Tootfinder

Deciding the Value of Two-Clock Almost Non-Zeno Weighted Timed Games
Isa Vialard
https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.00014 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2508.00014

Deciding the Value of Two-Clock Almost Non-Zeno Weighted Timed Games
The Value Problem for weighted timed games (wtgs) consists in determining, given a two-player weighted timed game with a reachability objective and a rational threshold, whether or not the value of the game exceeds the threshold. When restrained to wtgs with non-negative weight, this problem is known to be undecidable for weighted timed games with three or more clocks, and decidable for one-clock wtgs. The Value Problem for two-clock non-negative wtgs, which remained stubbornly open for a decad…

How LLMs are Shaping the Future of Virtual Reality
S\"ueda \"Ozkaya, Santiago Berrezueta-Guzman, Stefan Wagner
https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.00737 https://

How LLMs are Shaping the Future of Virtual Reality
The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into Virtual Reality (VR) games marks a paradigm shift in the design of immersive, adaptive, and intelligent digital experiences. This paper presents a comprehensive review of recent research at the intersection of LLMs and VR, examining how these models are transforming narrative generation, non-player character (NPC) interactions, accessibility, personalization, and game mastering. Drawing from an analysis of 62 peer reviewed studies published b…

Sources detail EA's issues developing the next Battlefield, which now has a $400M budget; some staff were skeptical of the EA leadership's 100M player target (Samuel Axon/Ars Technica)
https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2025/07

What’s wrong with AAA games? The development of the next Battlefield has answers.
EA insiders describe stress and setbacks in a project that’s too big to fail.

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.20466 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csGT_…

Semicoarse Correlated Equilibria and LP-Based Guarantees for Gradient Dynamics in Normal-Form Games
Projected gradient ascent is known to satisfy no-external regret as a learning algorithm. However, recent empirical work shows that projected gradient ascent often finds the Nash equilibrium in settings beyond two-player zero-sum interactions or potential games, including those where the set of coarse correlated equilibria is very large. We show that gradient ascent in fact satisfies a stronger class of linear $Φ$-regret in normal-form games; resulting in a refined solution concept which we du…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.20011 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csAI_…

The Many Challenges of Human-Like Agents in Virtual Game Environments
Human-like agents are an increasingly important topic in games and beyond. Believable non-player characters enhance the gaming experience by improving immersion and providing entertainment. They also offer players the opportunity to engage with AI entities that can function as opponents, teachers, or cooperating partners. Additionally, in games where bots are prohibited -- and even more so in non-game environments -- there is a need for methods capable of identifying whether digital interaction…

»Solo RPGs: A Breakdown of Single Player Role-Playing Games«
You don't always have to be online or watch TV to entertain yourself ;)
🎲 https://wizardsrespite.com/2024/02/13/solo-rpgs-a-breakdown-of-single-player-role-playi…

Solo RPGs: A Breakdown of Single Player Role-Playing Games - Wizard's Respite
Take a close look at the solo RPGs. Discover their history, how they evolved over the years, and what they are today.

So arguably the Pac-Man ghost logic is the exact opposite of “AI”.
It’s extremely well defined behavior based on very basic deterministic algorithms that are so simple a 8-year old player can understand them and anticipate them correctly for those high-scores.
The game actually is famous for the simple enemy logic and studied by games designers for it.
Pac-Man enemy behavior:
deterministic, well-defined algorithm that can easily be executed on the most primitive* computer hardware
“AI”:
black-box algorithm with indeterministic behavior that requires a metric shitload of compute
—
*By “primitive computer hardware” I mean that the Pac-Man arcade machine runs on a Zilog Z80 CPU with 8,500 transistors.The CPU in the phone you are reading this on has (latest iPhone as example) 15 billion transistors or so (almost 2 million times more) and runs tens of thousands of times faster.

Maker playing against an invisible Breaker
Dennis Clemens, Fabian Hamann, Mirjana Mikala\v{c}ki, Yannick Mogge, Milo\v{s} Stojakovi\'c
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.22519 https…

Maker playing against an invisible Breaker
We initiate the study of the phantom version of Maker-Breaker positional games. In a phantom game, the moves of one of the players are hidden from the other player, who still has the complete information. We look at the biased $(a:b)$ Maker-PhantomBreaker games where the board is the edge set of the complete graph on $n$ vertices, $K_n$, and Maker has no information about PhantomBreaker's choices of edges. We give randomized strategies for both players in four classical games: connectivity game…

Stochastic Graphon Games with Interventions
Eyal Neuman, Sturmius Tuschmann
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.00561 https://arxiv.org/pdf/25…

Stochastic Graphon Games with Interventions
We consider a class of targeted intervention problems in dynamic network and graphon games. First, we study a general dynamic network game in which players interact over a graph and maximize their heterogeneous, concave goal functionals, which depend on both their own actions and their interactions with their neighbors. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in both the finite-player network game and the corresponding infinite-player graphon game. We also prove the co…

Absolutely the most surprising part of this obit of Dilip Doshi, a former Indian #cricket player, is that while Doshi always struck me as the squarest of blokes, he was thick chums with MICK JAGGER, the sultan of cool.

