Tootfinder

Przygotowałem wstępnie weryfikację autentyczności plików z #PyPI dla #Gentoo.
Wiecie, ten nowy wynalazek, który chroni przed atakami podmieniającymi pliki na PyPI, i upewnia się, że macie do czynienia z oryginalnymi plikami z GitHuba. No bo, jak powszechnie wiadomo, repozytoria na GitHubie i tamtejsze syste…

I've drafted support for verification of #PyPI provenance for #Gentoo.
You know, the new fancy thing that protects against supply chain attacks on PyPI, and verifies that you're using genuine #GitHub artifacts. Because, you know, GitHub repositories and deployment pipelines are an unlikely attack vector. And you definitely don't need to worry about #Microsoft owning the keys, the repositories and the pipelines at all.
#security #Python #SigStore

Here are some key takeaways from implementing #PyPI attestations in #Gentoo:
• With OpenPGP, you need to validate the authenticity of a key. With attestations, you need to validate the authenticity of the identity (i.e. know the right GitHub repository). No problem really solved here.
• They verify that the artifact was created by the Continuous Deployment workflow of a given repository. A compromised workflow can produce valid attestations.
• They don't provide sufficient protection against PyPI being compromised. You can't e.g. detect whether new releases weren't hidden.
On the plus side, TOFU is easier here: we don't have to maintain hundreds of key packages, just short URLs on top of ebuilds.
Security-wise, I think PEP 740 itself summarizes it well in the "rationale and motivation" section. To paraphrase, maintainers wanted to create some signatures, and downstreams wanted to verify some signatures, so we gave them some signatures.
#security #Python