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Iterative Vickrey Auctions via Linear Programming
S\'ebastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.03252 https://arx…

Iterative Vickrey Auctions via Linear Programming
Building on the linear programming approach to competitive equilibrium pricing, we develop a general method for constructing iterative auctions that achieve Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcomes. We show how to transform a linear program characterizing competitive equilibrium prices into one that characterizes universal competitive equilibrium (UCE) prices, which elicit precisely the information needed to compute VCG payments. By applying a primal-dual algorithm to these transformed programs, we…

Online Learning for Dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism in Sequential Auctions under Unknown Environments
Vincent Leon, S. Rasoul Etesami
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.19038

Online Learning for Dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism in Sequential Auctions under Unknown Environments
We consider the problem of online dynamic mechanism design for sequential auctions in unknown environments, where the underlying market and, thus, the bidders' values vary over time as interactions between the seller and the bidders progress. We model the sequential auctions as an infinite-horizon average-reward Markov decision process (MDP), where the transition kernel and reward functions are unknown to the seller. In each round, the seller determines an allocation and a payment for each bidd…