Tootfinder

Sensitivity-Driven Migration and the Evolution of Cooperation in Multi-Player Games on Structured Populations
Dhaker Kroumi
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.01126 https://

Sensitivity-Driven Migration and the Evolution of Cooperation in Multi-Player Games on Structured Populations
Cooperation often depends on individuals avoiding exploitation and interacting preferentially with other cooperators. We explore how context-dependent migration influences the evolution of cooperation in spatially structured populations. Individuals interact in small groups through public goods games and reproduce with possible dispersal. Cooperators migrate more frequently when surrounded by defectors, while defectors disperse uniformly. This behavioral asymmetry reflects realistic differences…

Evolution of cooperation among migrating resource-oriented agents under environmental variability
Masaaki Inaba, Eizo Akiyama
https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.21352 https://

Evolution of cooperation among migrating resource-oriented agents under environmental variability
Cooperation is fundamental to human societies. While several basic theoretical mechanisms underlying its evolution have been established, research addressing more realistic settings remains underdeveloped. Drawing on the hypothesis that intensified environmental fluctuations drove early behavioral evolution in humans during the Middle Stone Age in Africa, we examine the effects of environmental variability and human mobility on the evolution of cooperation. In our model, the variability is repr…

Emergence of Cooperation and Commitment in Optional Prisoner's Dilemma
Zhao Song, The Anh Han
https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.06702 https://arxiv.org/pdf/25…

Emergence of Cooperation and Commitment in Optional Prisoner's Dilemma
Commitment is a well-established mechanism for fostering cooperation in human society and multi-agent systems. However, existing research has predominantly focused on the commitment that neglects the freedom of players to abstain from an interaction, limiting their applicability to many real-world scenarios where participation is often voluntary. In this paper, we present a two-stage game model to investigate the evolution of commitment-based behaviours and cooperation within the framework of t…

Social influence on complex networks as a perturbation to individual behavior
Dhruv Mittal, Fl\'avio L. Pinheiro, V\'itor V. Vasconcelos
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.17948

Social influence on complex networks as a perturbation to individual behavior
Cooperation is fundamental to the functioning of biological and social systems in both human and animal populations, with the structure of interactions playing a crucial role. Previous studies have used networks to describe interactions and explore the evolution of cooperation, but with limited transposability to social settings due to biologically relevant assumptions. Exogenous processes -- that affect the individual and are not derived from social interactions -- even if unbiased, have a rol…

Evolution of Coordination Through Institutional Incentives: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach
Ndidi Bianca Ogbo, Zhao Song, The Anh Han
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.10112 https…

Evolution of Coordination Through Institutional Incentives: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach
There is a broad recognition that commitment-based mechanisms can promote coordination and cooperative behaviours in both biological populations and self-organised multi-agent systems by making individuals' intentions explicit prior to engagement. Yet their effectiveness depends on sustained compliance supported by institutions, especially in one-off interactions. Despite advances in quantitative studies of cooperation and commitment, most applied analyses and policy debates remain largely qual…

A Self-Organized Tower of Babel: Diversification through Competition
Riz Fernando Noronha, Kunihiko Kaneko
https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.11522 https://arxiv.o…

A Self-Organized Tower of Babel: Diversification through Competition
We introduce a minimal evolutionary model to show how local cooperation and global competition can create a transition to the diversity of communities such as linguistic groups. By using a lattice model with high-dimensional state agents and evolution under a fitness that depends on an agent's local neighborhood and global dissimilarity, clusters of diverse communities with different fitness are organized by equalizing the finesses on the boundaries, where their numbers and sizes are robust to …

The evolution of trust as a cognitive shortcut in repeated interactions
Cedric Perret, The Anh Han, Elias Fern\'andez Domingos, Theodor Cimpeanu, Simon T. Powers
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.04143

The evolution of trust as a cognitive shortcut in repeated interactions
Trust is often thought to increase cooperation. However, game-theoretic models often fail to distinguish between cooperative behaviour and trust. This makes it difficult to measure trust and determine its effect in different social dilemmas. We address this here by formalising trust as a cognitive shortcut in repeated games. This functions by avoiding checking a partner's actions once a threshold level of cooperativeness has been observed. We consider trust-based strategies that implement this …

Evolutionary dynamics under coordinated reciprocity
Feipeng Zhang, Bingxin Lin, Lei Zhou, Long Wang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.03524 https://arxiv.org/pdf/…

Evolutionary dynamics under coordinated reciprocity
Using past behaviors to guide future actions is essential for fostering cooperation in repeated social dilemmas. Traditional memory-based strategies that focus on recent interactions have yielded valuable insights into the evolution of cooperative behavior. However, as memory length increases, the complexity of analysis grows exponentially, since these strategies need to map every possible action sequence of a given length to subsequent responses. Due to their inherent reliance on exhaustive ma…