Tootfinder

Forecasting Public Sentiments via Mean Field Games
Michael V. Klibanov, Kevin McGoff, Trung Truong
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.08465 https://

Forecasting Public Sentiments via Mean Field Games
A mathematical model for forecasting of public sentiments via the Mean Field Games theory is proposed. A numerical method is developed. This is a version of the so-called convexification method. Convergence analysis demonstrates the global convergence of this method. Convergence rate is established. Numerical experiments demonstrate both an accurate performance of the convexification technique and some promising features of this approach.

The algebraic structures of social organizations: the operad of cooperative games
Dylan Laplace Mermoud, Victor Roca i Lucio
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.01969

The algebraic structures of social organizations: the operad of cooperative games
The main goal of this paper is to settle a conceptual framework for cooperative game theory in which the notion of composition/aggregation of games is the defining structure. This is done via the mathematical theory of algebraic operads: we start by endowing the collection of all cooperative games with any number of players with an operad structure, and we show that it generalises all the previous notions of sums, products and compositions of games considered by Owen, Shapley, von Neumann and M…

A number game reconciliation
Prem Kant, Urban Larsson
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.04717 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.04717

A number game reconciliation
Number games play a central role in alternating normal play combinatorial game theory due to their real-number-like properties (Conway 1976). Here we undertake a critical re-examination: we begin with integer and dyadic games and identify subtle inconsistencies and oversights in the established literature (e.g. Siegel 2013), most notably, the lack of distinction between a game being a number and a game being equal to a number. After addressing this, we move to the general theory of number games…

Replaced article(s) found for cs.FL. https://arxiv.org/list/cs.FL/new
[1/1]:
- The Complexity of Pure Strategy Relevant Equilibria in Concurrent Games
Purandar Bhaduri

Cat Royale: An Artistic Inquiry into Trust in Robots
Matt Adams, Nick Tandavanitj, Steve Benford, Ayse Kucukyilmaz, Victor Ngo, Simon Castle-Green, Guido Salimberi, Pepita Bernard, Joel Fischer, Alan Chamberlain, Eike Schneiders, Clara Mancini
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.04970

Cat Royale: An Artistic Inquiry into Trust in Robots
Cat Royale is an artwork created by the artists Blast Theory to explore the question of whether we should trust robots to care for our loved ones. The artists endeavoured to create a `Cat Utopia', a luxurious environment that was inhabited by a family of three cats for six hours a day for twelve days, at the centre of which a robot arm played with them by wielding toys. Behind the scenes, the decision engine recommended games based on ongoing assessment of their happiness. A video installation …

Operator-Theoretic Methods for Differential Games
Craig Bakker, Adam T. Rupe, Alexander Von Moll, Adam R. Gerlach
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.02203 https://…

Operator-Theoretic Methods for Differential Games
Differential game theory offers an approach for modeling interactions between two or more agents that occur in continuous time. The goal of each agent is to optimize its objective cost functional. In this paper, we present two different methods, based on the Koopman Operator (KO), to solve a zero-sum differential game. The first approach uses the resolvent of the KO to calculate a continuous-time global feedback solution over the entire domain. The second approach uses a discrete-time, data-dri…

Replaced article(s) found for cs.GT. https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new
[1/1]:
- The Power of Regularization in Solving Extensive-Form Games
Mingyang Liu, Asuman Ozdaglar, Tiancheng Yu, Kaiqing Zhang

Deception in Oligopoly Games via Adaptive Nash Seeking Systems
Michael Tang, Miroslav Krstic, Jorge Poveda
https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.24112 https://…

Deception in Oligopoly Games via Adaptive Nash Seeking Systems
In the theory of multi-agent systems, deception refers to the strategic manipulation of information to influence the behavior of other agents, ultimately altering the long-term dynamics of the entire system. Recently, this concept has been examined in the context of model-free Nash equilibrium seeking (NES) algorithms for noncooperative games. Specifically, it was demonstrated that players can exploit knowledge of other players' exploration signals to drive the system toward a ``deceptive" Nash…

@…
Are you interested in chess openings or chess puzzles?
I use to open with King's Pawn Game in regular games but there are many other openings.
Do you know about the Philidor Defense?(played as black)

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.24171 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_eco…

A note on the diversity Owen values
Béal et al. (Int J Game Theory 54, 2025) introduce the Diversity Owen value for TU-games with diversity constraints, and provide axiomatic characterizations using the axioms of fairness and balanced contributions. However, there exist logical flaws in the proofs of the uniqueness of these characterizations. In this note we provides the corrected proofs of the characterizations by introducing the null player for diversity games axiom. Also, we establish two alternative characterizations of the …

