Tootfinder

I have long lived by the principles of community, voluntary cooperation, and decentralized member-driven governance. Before knowing the term anarcho-syndicalism, I often imagined unions as truly democratic organizations, where delegates are elected and revocable at any moment, rooted in direct workers’ self-management and direct participation in controlling economic and social life, independent from both state authority and capitalist ownership.
Discovering anarcho-syndicalism about a…

«Kovid betrayed us with Calibre 8.16.2, and we as a community never should have let that happen, never have placed such a burden on individual generosity. The synthesis of these two truths, then, is nearly self-evident. There must be a new effort, free from AI encumbrances, that is built from the ground-up as a community effort. Something that can outlive the decisions of any one participant»
Glad to see more efforts on community-based FOSS governance!
https://blog.rereading.space/rereading-because-books-are-art-and-art-is-labor

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators
Kevin Vallier
https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.07901 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.07901 https://arxiv.org/html/2512.07901
arXiv:2512.07901v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: This paper develops the Theory of Strategic Evolution, a general model for systems in which the population of players, strategies, and institutional rules evolve together. The theory extends replicator dynamics to settings with endogenous players, multi level selection, innovation, constitutional change, and meta governance. The central mathematical object is a Poiesis stack: a hierarchy of strategic layers linked by cross level gain matrices. Under small gain conditions, the system admits a global Lyapunov function and satisfies selection, tracking, and stochastic stability results at every finite depth. We prove that the class is closed under block extension, innovation events, heterogeneous utilities, continuous strategy spaces, and constitutional evolution. The closure theorem shows that no new dynamics arise at higher levels and that unrestricted self modification cannot preserve Lyapunov structure. The theory unifies results from evolutionary game theory, institutional design, innovation dynamics, and constitutional political economy, providing a general mathematical model of long run strategic adaptation.
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