Tootfinder

An operatorial view of competition and cooperation in a network of economic agents
G. Giunta, M. Gorgone, F. Oliveri
https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.22917 https…

An operatorial view of competition and cooperation in a network of economic agents
A network of agents interacting both with competitive and/or cooperative mechanisms is modeled by using fermionic ladder operators. The time evolution of the network is assumed to be governed by a Hermitian time-independent Hamiltonian operator, and the mean values of the number operators are interpreted as a measure of the wealth status of the agents. Besides classical Heisenberg, we use the recently introduced $(H,ρ)$-induced dynamics approach to account for some actions able to provide a se…

The Devil's Dung? Money as a mechanism of generalized reciprocity in human societies
Eduardo C. Ferraciolli, Francesco Renzini, Tanya V. Araujo, Flaminio Squazzoni
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.20691

The Devil's Dung? Money as a mechanism of generalized reciprocity in human societies
St. Francis of Assisi (1181/82-1226) famously called money the devil's dung, and indeed money is often associated with greed, inequality, and corruption. Drawing on Nowak's five rules for the evolution of cooperation, we argue here that money promotes the formation of circuits of generalized reciprocity across human groups that are fundamental to social evolution. In an evolutionary tournament, we show that money exchange is an evolutionary stable strategy that promotes cooperation without rely…

Dynamic Evolution of Cooperation Based on Adaptive Reputation Threshold and Game Transition
Hongyu Yue, Xiaojin Xiong, Minyu Feng, Attila Szolnoki
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.13319

Dynamic Evolution of Cooperation Based on Adaptive Reputation Threshold and Game Transition
In real-world social systems, individual interactions are frequently shaped by reputation, which not only influences partner selection but also affects the nature and benefits of the interactions themselves. We propose a heterogeneous game transition model that incorporates a reputation-based dynamic threshold mechanism to investigate how reputation regulates game evolution. In our framework, individuals determine the type of game they engage in according to their own and their neighbors' reput…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.19487 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csMA_…

Evolution of Cooperation in LLM-Agent Societies: A Preliminary Study Using Different Punishment Strategies
The evolution of cooperation has been extensively studied using abstract mathematical models and simulations. Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLM) and the rise of LLM agents have demonstrated their ability to perform social reasoning, thus providing an opportunity to test the emergence of norms in more realistic agent-based simulations with human-like reasoning using natural language. In this research, we investigate whether the cooperation dynamics presented in Boyd and Richerson's m…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.19375 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arX…

The Co-evolution of Cooperation and Epidemic Spreading
People's cooperation in adopting protective measures is effective in epidemic control and creates herd immunity as a public good. Similarly, the presence of an epidemic is a driving factor for the formation and improvement of cooperation. Here, we study the coevolution of epidemic dynamics and the public good game as a paradigm of cooperation dynamics. Using simulations and a mean-field description, we show that the presence of an epidemic can promote cooperation even in regimes where cooperati…