Properties of zero-determinant strategies in multichannel games
Masahiko Ueda
https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.21952 https://arxiv.org/pdf/…

Properties of zero-determinant strategies in multichannel games
Controlling payoffs in repeated games is one of the important topics in control theory of multi-agent systems. Recently proposed zero-determinant strategies enable players to unilaterally enforce linear relations between payoffs. Furthermore, based on the mathematics of zero-determinant strategies, regional payoff control, in which payoffs are enforced into some feasible regions, has been discovered in social dilemma situations. More recently, theory of payoff control was extended to multichann…

Solving Mean-Field Games with Monotonicity Methods in Banach Spaces?
Rita Ferreira, Diogo Gomes, Melih Ucer
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.21212 https://

Solving Mean-Field Games with Monotonicity Methods in Banach Spaces?
This paper develops a unified framework for proving the existence of solutions to stationary first-order mean-field games (MFGs) based on the theory of monotone operators in Banach spaces. We cast the coupled MFG system as a variational inequality, overcoming the limitations of prior Hilbert-space approaches that relied on high-order regularization and typically yielded only weak solutions in the monotone operator sense. In contrast, with our low-order regularization, we obtain strong solutions…

Beyond Shapley Values: Cooperative Games for the Interpretation of Machine Learning Models
Marouane Il Idrissi, Agathe Fernandes Machado, Arthur Charpentier
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.13900

Beyond Shapley Values: Cooperative Games for the Interpretation of Machine Learning Models
Cooperative game theory has become a cornerstone of post-hoc interpretability in machine learning, largely through the use of Shapley values. Yet, despite their widespread adoption, Shapley-based methods often rest on axiomatic justifications whose relevance to feature attribution remains debatable. In this paper, we revisit cooperative game theory from an interpretability perspective and argue for a broader and more principled use of its tools. We highlight two general families of efficient al…

The Complexity of Correlated Equilibria in Generalized Games
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Gabriele Farina
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.01899

The Complexity of Correlated Equilibria in Generalized Games
Correlated equilibria -- and their generalization $Φ$-equilibria -- are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of equilibrium computation are well-understood in some settings, fundamental questions are still open in generalized games, that is, games in which the set of strategies allowed to each player depends on the other players' strategies. These classes of games model funda…

Replaced article(s) found for cs.GT. https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new
[1/1]:
- The Complexity of Pure Strategy Relevant Equilibria in Concurrent Games
Purandar Bhaduri

Replaced article(s) found for cs.FL. https://arxiv.org/list/cs.FL/new
[1/1]:
- Computing Threshold Budgets in Discrete-Bidding Games
Guy Avni, Suman Sadhukhan

Evolution of boundedly rational learning in games
Marta C. Couto, Fernando P. Santos, Christian Hilbe
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.21498 https://

Evolution of boundedly rational learning in games
People make strategic decisions multiple times a day. We act strategically in negotiations, when we coordinate our actions with others, or when we choose with whom to cooperate. The resulting dynamics can be studied with evolutionary game theory. This framework explores how people adapt their decisions over time, in light of how effective their strategies have proven to be. A crucial quantity in respective models is the strength of selection. This quantity regulates how likely individuals switc…

From Average-Iterate to Last-Iterate Convergence in Games: A Reduction and Its Applications
Yang Cai, Haipeng Luo, Chen-Yu Wei, Weiqiang Zheng
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.03464

From Average-Iterate to Last-Iterate Convergence in Games: A Reduction and Its Applications
The convergence of online learning algorithms in games under self-play is a fundamental question in game theory and machine learning. Among various notions of convergence, last-iterate convergence is particularly desirable, as it reflects the actual decisions made by the learners and captures the day-to-day behavior of the learning dynamics. While many algorithms are known to converge in the average-iterate, achieving last-iterate convergence typically requires considerably more effort in both …

Defining the Game Producer: A Mapping of Key Characteristics and Differentiators of the Professional Behind Digital Game Production
Rafael C. Lopes, Danilo M. Ribeiro
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.14409

Defining the Game Producer: A Mapping of Key Characteristics and Differentiators of the Professional Behind Digital Game Production
Introduction: As digital games grow in complexity, the role of the Game Producer becomes increasingly relevant for aligning creative, technical, and business dimensions. Objective: This study aimed to identify and map the main characteristics, skills, and competencies that define the Digital Game Producer profile. Methodology: A qualitative investigation was conducted with 11 semi-structured interviews, analyzed through Grounded Theory to build categories grounded in professional practice. Resu…

