Tootfinder

Cooperation and the Design of Public Goods
J. Carlos Mart\'inez Mori, Alejandro Toriello
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.05251 https://

Cooperation and the Design of Public Goods
We consider the cooperative elements that arise in the design of public goods, such as transportation policies and infrastructure. These involve a variety of stakeholders: governments, businesses, advocates, and users. Their eventual deployment depends on the decision maker's ability to garner sufficient support from each of these groups; we formalize these strategic requirements from the perspective of cooperative game theory. Specifically, we introduce non-transferable utility, linear product…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.13983 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csMA_…

Learning Two-agent Motion Planning Strategies from Generalized Nash Equilibrium for Model Predictive Control
We introduce an Implicit Game-Theoretic MPC (IGT-MPC), a decentralized algorithm for two-agent motion planning that uses a learned value function that predicts the game-theoretic interaction outcomes as the terminal cost-to-go function in a model predictive control (MPC) framework, guiding agents to implicitly account for interactions with other agents and maximize their reward. This approach applies to competitive and cooperative multi-agent motion planning problems which we formulate as const…

The algebraic structures of social organizations: the operad of cooperative games
Dylan Laplace Mermoud, Victor Roca i Lucio
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.01969

The algebraic structures of social organizations: the operad of cooperative games
The main goal of this paper is to settle a conceptual framework for cooperative game theory in which the notion of composition/aggregation of games is the defining structure. This is done via the mathematical theory of algebraic operads: we start by endowing the collection of all cooperative games with any number of players with an operad structure, and we show that it generalises all the previous notions of sums, products and compositions of games considered by Owen, Shapley, von Neumann and M…

Two-stage Stochastic Assignment Games
Laura Sanit\`a, Lucy Verberk
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.01509 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2506.01509

Two-stage Stochastic Assignment Games
In this paper, we study a two-stage stochastic version of the assignment game, which is a fundamental cooperative game. Given an initial setting, the set of players may change in the second stage according to some probability distribution, and the goal is to find core solutions that are minimally modified. When the probability distribution is given explicitly, we observe that the problem is polynomial time solvable, as it can be modeled as an LP. More interestingly, we prove that the underlyi…

Beyond Shapley Values: Cooperative Games for the Interpretation of Machine Learning Models
Marouane Il Idrissi, Agathe Fernandes Machado, Arthur Charpentier
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.13900

Beyond Shapley Values: Cooperative Games for the Interpretation of Machine Learning Models
Cooperative game theory has become a cornerstone of post-hoc interpretability in machine learning, largely through the use of Shapley values. Yet, despite their widespread adoption, Shapley-based methods often rest on axiomatic justifications whose relevance to feature attribution remains debatable. In this paper, we revisit cooperative game theory from an interpretability perspective and argue for a broader and more principled use of its tools. We highlight two general families of efficient al…

Decentralized Consensus Inference-based Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning for Multi-Constrained UAV Pursuit-Evasion Game
Xiang Yuming, Li Sizhao, Li Rongpeng, Zhao Zhifeng, Zhang Honggang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.18126

Decentralized Consensus Inference-based Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning for Multi-Constrained UAV Pursuit-Evasion Game
Multiple quadrotor unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems have garnered widespread research interest and fostered tremendous interesting applications, especially in multi-constrained pursuit-evasion games (MC-PEG). The Cooperative Evasion and Formation Coverage (CEFC) task, where the UAV swarm aims to maximize formation coverage across multiple target zones while collaboratively evading predators, belongs to one of the most challenging issues in MC-PEG, especially under communication-limited con…

Rational Miner Behaviour, Protocol Stability, and Time Preference: An Austrian and Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bitcoin's Incentive Environment
Craig Steven Wright
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.20965

Rational Miner Behaviour, Protocol Stability, and Time Preference: An Austrian and Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bitcoin's Incentive Environment
This paper integrates Austrian capital theory with repeated game theory to examine strategic miner behaviour under different institutional conditions in blockchain systems. It shows that when protocol rules are mutable, effective time preference rises, undermining rational long-term planning and cooperative equilibria. Using formal game-theoretic analysis and Austrian economic principles, the paper demonstrates how mutable protocols shift miner incentives from productive investment to political…

