Bus cap proposal ‘throws global south countries under the bus’, says ActionAid UK director.
Funding bus fare cap from aid budget will hit world’s poorest, Burnham told | Transport policy | The Guardian
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2026/
Just sent the files of a voice over performance for one of @rorschachdc@threads.net’s KLEX ED intensive short plays.
It was fun! I’m excited to hear how the production uses it.
#voiceover #voice #acting
Beihilfe zum Angriffskrieg https://www.german-foreign-policy.com/news/detail/10492
MerchantSpring Marketplace Masters
going deeper into the challenges brands and agencies face to lift performance via practical actions and insights...
Great Australian Pods Podcast Directory: https://www.greataustralianpods.com/marketplace-masters/
Acting Navy secretary: Taiwan weapons sales paused to ensure munitions for Iran war (Ellen Mitchell/The Hill)
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5890471-us-arms-sales-taiwan-paused-iran/
http://www.memeorandum.com/260521/p145#a260521p145
MIT’s loss is emblematic of the shrinking of American science caused by Trump administration actions that are affecting labs across the country.
Federally funded research on MIT’s campus is down more than 20 percent compared to this time last year.
https://www.
Information can be useful even if it isn’t news.
https://bsky.app/profile/did:plc:zdduilknsuqlql34lkbf5ge5/post/3mmdu7fdgzc2v
Toward cryptographically verifiable authorization for autonomous AI agents: A security hypothesis, preliminary formal model, and proof-of-concept implementation
M. Llamb\'i-Morillas, D. Fern\'andez-Fern\'andez
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.21325 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.21325 https://arxiv.org/html/2607.21325
arXiv:2607.21325v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Autonomous AI agents increasingly execute actions, invoke tools, and operate on protected resources with limited human oversight. Existing authentication and authorization mechanisms establish identity and delegate authority, but do not inherently provide cryptographic evidence that a concrete request issued by a specific agent satisfies the applicable policy in a specific execution context. This paper hypothesizes that agent authorization can be formalized as a cryptographically verifiable relation, denoted $R_{CVA}$, that jointly binds an agent principal, a concrete authorization request, an execution context, and the satisfaction of an applicable policy, while selectively preserving the confidentiality of private authorization attributes. We introduce a preliminary formal abstraction for Cryptographically Verifiable Agent Authorization (CVA), define a compact set of candidate security properties including authorization soundness, principal binding, request binding, policy binding, and replay resistance, and provide an executable zero-knowledge proof of concept that instantiates selected elements of the model over a Groth16 zk-SNARK construction. We further identify and formalize the structural separation among identity binding, authorization-request binding, and runtime execution binding as a central open problem in the design of secure agentic systems (a distinction {not explicitly addressed by} current agentic security frameworks) and present a falsifiable research agenda for its resolution.
toXiv_bot_toot