Tootfinder

Clustering and emergent hyperuniformity by breaking microswimmer shape and actuation symmetries
Anson G. Thambi, William E. Uspal
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.12293

Clustering and emergent hyperuniformity by breaking microswimmer shape and actuation symmetries
Hydrodynamic interactions driven by particle activity are ubiquitous in active colloidal systems. Although these interactions are strongly influenced by the interfacial actuation mechanism and geometry of the swimming particles, theoretical understanding of how these microscopic design parameters govern collective dynamics remains limited. Here, we investigate the collective dynamics of oblate spheroidal microswimmers. Using an approximate kinetic theory and corroborating boundary element metho…

Equitable Mechanism Design for Facility Location
Toby Walsh
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.10460 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2506.10460

Equitable Mechanism Design for Facility Location
We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both d…

Replaced article(s) found for econ.TH. https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new
[1/1]:
Auctions with Tokens: Monetary Policy as a Mechanism Design Choice

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.13762 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csRO_…

From Structural Design to Dynamics Modeling: Control-Oriented Development of a 3-RRR Parallel Ankle Rehabilitation Robot
This paper presents the development of a wearable ankle rehabilitation robot based on a 3-RRR spherical parallel mechanism (SPM) to support multi-DOF recovery through pitch, roll, and yaw motions. The system features a compact, ergonomic structure designed for comfort, safety, and compatibility with ankle biomechanics. A complete design-to-dynamics pipeline has been implemented, including structural design, kinematic modeling for motion planning, and Lagrangian-based dynamic modeling for torque…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.04665 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csGT_…

An O(log log n)-approximate budget feasible mechanism for subadditive valuations
In budget-feasible mechanism design, there is a set of items $U$, each owned by a distinct seller. The seller of item $e$ incurs a private cost $\overline{c}_e$ for supplying her item. A buyer wishes to procure a set of items from the sellers of maximum value, where the value of a set $S\subseteq U$ of items is given by a valuation function $v:2^U\to \mathbb{R}_+$. The buyer has a budget of $B \in \mathbb{R}_+$ for the total payments made to the sellers. We wish to design a mechanism that is tr…

Distributionally Robust Auction Design with Deferred Inspection
Halil I. Bayrak, Martin Bichler
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.04767 https://

Distributionally Robust Auction Design with Deferred Inspection
Mechanism design with inspection has received increasing attention due to its applications in the field. For example, large warehouses have started to auction scarce capacity. This capacity shall be allocated in a way that maximizes the seller's revenue. In such mechanism design problems, the seller can inspect the true value of a buyer and his realized sales in the next period without cost. Prior work on mechanism design with deferred inspection is based on the assumption of a common prior dis…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.11295 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csCR_…

BRC20 Pinning Attack
BRC20 tokens are a type of non-fungible asset on the Bitcoin network. They allow users to embed customised content within Bitcoin's satoshis. The token frenzy reached a market size of US\$2.811\,b (2023Q3--2025Q1). However, this intuitive design has not undergone serious security scrutiny. We present the first analysis of BRC20's \emph{transfer} mechanism and identify a new attack vector. A typical BRC20 transfer involves two "bundled" on-chain transactions with different fee levels: the firs…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.06208 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_ees…

Event-triggered moving horizon estimation for nonlinear systems
This work proposes an event-triggered moving horizon estimation (ET-MHE) scheme for general nonlinear systems. The key components of the proposed scheme are a novel event-triggering mechanism (ETM) and the suitable design of the MHE cost function. The main characteristic of our method is that the MHE's nonlinear optimization problem is only solved when the ETM triggers the transmission of measured data to the remote state estimator. If no event occurs, then the current state estimate results fr…

An O(log log n)-approximate budget feasible mechanism for subadditive valuations
Rian Neogi, Kanstantsin Pashkovich, Chaitanya Swamy
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.04665

An O(log log n)-approximate budget feasible mechanism for subadditive valuations
In budget-feasible mechanism design, there is a set of items $U$, each owned by a distinct seller. The seller of item $e$ incurs a private cost $\overline{c}_e$ for supplying her item. A buyer wishes to procure a set of items from the sellers of maximum value, where the value of a set $S\subseteq U$ of items is given by a valuation function $v:2^U\to \mathbb{R}_+$. The buyer has a budget of $B \in \mathbb{R}_+$ for the total payments made to the sellers. We wish to design a mechanism that is tr…

A Transformer-Based Neural Network for Optimal Deterministic-Allocation and Anonymous Joint Auction Design
Zhen Zhang, Luowen Liu, Wanzhi Zhang, Zitian Guo, Kun Huang, Qi Qi, Qiang Liu, Xingxing Wang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.02435

A Transformer-Based Neural Network for Optimal Deterministic-Allocation and Anonymous Joint Auction Design
With the advancement of machine learning, an increasing number of studies are employing automated mechanism design (AMD) methods for optimal auction design. However, all previous AMD architectures designed to generate optimal mechanisms that satisfy near dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) fail to achieve deterministic allocation, and some also lack anonymity, thereby impacting the efficiency and fairness of advertising allocation. This has resulted in a notable discrepancy between…

