Tootfinder

Evolutionary game on any hypergraph
Dini Wang, Peng Yi, Yiguang Hong, Jie Chen, Gang Yan
https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.03305 https://arx…

Evolutionary game on any hypergraph
Cooperation plays a fundamental role in societal and biological domains, and the population structure profoundly shapes the dynamics of evolution. Practically, individuals behave either altruistically or egoistically in multiple groups, such as relatives, friends and colleagues, and feedbacks from these groupwise interactions will contribute to one's cognition and behavior. Due to the intricacy within and between groups, exploration of evolutionary dynamics over hypergraphs is relatively limite…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.03685 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arX…

Cooperative Evolutionary Pressure and Diminishing Returns Might Explain the Fermi Paradox: On What Super-AIs Are Like
With an evolutionary approach, the basis of morality can be explained as adaptations to problems of cooperation. With 'evolution' taken in a broad sense, evolving AIs that satisfy the conditions for evolution to apply will be subject to the same cooperative evolutionary pressure as biological entities. Here the adaptiveness of increased cooperation as material safety and wealth increase is discussed -- for humans, for other societies, and for AIs. Diminishing beneficial returns from increased a…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.11376 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arX…

Coevolution of cognition and cooperation in structured populations under reinforcement learning
We study the evolution of behavior under reinforcement learning in a Prisoner's Dilemma where agents interact in a regular network and can learn about whether they play one-shot or repeatedly by incurring a cost of deliberation. With respect to other behavioral rules used in the literature, (i) we confirm the existence of a threshold value of the probability of repeated interaction, switching the emergent behavior from intuitive defector to dual-process cooperator; (ii) we find a different role…

Enhancing Cooperation through Selective Interaction and Long-term Experiences in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
Tianyu Ren, Xiao-Jun Zeng
https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.02654

Enhancing Cooperation through Selective Interaction and Long-term Experiences in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
The significance of network structures in promoting group cooperation within social dilemmas has been widely recognized. Prior studies attribute this facilitation to the assortment of strategies driven by spatial interactions. Although reinforcement learning has been employed to investigate the impact of dynamic interaction on the evolution of cooperation, there remains a lack of understanding about how agents develop neighbour selection behaviours and the formation of strategic assortment with…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.16317 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arX…

Effects of group size and noise on cooperation in population evolution of dynamic groups
In a large population, the agents temporally form group of the Public Goods Game (PGG) one after another, and size of one group is randomly distributed at $g\in [g_l,g_h]$. Players in it have two strategies to be chosen to cooperate, or to defect for playing the PGG. Based on this structure we investigate the evolution of cooperation in PGG as a function of the noise level underlying strategy adoptions with the group size distribution. In the process of the evolution, the payoffs of cooperators…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.16317 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arX…

Effects of group size and noise on cooperation in population evolution of dynamic groups
In a large population, the agents temporally form group of the Public Goods Game (PGG) one after another, and size of one group is randomly distributed at $g\in [g_l,g_h]$. Players in it have two strategies to be chosen to cooperate, or to defect for playing the PGG. Based on this structure we investigate the evolution of cooperation in PGG as a function of the noise level underlying strategy adoptions with the group size distribution. In the process of the evolution, the payoffs of cooperators…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.16317 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arX…

Effects of group size and noise on cooperation in population evolution of dynamic groups
In a large population, the agents temporally form group of the Public Goods Game (PGG) one after another, and size of one group is randomly distributed at $g\in [g_l,g_h]$. Players in it have two strategies to be chosen to cooperate, or to defect for playing the PGG. Based on this structure we investigate the evolution of cooperation in PGG as a function of the noise level underlying strategy adoptions with the group size distribution. In the process of the evolution, the payoffs of cooperators…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.16317 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arX…

Effects of group size and noise on cooperation in population evolution of dynamic groups
In a large population, the agents temporally form group of the Public Goods Game (PGG) one after another, and size of one group is randomly distributed at $g\in [g_l,g_h]$. Players in it have two strategies to be chosen to cooperate, or to defect for playing the PGG. Based on this structure we investigate the evolution of cooperation in PGG as a function of the noise level underlying strategy adoptions with the group size distribution. In the process of the evolution, the payoffs of cooperators…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.16317 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arX…

Effects of group size and noise on cooperation in population evolution of dynamic groups
In a large population, the agents temporally form group of the Public Goods Game (PGG) one after another, and size of one group is randomly distributed at $g\in [g_l,g_h]$. Players in it have two strategies to be chosen to cooperate, or to defect for playing the PGG. Based on this structure we investigate the evolution of cooperation in PGG as a function of the noise level underlying strategy adoptions with the group size distribution. In the process of the evolution, the payoffs of cooperators…

Partner selection and evolution of out-group avoidance
Hirofumi Takesue
https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.06893 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2403.0…

Partner selection and evolution of out-group avoidance
The preferential treatment of in-group members is widely observed. This study examines this phenomenon in the domain of cooperation in social dilemmas using evolutionary agent-based models that consider the role of partner selection. The model considers a repeated prisoner's dilemma game, in which agents belong to one of two groups that are distinguished by the continuation probability of pair interactions. On the basis of the behavior in the last round and the group affiliation of the partner,…

Cooperative Evolutionary Pressure and Diminishing Returns Might Explain the Fermi Paradox: On What Super-AIs Are Like
Daniel Vallstrom
https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.03685

Cooperative Evolutionary Pressure and Diminishing Returns Might Explain the Fermi Paradox: On What Super-AIs Are Like
With an evolutionary approach, the basis of morality can be explained as adaptations to problems of cooperation. With 'evolution' taken in a broad sense, evolving AIs that satisfy the conditions for evolution to apply will be subject to the same cooperative evolutionary pressure as biological entities. Here the adaptiveness of increased cooperation as material safety and wealth increase is discussed -- for humans, for other societies, and for AIs. Diminishing beneficial returns from increased a…

Promoting collective cooperation through temporal interactions
Yao Meng, Alex McAvoy, Aming Li
https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.07530 https://

Promoting collective cooperation through temporal interactions
Collective cooperation drives the dynamics of many natural, social, and economic phenomena, making understanding the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary game theory a central question of modern science. Although human interactions are best described as complex networks, current explorations are limited to static networks where interactions represented by network links are permanent and do not change over time. In reality, human activities often involve temporal interactions, where links …