The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators
Kevin Vallier
https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.07901 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.07901 https://arxiv.org/html/2512.07901
arXiv:2512.07901v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: This paper develops the Theory of Strategic Evolution, a general model for systems in which the population of players, strategies, and institutional rules evolve together. The theory extends replicator dynamics to settings with endogenous players, multi level selection, innovation, constitutional change, and meta governance. The central mathematical object is a Poiesis stack: a hierarchy of strategic layers linked by cross level gain matrices. Under small gain conditions, the system admits a global Lyapunov function and satisfies selection, tracking, and stochastic stability results at every finite depth. We prove that the class is closed under block extension, innovation events, heterogeneous utilities, continuous strategy spaces, and constitutional evolution. The closure theorem shows that no new dynamics arise at higher levels and that unrestricted self modification cannot preserve Lyapunov structure. The theory unifies results from evolutionary game theory, institutional design, innovation dynamics, and constitutional political economy, providing a general mathematical model of long run strategic adaptation.
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Replaced article(s) found for cs.GT. https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new
[1/1]:
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https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.06326
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https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.05747 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csGT_bot/113627246220336424
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Sam Ganzfried
https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.20859 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csGT_bot/115620508246637361
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https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.01112 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csGT_bot/115649040881525135
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https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.18149 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csPF_bot/111322112226936579
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Clayton Thomas
https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.02142 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_econTH_bot/112205968984928881
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Zixuan Chen, Fengkui Ju
https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.05466 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csLO_bot/113819715349259373
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https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.04478 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csAI_bot/114635186215388479
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On Dynamic Programming Theory for Leader-Follower Stochastic Games
Jilles Steeve Dibangoye, Thibaut Le Marre, Ocan Sankur, Fran\c{c}ois Schwarzentruber
https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.05667 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.05667 https://arxiv.org/html/2512.05667
arXiv:2512.05667v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Leader-follower general-sum stochastic games (LF-GSSGs) model sequential decision-making under asymmetric commitment, where a leader commits to a policy and a follower best responds, yielding a strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) with leader-favourable tie-breaking. This paper introduces a dynamic programming (DP) framework that applies Bellman recursion over credible sets-state abstractions formally representing all rational follower best responses under partial leader commitments-to compute SSEs. We first prove that any LF-GSSG admits a lossless reduction to a Markov decision process (MDP) over credible sets. We further establish that synthesising an optimal memoryless deterministic leader policy is NP-hard, motivating the development of {\epsilon}-optimal DP algorithms with provable guarantees on leader exploitability. Experiments on standard mixed-motive benchmarks-including security games, resource allocation, and adversarial planning-demonstrate empirical gains in leader value and runtime scalability over state-of-the-art methods.
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Crosslisted article(s) found for cs.GT. https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new
[1/1]:
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https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.05998
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https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.06791 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csLG_bot/115689591150148735
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https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.07219 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csMA_bot/115688571373683355
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Kemal Ozbek
https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.07798 https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_econTH_bot/115688939067758036
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Crosslisted article(s) found for cs.GT. https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new
[1/1]:
- GRPO-GCC: Enhancing Cooperation in Spatial Public Goods Games via Group Relative Policy Optimizat...
Zhaoqilin Yang, Chanchan Li, Tianqi Liu, Hongxin Zhao, Youliang Tian