Tootfinder

Some more BBC B screen shots - I put my beeb on a TV via UHF and os now I've got screenshots here from Acornsoft {Snooker, Monsters and Snapper}, and as a Bonus, PMS Multifont - which I think was part of a 64k external 1MHz bus RAM box; which I must look at some day.
(Was UHF always this bad but our TVs were small enough not to notice?)
(My Beeb only started some stuff after I took it's lid off - is it's got some heat problems!)

Evaluating Large Language Models for Symbolic Security Protocol Analysis
Paolo Modesti, Syed Ahmed, Ioannis Sfyrakis, Derek Enodolomwanyi
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.20712 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.20712 https://arxiv.org/html/2607.20712
arXiv:2607.20712v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Security protocol verification relies on formal tools such as ProVerif and OFMC. This study evaluates whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can perform comparable analysis. We test GPT and DeepSeek in chat and reasoning modes over three runs on 130 obfuscated AnB/AnBx protocols covering 388 security goals, scored against ProVerif and OFMC. Chat models reach 69 to 81% recall at precision below 31%. Reasoning models reverse this trade-off, reaching 66.5% precision for GPT and 45.4% for DeepSeek, but detect just over half the attacks. DeepSeek's two modes share one underlying model, so the comparison isolates reasoning itself, which raises precision from 27.2% to 45.4%. The GPT contrast spans a model-version change and is only suggestive. All models perform worst on authentication goals: reasoning models detect well under half of injective and non-injective agreement attacks, whereas chat models over-flag them at low precision. Confidentiality is the exception, with F1 up to 95.7% in reasoning mode. Verdicts are unstable across runs, identical on 89.7% of goals for GPT but 74.0% for DeepSeek. Self-reported confidence is uniformly high yet shows no meaningful correlation with correctness. On this benchmark LLMs do not match formal verification, but may serve, at best, as pre-screening filters.
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Orientation Reading by Production Vision-Language Models on Optotype Charts: A Controlled Multi-Model Evaluation Across Reasoning Modes, Prompts, and Access Modalities
Shahryar Wasif, Avneek Sandhu, Bin Hu
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.16595 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.16595 https://arxiv.org/html/2607.16595
arXiv:2607.16595v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: OBJECTIVES: Vision-language models are increasingly used to interpret medical and everyday images through consumer chat interfaces, yet their ability to read orientation - the single perceptual operation tested by the tumbling-E acuity optotype - is poorly characterized on the surfaces through which they are actually used. METHODS: We evaluated four production vision-language models (referred to as Claude, GPT, GROK, and Gemini) through their consumer chat interfaces on a locked set of seven optotype charts: four uniform tumbling-E charts (one per cardinal orientation), two mixed-orientation tumbling-E charts, and one Snellen letter chart as a specificity control. Each model was run in two reasoning modes (Fast and Thinking) under two prompt variants (with and without an explicit orientation-decoding rule) by up to three operators. The corpus comprised 920 scoreable trials and 50,420 glyph judgements. The primary outcome was glyph-level accuracy against the chart's designed orientation, summarized with Wilson 95% confidence intervals. RESULTS: Accuracy ranged from 43.0% to 97.0% across models on identical charts, and the strongest model depended on reasoning mode (GPT 97.0% in Fast mode; GROK 96.6% in Thinking mode). Errors were not random but collapsed onto a model-specific attractor direction. Models were 96-100% internally self-consistent yet ranged widely in accuracy, dissociating reliability from validity. An answer-key-free ensemble-consensus estimate tracked accuracy closely (r = 0.998). For one model, consumer-interface accuracy fell 25-27 points below programmatic access, almost entirely on a single orientation. CONCLUSIONS: A single accuracy figure conceals clinically relevant, orientation-specific failure modes; vision-language models should be evaluated along multiple axes and on the deployment surface before image-interpretation outputs are trusted.
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