Phase transitions in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on the Barab\'asi-Albert graph with participation cost
Jacek Mi\c{e}kisz, Javad Mohamadichamgavi
https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.23370

Phase transitions in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on the Barabási-Albert graph with participation cost
We examine the impact of the maintenance cost of social links on cooperative behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on the Barabási-Albert scale-free network with a pairwise stochastic imitation. We show by means of Monte Carlo simulations and pair approximation that the cooperation frequency changes abruptly from an almost full cooperation to a much smaller value when we increase the cost of maintaining links. In the critical region, the stationary distribution is bi-modal and the system osc…

Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets
Hadi Hosseini, Grzegorz Lisowski, Shraddha Pathak
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.00554 https://

Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is an elegant procedure for finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. It ensures that no pair of agents prefers each other to their matched partners. In this work, we initiate the study of two-sided manipulations in matching markets as non-cooperative games. We introduce the accomplice manipulation game, where a man misreports to help a specific woman obtain a better partner, whenever possible. We provide a polynomial time algorithm for find…

Two-Person Cooperative Games with delta-Rationality
Fang-Fang Tang, Yongsheng Xu
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.16465 https://arxiv.org/p…

Two-Person Cooperative Games with delta-Rationality
A player's payoff is modeled as consisting of two parts: a rational-value part and a distortion-value part. It is argued that the (total) payoff function should be used to explain and predict the behaviors of the players, while the rational value function should be used to conduct welfare analysis of the final outcome. We use the Nash demand game to illustrate our model.

Perceptual Rationality: An Evolutionary Game Theory of Perceptually Rational Decision-Making
Mohammad Salahshour
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.17724 https://

Perceptual Rationality: An Evolutionary Game Theory of Perceptually Rational Decision-Making
Understanding how biological organisms make decisions is of fundamental importance in understanding behavior. Such an understanding within evolutionary game theory so far has been sought by appealing to bounded rationality. Here, we present a perceptual rationality framework in the context of group cooperative interactions, where individuals make rational decisions based on their evolvable perception of the environment. We show that a simple public goods game accounts for power law distributed …

Institutional Noise, Strategic Deviation, and Intertemporal Collapse: A Formal Model of Miner Behaviour under Protocol Uncertainty
Craig Steven Wright
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.20992

Institutional Noise, Strategic Deviation, and Intertemporal Collapse: A Formal Model of Miner Behaviour under Protocol Uncertainty
This paper develops a formal game-theoretic model to examine how protocol mutability disrupts cooperative mining behaviour in blockchain systems. Using a repeated game framework with stochastic rule shocks, we show that even minor uncertainty in institutional rules increases time preference and induces strategic deviation. Fixed-rule environments support long-term investment and stable equilibrium strategies; in contrast, mutable protocols lead to short-termism, higher discounting, and collapse…

Learning Recommender Mechanisms for Bayesian Stochastic Games
Bengisu Guresti, Chongjie Zhang, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.22979 https:…

Learning Recommender Mechanisms for Bayesian Stochastic Games
An important challenge in non-cooperative game theory is coordinating on a single (approximate) equilibrium from many possibilities - a challenge that becomes even more complex when players hold private information. Recommender mechanisms tackle this problem by recommending strategies to players based on their reported type profiles. A key consideration in such mechanisms is to ensure that players are incentivized to participate, report their private information truthfully, and follow the recom…

Solving Nash Equilibria in Nonlinear Differential Games for Common-Pool Resources
Yongyang Cai, Anastasios Xepapadeas, Aart de Zeeuw
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.06646

Solving Nash Equilibria in Nonlinear Differential Games for Common-Pool Resources
Many resources are provided by an ecological system that is vulnerable to tipping when exceeding a certain level of pollution, with a sudden big loss of ecosystem services. An ecological system is usually also a common-pool resource and therefore vulnerable to suboptimal use resulting from non-cooperative behavior. An analysis requires methods to derive cooperative and non-cooperative solutions for managing a dynamical system with tipping points. Such a game is a differential game which has two…

Replaced article(s) found for cs.MA. https://arxiv.org/list/cs.MA/new
[1/1]:
Robust Cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning:A Mean-Field Type Game Perspective