Tootfinder

Bayesian tit-for-tat fosters cooperation in evolutionary stochastic games
Arunava Patra, Supratim Sengupta, Sagar Chakraborty
https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.00363 https://

Bayesian tit-for-tat fosters cooperation in evolutionary stochastic games
Learning from experience is a key feature of decision-making in cognitively complex organisms. Strategic interactions involving Bayesian inferential strategies can enable us to better understand how evolving individual choices to be altruistic or selfish can affect collective outcomes in social dilemmas. Bayesian strategies are distinguished, from their reactive opponents, in their ability to modulate their actions in the light of new evidence. We investigate whether such strategies can be resi…

Crosslisted article(s) found for physics.soc-ph. https://arxiv.org/list/physics.soc-ph/new
[1/1]:
- Bayesian tit-for-tat fosters cooperation in evolutionary stochastic games
Arunava Patra, Supratim Sengupta, Sagar Chakraborty

Evolutionary dynamics of memory-based strategies in repeated and structured social interactions
Ketian Sun, Qi Su, Long Wang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.10820 https://

Evolutionary dynamics of memory-based strategies in repeated and structured social interactions
Human social life is shaped by repeated interactions, where past experiences guide future behavior. In evolutionary game theory, a key challenge is to identify strategies that harness such memory to succeed in repeated encounters. Decades of research have identified influential one-step memory strategies (such as Tit-for-Tat, Generous Tit-for-Tat, and Win-Stay Lose-Shift) that promote cooperation in iterated pairwise games. However, these strategies occupy only a small corner of the vast strate…

Crosslisted article(s) found for econ.TH. https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new
[1/1]:
- Bayesian tit-for-tat fosters cooperation in evolutionary stochastic games
Arunava Patra, Supratim Sengupta, Sagar Chakraborty

Crosslisted article(s) found for q-bio.PE. https://arxiv.org/list/q-bio.PE/new
[1/1]:
- Bayesian tit-for-tat fosters cooperation in evolutionary stochastic games
Arunava Patra, Supratim Sengupta, Sagar Chakraborty