Beyond Private or Public: Large Language Models as Quasi-Public Goods in the AI Economy
Yukun Zhang, TianYang Zhang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.13265 https://
"Assessing the academic and societal impact of Open Access: bibliometric and altmetric analyses" https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-025-05436-6
"The accessibility of scholarly research plays a crucial role in shaping academic impact and societal engagement. This study examine…
Sensitivity Analysis for Treatment Effects in Difference-in-Differences Models using Riesz Representation
Philipp Bach, Sven Klaassen, Jannis Kueck, Mara Mattes, Martin Spindler
https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.09064
Scaling Law in LLM Simulated Personality: More Detailed and Realistic Persona Profile Is All You Need
Yuqi Bai, Tianyu Huang, Kun Sun, Yuting Chen
https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.11734
CrisisNews: A Dataset Mapping Two Decades of News Articles on Online Problematic Behavior at Scale
Jeanne Choi, DongJae Kang, Yubin Choi, Juhoon Lee, Joseph Seering
https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.12243
SHERLOCK: Towards Dynamic Knowledge Adaptation in LLM-enhanced E-commerce Risk Management
Nan Lu, Yurong Hu, Jiaquan Fang, Yan Liu, Rui Dong, Yiming Wang, Rui Lin, Shaoyi Xu
https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.08948
Trends in New Mexico School Districts Serving Low-Income Communities
Uloma E. Nelson, Onyedikachi J. Okeke
https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.09993 https://arxiv.o…
Selling Privacy in Blockchain Transactions
Georgios Chionas, Olga Gorelkina, Piotr Krysta, Rida Laraki
https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.08096 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.08096 https://arxiv.org/html/2512.08096
arXiv:2512.08096v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We study methods to enhance privacy in blockchain transactions from an economic angle. We consider mechanisms for privacy-aware users whose utility depends not only on the outcome of the mechanism but also negatively on the exposure of their economic preferences. Specifically, we study two auction-theoretic settings with privacy-aware users. First, we analyze an order flow auction, where a user auctions off to specialized agents, called searchers, the right to execute her transaction while maintaining a degree of privacy. We examine how the degree of privacy affects the revenue of the auction and, broadly, the net utility of the privacy-aware user. In this new setting, we describe the optimal auction, which is a sealed-bid auction. Subsequently, we analyze a variant of a Dutch auction in which the user gradually decreases the price and the degree of privacy until the transaction is sold. We compare the revenue of this auction to that of the optimal one as a function of the number of communication rounds. Then, we introduce a two-sided market - a privacy marketplace - with multiple users selling their transactions under their privacy preferences to multiple searchers. We propose a posted-price mechanism for the two-sided market that guarantees constant approximation of the optimal social welfare while maintaining incentive compatibility (from both sides of the market) and budget balance. This work builds on the emerging line of research that attempts to improve the performance of economic mechanisms by appending cryptographic primitives to them.
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Sensitivity Analysis for Causal ML: A Use Case at Booking.com
Philipp Bach, Victor Chernozhukov, Carlos Cinelli, Lin Jia, Sven Klaassen, Nils Skotara, Martin Spindler
https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.09109
Mechanism design and equilibrium analysis of smart contract mediated resource allocation
Jinho Cha, Justin Yoo, Eunchan Daniel Cha, Emily Yoo, Caedon Geoffrey, Hyoshin Song
https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.05504