Innovative DC-coupled Resistive Silicon Detector for 4D tracking
R. Arcidiacono, G. Bardelli, M. Bartolini, M. Boscardin, N. Cartiglia, A. Cassese, M. Centis Vignali, T. Croci, M. Ferrero, A. Fondacci, O. Hammad Ali, M. Lizzo, L. Menzio, A. Morozzi, F. Moscatelli, D. Passeri, G. Paternoster, G. Sguazzoni, F. Siviero, V. Sola, L. Viliani
https://

Innovative DC-coupled Resistive Silicon Detector for 4D tracking
In the past 10 years, two design innovations, the introduction of low internal gain (LGAD) and of resistive read-out (RSD), have radically changed the performance of silicon detectors. The LGAD mechanism, increasing the signal-to-noise ratio by about a factor of 20, leads to improved time resolution (typically 30 ps for a 50-$μ$m thick sensor), while resistive read-out, sharing the collected charge among read-out electrodes, leads to excellent spatial resolution even using large pixels (about …

Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions
Georgios Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis, Christodoulos Santorinaios, Guido Sch\"afer, Panagiotis Tsamopoulos, Artem Tsikiridis
https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.24624

Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions
Augmenting the input of algorithms with predictions is an algorithm design paradigm that suggests leveraging a (possibly erroneous) prediction to improve worst-case performance guarantees when the prediction is perfect (consistency), while also providing a performance guarantee when the prediction fails (robustness). Recently, Xu and Lu [2022] and Agrawal et al. [2024] proposed to consider settings with strategic agents under this framework. In this paper, we initiate the study of budget-feasib…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.02660 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_eco…

Matching with Generalized Sequential Reserves
This paper introduces a general theory of sequential reserves by formulating a parameterized family of generalized sequential (GS) choice rules for institutions consisting of multiple divisions (or reserve categories). We show that the cumulative offer mechanism (COM) is the unique stable and strategy-proof mechanism when institutions' choice rules are in the GS family. Choice rules in real-life market design applications appear naturally in the GS family. We present two such real-world applica…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.07385 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csGT_…

Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents
Budget-feasible procurement has been a major paradigm in mechanism design since its introduction by Singer (2010). An auctioneer (buyer) with a strict budget constraint is interested in buying goods or services from a group of strategic agents (sellers). In many scenarios it makes sense to allow the auctioneer to only partially buy what an agent offers, e.g., an agent might have multiple copies of an item to sell, they might offer multiple levels of a service, or they may be available to perfor…

Optimal Auction Design for Dynamic Stochastic Environments: Myerson Meets Naor
Yeon-Koo Che, Andrew B. Choi
https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.22862 https://

Optimal Auction Design for Dynamic Stochastic Environments: Myerson Meets Naor
Allocation of goods and services often involves both stochastic supply and stochastic demand. Motivated by applications such as cloud computing, gig platforms, and blockchain auctions, we study the design of optimal selling mechanisms in an environment where buyers with private valuations arrive stochastically and are assigned goods that also arrive stochastically, and either buyers or goods can be held in a queue at costs until allocation. The optimal mechanism dynamically leverages competitiv…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.11154 has been replaced.
link: https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=a

An Isotonic Mechanism for Overlapping Ownership
Motivated by the problem of improving peer review at large scientific conferences, this paper studies how to elicit self-evaluations to improve review scores in a natural many-to-many owner-item (e.g., author-paper) situation with overlapping ownership. We design a simple, efficient and truthful mechanism to elicit self-evaluations from item owners that can be used to calibrate their noisy review scores in the existing evaluation process (e.g., papers' review scores from peers). Our approach …

Designing DSIC Mechanisms for Data Sharing in the Era of Large Language Models
Seyed Moein Ayyoubzadeh, Kourosh Shahnazari, Mohammmadali Keshtparvar, MohammadAmin Fazli
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.05379

Designing DSIC Mechanisms for Data Sharing in the Era of Large Language Models
Training large language models (LLMs) requires vast amounts of high-quality data from institutions that face legal, privacy, and strategic constraints. Existing data procurement methods often rely on unverifiable trust or ignore heterogeneous provider costs. We introduce a mechanism-design framework for truthful, trust-minimized data sharing that ensures dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC), individual rationality, and weak budget balance, while rewarding data based on both quality …

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.22862 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_eco…

Optimal Auction Design for Dynamic Stochastic Environments: Myerson Meets Naor
Allocation of goods and services often involves both stochastic supply and stochastic demand. Motivated by applications such as cloud computing, gig platforms, and blockchain auctions, we study the design of optimal selling mechanisms in an environment where buyers with private valuations arrive stochastically and are assigned goods that also arrive stochastically, and either buyers or goods can be held in a queue at costs until allocation. The optimal mechanism dynamically leverages competitiv…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.14485 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csGT_…

On Sybil-proof Mechanisms
We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only non-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and Sybil-proof direct mechanism is a second price auction with symmetric tie-breaking. Thus, if there is private information, lotteries or other mechanisms that do not always allocate to a highest-value bidder are not Sybil-proof or not incentive compatible. Moreover, we show that our main (im)possibility result extends beyond linear valuations, but not to multi-unit object…