Tootfinder

An Implementation Relaxation Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
Hang Jiang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.14766 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2509.14766

An Implementation Relaxation Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
The first-order approach (FOA) is the standard tool for solving principal-agent problems, replacing the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint with its first-order condition to obtain a relaxed problem. We show that FOA is not a valid relaxation when the support of the outcome distribution shifts with the agent's effort, as in well-studied additive-noise models. In such cases, the optimal effort may occur at a kink point that the first-order condition cannot capture, causing FOA to miss optima…

Voltage Support Procurement in Transmission Grids: Incentive Design via Online Bilevel Games
Zhisen Jiang, Saverio Bolognani, Giuseppe Belgioioso
https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.05378

Voltage Support Procurement in Transmission Grids: Incentive Design via Online Bilevel Games
The integration of distributed energy resources into transmission grid operations presents a complex challenge, particularly in the context of reactive power procurement for voltage support. This paper addresses this challenge by formulating the voltage regulation problem as a Stackelberg game, where the Transmission System Operator (TSO) designs incentives to guide the reactive power responses of Distribution System Operators (DSOs). We utilize a gradient-based iterative algorithm that updates…

A Soft Inducement Framework for Incentive-Aided Steering of No-Regret Players
Asrin Efe Yorulmaz, Raj Kiriti Velicheti, Melih Bastopcu, Tamer Ba\c{s}ar
https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.21672

A Soft Inducement Framework for Incentive-Aided Steering of No-Regret Players
In this work, we investigate a steering problem in a mediator-augmented two-player normal-form game, where the mediator aims to guide players toward a specific action profile through information and incentive design. We first characterize the games for which successful steering is possible. Moreover, we establish that steering players to any desired action profile is not always achievable with information design alone, nor when accompanied with sublinear payment schemes. Consequently, we derive…

Chameleon Channels: Measuring YouTube Accounts Repurposed for Deception and Profit
Alejandro Cuevas, Manoel Horta Ribeiro, Nicolas Christin
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.16045

Chameleon Channels: Measuring YouTube Accounts Repurposed for Deception and Profit
Online content creators spend significant time and effort building their user base through a long, often arduous process, which requires finding the right ``niche'' to cater to. So, what incentive is there for an established content creator known for cat memes to completely reinvent their page channel and start promoting cryptocurrency services or cover electoral news events? And, if they do, do their existing subscribers not notice? We explore this problem of \textit{repurposed channels}, wher…

Resolving CAP Through Automata-Theoretic Economic Design: A Unified Mathematical Framework for Real-Time Partition-Tolerant Systems
Craig S Wright
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.02464

Resolving CAP Through Automata-Theoretic Economic Design: A Unified Mathematical Framework for Real-Time Partition-Tolerant Systems
The CAP theorem asserts a trilemma between consistency, availability, and partition tolerance. This paper introduces a rigorous automata-theoretic and economically grounded framework that reframes the CAP trade-off as a constraint optimization problem. We model distributed systems as partition-aware state machines and embed economic incentive layers to stabilize consensus behavior across adversarially partitioned networks. By incorporating game-theoretic mechanisms into the global transition se…