Tootfinder

I can see the CA hashes that #Intel publishes in their AMT docs also in the MFS in my #firmware samples. This one is from a ThinkPad X230, so it's version 8.x.

At this year's Open Source #Firmware #Conference, I will be presenting on "Boot Chains and Build Systems"! 🥳🥳
(spoiler: it's complicated 🫠)

Boot Chains and Build Systems Open Source Firmware Conference 2026
It is clear that booting a system based on an application processor requires multiple binaries and possibly multiple hardware components - at the very least, one to initialize the DRAM and one to run in it. This implies that the various components of the chain, however many, need to be aware of the respective next and previous one somehow: Any component has to know the source, the protocol, and the destination for loading the next one, and the build system needs to create an overall image for t…

Here is a list of hashes to remind you that you should really better be in full control of your #firmware and boot chain:
https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-res

Forgotten UEFI shims undermining Secure Boot
ESET researchers discovered 11 vulnerable UEFI shim bootloaders signed by Microsoft that allow attackers to bypass UEFI Secure Boot by exploiting decade-old vulnerabilities.

Lenovo #UEFI #firmware bricked itself, messing up the NVRAM during suspend. Black screen only.
We took a fresh image from the website, and the system booted again.
But it showed INVALID for the product name and Linux wouldn't boot. I assume this ended up in DMI.
So we patched bac…