The Third Visual Pathway for Social Perception
David Pitcher
https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.09351 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.09351 https://arxiv.org/html/2512.09351
arXiv:2512.09351v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Influential models of primate visual cortex describe two functionally distinct pathways: a ventral pathway for object recognition and the dorsal pathway for spatial and action processing. However, recent human and non-human primate research suggests the existence of a third visual pathway projecting from early visual cortex through the motion-selective area V5/MT into the superior temporal sulcus (STS). Here we integrate anatomical, neuroimaging, and neuropsychological evidence demonstrating that this pathway specializes in processing dynamic social cues such as facial expressions, eye gaze, and body movements. This third pathway supports social perception by computing the actions and intentions of other people. These findings enhance our understanding of visual cortical organization and highlight the STS's critical role in social cognition, suggesting that visual processing encompasses a dedicated neural circuit for interpreting socially relevant motion and behavior.
toXiv_bot_toot
A "Warning/Guarantee" on the album Frank Zappa Meets the Mothers of Prevention (1985 Protest against governmental music censorship):
WARNING/GUARANTEE:
This album contains material which a truly free society would neither fear nor suppress.
In some socially retarded areas, religious fanatics and ultra-conservative political organizations violate your First Amendment Rights by attempting to censor rock & roll albums. We feel that this is un-Constitutional and un…
@… I know at least one actual programmer who would phrase themselves like that 😂
The bar isn’t that high if you’re trying to mimic socially awkward nerds.
Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs
J\'er\^ome Renault, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille
https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.06180 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.06180 https://arxiv.org/html/2512.06180
arXiv:2512.06180v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We study a strategic experimentation game with exponential bandits, in which experiment outcomes are private. The equilibrium amount of experimentation is always higher than in the benchmark case where experiment outcomes are publicly observed. In addition, for pure equilibria, the equilibrium amount of experimentation is at least socially optimal, and possibly higher. We provide a tight bound on the degree of over-experimentation. The analysis rests on a new form of encouragement effect, according to which a player may hide the absence of a success to encourage future experimentation by the other player, which incentivizes current experimentation.
toXiv_bot_toot
🦻 Good listeners connect more easily with strangers, study finds
#social