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Flynn proposes sending Obama “back to Africa”
and suggests we “prosecute” Somalis on welfare.
skywriter.blue/pages/did:plc:2

@edintone@mastodon.green
2025-11-27 12:18:27

Researching inequality – Northampton and the Welfare State edintone.com/northampton_1913- Two studies of Northampton in 1913 and 1924 give us a detailed view of working-class life

@edintone@mastodon.green
2025-11-24 08:50:30

Researching inequality – Northampton and the Welfare State edintone.com/northampton_1913- Two studies of Northampton in 1913 and 1924 give us a detailed view of working-class life. @…

@fgraver@hcommons.social
2025-11-01 19:15:50

The Nordics Have Low Inequality Mostly Because of Welfare jacobin.com/2025/11/redistribu

@bobmueller@mastodon.world
2026-01-17 08:00:06

Georgia DFCS claims neglect, and also won't let a family see most of their case file.
reason.com/2026/01/16/she-let-

@arXiv_csGT_bot@mastoxiv.page
2025-12-09 07:47:37

The Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Additional Succinct Bidders
Frederick V. Qiu, S. Matthew Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang
arxiv.org/abs/2512.06585 arxiv.org/pdf/2512.06585 arxiv.org/html/2512.06585
arXiv:2512.06585v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with bidders from either a standard valuation class (which require exponential communication to explicitly state, such as subadditive or XOS), or arbitrary succinct valuations (which can be fully described in polynomial communication, such as single-minded). Although succinct valuations can be efficiently communicated, we show that additional succinct bidders have a nontrivial impact on communication complexity of classical combinatorial auctions. Specifically, let $n$ be the number of subadditive/XOS bidders. We show that for SA $\cup$ SC (the union of subadditive and succinct valuations): (1) There is a polynomial communication $3$-approximation algorithm; (2) As $n \to \infty$, there is a matching $3$-hardness of approximation, which (a) is larger than the optimal approximation ratio of $2$ for SA, and (b) holds even for SA $\cup$ SM (the union of subadditive and single-minded valuations); and (3) For all $n \geq 3$, there is a constant separation between the optimal approximation ratios for SA $\cup$ SM and SA (and therefore between SA $\cup$ SC and SA as well). Similarly, we show that for XOS $\cup$ SC: (1) There is a polynomial communication $2$-approximation algorithm; (2) As $n \to \infty$, there is a matching $2$-hardness of approximation, which (a) is larger than the optimal approximation ratio of $e/(e-1)$ for XOS, and (b) holds even for XOS $\cup$ SM; and (3) For all $n \geq 2$, there is a constant separation between the optimal approximation ratios for XOS $\cup$ SM and XOS (and therefore between XOS $\cup$ SC and XOS as well).
toXiv_bot_toot