Tootfinder

I really like the ideas. So far this is my set of 🤓 nerdy cards (although Agile Poker is not really a game).
Especially the "Exploding Git Commits" is nice, since I'm an Exploding Kittens fan. 💥🐱
Cash you recommend other games?
#programming #programmers

I second Peter Sjökvist's suggestion and wonder if there is any library catalogue that has such granular identifiers.
From: Sjökvist, P. (2022). »Resource Description and Access (RDA)« – Transcription and the Dilemma of a Rare Materials Cataloger. Bibliothek Und Wissenschaft, 55, 279–285 (p. 284).

Reducing Cartel Violence: The Mexican Dilemma Between Social and Security Spending
Rafael Prieto-Curiel, Dieter Grass, Stefan Wrzaczek, Gian Maria Campedelli, Gernot Tragler, Gustav Feichtinger
https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.06509

Reducing Cartel Violence: The Mexican Dilemma Between Social and Security Spending
Organised crime in Mexico threatens societal stability and public safety, driving pervasive violence and economic disruption. Despite security investments and social programs designed in part to reduce involvement in crime, cartel power and violence continue to persist. This study evaluates existing policies and introduces a novel framework using optimal control theory to analyse cartel dynamics. Specifically, by modelling resource allocation between security measures and social programs, we id…

Maximizing Social Welfare with Side Payments
Ivan Geffner, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.07147 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2508.…

Maximizing Social Welfare with Side Payments
We examine normal-form games in which players may \emph{pre-commit} to outcome-contingent transfers before choosing their actions. In the one-shot version of this model, Jackson and Wilkie showed that side contracting can backfire: even a game with a Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium can devolve into inefficient equilibria once unbounded, simultaneous commitments are allowed. The root cause is a prisoner's dilemma effect, where each player can exploit her commitment power to reshape the equilibri…

"If your reports don't feel safe, they won't tell you" — This is one of the clearest and most important pieces of advice I've heard for managers.
It's a perfect illustration of the "monster in the middle dilemma for navigating both social and organizational/authoritative power dynamics as a manager. Power dynamics are the monster in the middle — and if a manager doesn't actively work to mitigate that, they will fail to operate effectively as a manager…

»Advances in silicon and processing technologies now give us clock speeds in excess of 40 MHz and chips with 1 million transistors!«
Source: Victor K. L. Huang – High-Performance Microprocessors: The RISC Dilemma, in “IEEE Micro August 1989 #vintagecomputing #risc

Israel are continuously running the Trolley Dilemma thinking that they will somehow get a different outcome by ignoring the collateral effects of lots of dead and maimed people.

Phase transitions in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on the Barab\'asi-Albert graph with participation cost
Jacek Mi\c{e}kisz, Javad Mohamadichamgavi
https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.23370

Phase transitions in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on the Barabási-Albert graph with participation cost
We examine the impact of the maintenance cost of social links on cooperative behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on the Barabási-Albert scale-free network with a pairwise stochastic imitation. We show by means of Monte Carlo simulations and pair approximation that the cooperation frequency changes abruptly from an almost full cooperation to a much smaller value when we increase the cost of maintaining links. In the critical region, the stationary distribution is bi-modal and the system osc…

This paragraph from Peopleware (in Chapter 21, under subheading "Management by Hysterical Optimism") is one I think about a lot.

The Dinosaur Dilemma That Darwin Couldn’t Solve - Be Smart | PBS
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yLB839Sir5c

Validating Generative Agent-Based Models of Social Norm Enforcement: From Replication to Novel Predictions
Logan Cross, Nick Haber, Daniel L. K. Yamins
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.22049

Validating Generative Agent-Based Models of Social Norm Enforcement: From Replication to Novel Predictions
As large language models (LLMs) advance, there is growing interest in using them to simulate human social behavior through generative agent-based modeling (GABM). However, validating these models remains a key challenge. We present a systematic two-stage validation approach using social dilemma paradigms from psychological literature, first identifying the cognitive components necessary for LLM agents to reproduce known human behaviors in mixed-motive settings from two landmark papers, then usi…

Properties of zero-determinant strategies in multichannel games
Masahiko Ueda
https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.21952 https://arxiv.org/pdf/…

Properties of zero-determinant strategies in multichannel games
Controlling payoffs in repeated games is one of the important topics in control theory of multi-agent systems. Recently proposed zero-determinant strategies enable players to unilaterally enforce linear relations between payoffs. Furthermore, based on the mathematics of zero-determinant strategies, regional payoff control, in which payoffs are enforced into some feasible regions, has been discovered in social dilemma situations. More recently, theory of payoff control was extended to multichann…