Tootfinder

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.01930 has been replaced.
link: https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=a

Reducing Optimism Bias in Incomplete Cooperative Games
Cooperative game theory has diverse applications in contemporary artificial intelligence, including domains like interpretable machine learning, resource allocation, and collaborative decision-making. However, specifying a cooperative game entails assigning values to exponentially many coalitions, and obtaining even a single value can be resource-intensive in practice. Yet simply leaving certain coalition values undisclosed introduces ambiguity regarding individual contributions to the collecti…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.01930 has been replaced.
link: https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=a

Reducing Optimism Bias in Incomplete Cooperative Games
Cooperative game theory has diverse applications in contemporary artificial intelligence, including domains like interpretable machine learning, resource allocation, and collaborative decision-making. However, specifying a cooperative game entails assigning values to exponentially many coalitions, and obtaining even a single value can be resource-intensive in practice. Yet simply leaving certain coalition values undisclosed introduces ambiguity regarding individual contributions to the collecti…

Detecting Adversarial Spectrum Attacks via Distance to Decision Boundary Statistics
Wenwei Zhao, Xiaowen Li, Shangqing Zhao, Jie Xu, Yao Liu, Zhuo Lu
https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08986

Detecting Adversarial Spectrum Attacks via Distance to Decision Boundary Statistics
Machine learning has been adopted for efficient cooperative spectrum sensing. However, it incurs an additional security risk due to attacks leveraging adversarial machine learning to create malicious spectrum sensing values to deceive the fusion center, called adversarial spectrum attacks. In this paper, we propose an efficient framework for detecting adversarial spectrum attacks. Our design leverages the concept of the distance to the decision boundary (DDB) observed at the fusion center and c…

On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a priori unions
J.M. Alonso-Meijide, J. Costa, I. García-Jurado, J.C. Gonçalves-Dosantos
https://arXiv.org/abs/2401.16918

On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a priori unions
In this paper we extend the equal division and the equal surplus division values for transferable utility cooperative games to the more general setup of transferable utility cooperative games with a priori unions. In the case of the equal surplus division value we propose three possible extensions. We provide axiomatic characterizations of the new values. Furthermore, we apply the proposed modifications to a particular cost sharing problem and compare the numerical results with those obtained w…

On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a priori unions
J.M. Alonso-Meijide, J. Costa, I. García-Jurado, J.C. Gonçalves-Dosantos
https://arXiv.org/abs/2401.16918

On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a priori unions
In this paper we extend the equal division and the equal surplus division values for transferable utility cooperative games to the more general setup of transferable utility cooperative games with a priori unions. In the case of the equal surplus division value we propose three possible extensions. We provide axiomatic characterizations of the new values. Furthermore, we apply the proposed modifications to a particular cost sharing problem and compare the numerical results with those obtained w…

On egalitarian values for cooperative games with level structures
J.M. Alonso-Meijide, J. Costa, I. García-Jurado, J.C. Gonçalves-Dosantos
https://arXiv.org/abs/2401.16938

On egalitarian values for cooperative games with level structures
In this paper we extend the equal division and the equal surplus division values for transferable utility cooperative games to the more general setup of transferable utility cooperative games with level structures. In the case of the equal surplus division value we propose three possible extensions, one of which has already been described in the literature. We provide axiomatic characterizations of the values considered, apply them to a particular cost sharing problem and compare them in the fr…

On egalitarian values for cooperative games with level structures
J.M. Alonso-Meijide, J. Costa, I. García-Jurado, J.C. Gonçalves-Dosantos
https://arXiv.org/abs/2401.16938

On egalitarian values for cooperative games with level structures
In this paper we extend the equal division and the equal surplus division values for transferable utility cooperative games to the more general setup of transferable utility cooperative games with level structures. In the case of the equal surplus division value we propose three possible extensions, one of which has already been described in the literature. We provide axiomatic characterizations of the values considered, apply them to a particular cost sharing problem and compare them in the fr…

Necessary players and values
J.C. Gonçalves-Dosantos, I. García-Jurado, J. Costa, J.M. Alonso-Meijide
https://arXiv.org/abs/2401.16930 https://

Necessary players and values
In this paper we introduce the $Γ$ value, a new value for cooperative games with transferable utility. We also provide an axiomatic characterization of the $Γ$ value based on a property concerning the so-called necessary players. A necessary players of a game is one without which the characteristic function is zero. We illustrate the performance of the $Γ$ value in a particular cost allocation problem that arises when the owners of the apartments in a building plan to install an elevator and…

Necessary players and values
J.C. Gonçalves-Dosantos, I. García-Jurado, J. Costa, J.M. Alonso-Meijide
https://arXiv.org/abs/2401.16930 https://

Necessary players and values
In this paper we introduce the $Γ$ value, a new value for cooperative games with transferable utility. We also provide an axiomatic characterization of the $Γ$ value based on a property concerning the so-called necessary players. A necessary players of a game is one without which the characteristic function is zero. We illustrate the performance of the $Γ$ value in a particular cost allocation problem that arises when the owners of the apartments in a building plan to install an elevator and…