A note on the diversity Owen values
Songtao He, Erfang Shan, Xinyu Sun
https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.24171 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.24…

A note on the diversity Owen values
Béal et al. (Int J Game Theory 54, 2025) introduce the Diversity Owen value for TU-games with diversity constraints, and provide axiomatic characterizations using the axioms of fairness and balanced contributions. However, there exist logical flaws in the proofs of the uniqueness of these characterizations. In this note we provides the corrected proofs of the characterizations by introducing the null player for diversity games axiom. Also, we establish two alternative characterizations of the …

Replaced article(s) found for cs.GT. https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new
[1/1]:
- Evolutionarily Stable Preferences Against Multiple Mutations in Multi-player Games
Yu-Sung Tu, Wei-Torng Juang

A "trembling hand perfect" equilibrium for a certain class of mean field games
P. Jameson Graber
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.11868 https://…

A "trembling hand perfect" equilibrium for a certain class of mean field games
We study a particular class of mean field games whose solutions can be formally connected to a scalar transport equation on the Wasserstein space of measures. For this class, we construct some interesting explicit examples of non-uniqueness of Nash equilibria. We then address the selection problem of finding rational criteria by which to choose one equilibrium over others. We show that when the theory of entropy solutions is used, we can obtain explicit error estimates for the ``vanishing noise…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.14547 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csGT_…

GUARD: Constructing Realistic Two-Player Matrix and Security Games for Benchmarking Game-Theoretic Algorithms
Game-theoretic algorithms are commonly benchmarked on recreational games, classical constructs from economic theory such as congestion and dispersion games, or entirely random game instances. While the past two decades have seen the rise of security games -- grounded in real-world scenarios like patrolling and infrastructure protection -- their practical evaluation has been hindered by limited access to the datasets used to generate them. In particular, although the structural components of the…

Enriching the Felsenthal index with a priori unions for decision-making processes
Alicia Mascare\~nas-Pazos, Silvia Lorenzo-Freire, Jose Maria Alonso-Meijide
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.01621

Enriching the Felsenthal index with a priori unions for decision-making processes
Within the domain of game theory, power indexes are defined as functions that quantify the influence of individual participants in collective decision-making processes. Felsenthal [D. Felsenthal. A Well-Behaved Index of a Priori P-Power for Simple N-Person Games. Homo Oeconomicus, 33, 2016] proposed a power index with a focus on least size winning coalitions, i.e., those coalitions capable of determining the final outcome and with the smallest number of players among all winning coalitions. How…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.07975 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csGT_…

Sink equilibria and the attractors of learning in games
Characterizing the limit behavior -- that is, the attractors -- of learning dynamics is one of the most fundamental open questions in game theory. In recent work in this front, it was conjectured that the attractors of the replicator dynamic are in one-to-one correspondence with the sink equilibria of the game -- the sink strongly connected components of a game's preference graph -- , and it was established that they do stand in at least one-to-many correspondence with them. We make threefold p…

Learning Recommender Mechanisms for Bayesian Stochastic Games
Bengisu Guresti, Chongjie Zhang, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.22979 https:…

Learning Recommender Mechanisms for Bayesian Stochastic Games
An important challenge in non-cooperative game theory is coordinating on a single (approximate) equilibrium from many possibilities - a challenge that becomes even more complex when players hold private information. Recommender mechanisms tackle this problem by recommending strategies to players based on their reported type profiles. A key consideration in such mechanisms is to ensure that players are incentivized to participate, report their private information truthfully, and follow the recom…

Replaced article(s) found for econ.TH. https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new
[1/1]:
- Competing Mechanisms in Games Played Through Agents: Theory and Experiment
Seungjin Han, Andrew Leal

Replaced article(s) found for cs.GT. https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new
[1/1]:
- Bayes correlated equilibria, no-regret dynamics in Bayesian games, and the price of anarchy
Kaito Fujii

Reasoning about Bounded Reasoning
Shuige Liu, Gabriel Ziegler
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.19737 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2506.19737

Reasoning about Bounded Reasoning
Interactive decision-making relies on strategic reasoning. Two prominent frameworks are (1) models of bounded reasoning, exemplified by level-$k$ models, which keep reasoning implicit, and (2) epistemic game theory, which makes reasoning explicit. We connect these approaches by "lifting" static complete-information games into incomplete-information settings where payoff types reflect players' reasoning depths as in level-$k$ models. We introduce downward rationalizability, defined via minimal b…