many properties of coalitions and…