A note on the diversity Owen values
Songtao He, Erfang Shan, Xinyu Sun
https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.24171 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.24…

A note on the diversity Owen values
Béal et al. (Int J Game Theory 54, 2025) introduce the Diversity Owen value for TU-games with diversity constraints, and provide axiomatic characterizations using the axioms of fairness and balanced contributions. However, there exist logical flaws in the proofs of the uniqueness of these characterizations. In this note we provides the corrected proofs of the characterizations by introducing the null player for diversity games axiom. Also, we establish two alternative characterizations of the …

Branch-and-Cut for Mixed-Integer Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems
Alo\"is Duguet, Tobias Harks, Martin Schmidt, Julian Schwarz
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.02520

Branch-and-Cut for Mixed-Integer Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems
Generalized Nash equilibrium problems with mixed-integer variables form an important class of games in which each player solves a mixed-integer optimization problem with respect to her own variables and the strategy space of each player depends on the strategies chosen by the rival players. In this work, we introduce a branch-and-cut algorithm to compute exact pure Nash equilibria for different classes of such mixed-integer games. The main idea is to reformulate the equilibrium problem as a sui…

The Effect of Network Topology on the Equilibria of Influence-Opinion Games
Yigit Ege Bayiz, Arash Amini, Radu Marculescu, Ufuk Topcu
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.22293

The Effect of Network Topology on the Equilibria of Influence-Opinion Games
Online social networks exert a powerful influence on public opinion. Adversaries weaponize these networks to manipulate discourse, underscoring the need for more resilient social networks. To this end, we investigate the impact of network connectivity on Stackelberg equilibria in a two-player game to shape public opinion. We model opinion evolution as a repeated competitive influence-propagation process. Players iteratively inject \textit{messages} that diffuse until reaching a steady state, mo…

Two-Person Additively-Separable Sum Games
Somdeb Lahiri
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.19325 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.19325

Two-Person Additively-Separable Sum Games
We consider a subclass of bimatrix games which we refer to as two person additively separable sum games, where the sum of the payoffs of the two players is additively separable. The payoff to the row player at each pair of pure strategies, is the sum of two numbers, the first of which may be dependent on the pure strategy chosen by the column player and the second being independent of the pure strategy chosen by the column player. The payoff to the column player at each pair of pure strategies,…

The Complexity of Correlated Equilibria in Generalized Games
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Gabriele Farina
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.01899

The Complexity of Correlated Equilibria in Generalized Games
Correlated equilibria -- and their generalization $Φ$-equilibria -- are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of equilibrium computation are well-understood in some settings, fundamental questions are still open in generalized games, that is, games in which the set of strategies allowed to each player depends on the other players' strategies. These classes of games model funda…

Self-correcting Reward Shaping via Language Models for Reinforcement Learning Agents in Games
Ant\'onio Afonso, Iolanda Leite, Alessandro Sestini, Florian Fuchs, Konrad Tollmar, Linus Gissl\'en
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.23626

Self-correcting Reward Shaping via Language Models for Reinforcement Learning Agents in Games
Reinforcement Learning (RL) in games has gained significant momentum in recent years, enabling the creation of different agent behaviors that can transform a player's gaming experience. However, deploying RL agents in production environments presents two key challenges: (1) designing an effective reward function typically requires an RL expert, and (2) when a game's content or mechanics are modified, previously tuned reward weights may no longer be optimal. Towards the latter challenge, we prop…

Team Variance Optimization of n-Player Stochastic Games with Separately Controlled Chains
Li Xia
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.22335 https://arxiv.org/pdf/250…

Team Variance Optimization of n-Player Stochastic Games with Separately Controlled Chains
In this paper, we study a subclass of n-player stochastic games, in which each player has their own internal state controlled only by their own action and their objective is a common goal called team variance which measures the total variation of the random rewards of all players. It is assumed that players cannot observe each others' state/action. Thus, players' internal chains are controlled separately by their own action and they are coupled through the objective of team variance. Since the …

ChatGPT (cat, I farted, to the French) can't beat the world's best chess player, and it sucks at old video games, mainly because ChatGPT is NOT INTELLIGENCE of ANY kind. It's a parrot machine.

Quantitative convergence for displacement monotone Mean Field Games of control
Joe Jackson, Alp\'ar R. M\'esz\'aros
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.17014 https://

Quantitative convergence for displacement monotone Mean Field Games of control
In this paper we establish quantitative convergence results for both open and closed-loop Nash equilibria of N-player stochastic differential games in the setting of Mean Field Games of Controls (MFGC), a class of models where interactions among agents occur through both states and controls. Our analysis covers a general class of non-separable Hamiltonians satisfying a displacement monotonicity condition, along with mild regularity and growth conditions at infinity. A major novelty of our work …

Where are the Frontlines? A Visualization Approach for Map Control in Team-Based Games
Jonas Pech\'e, Aliaksei Tsishurou, Alexander Zap, Guenter Wallner
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.19193

Where are the Frontlines? A Visualization Approach for Map Control in Team-Based Games
A central area of interest in many competitive online games is spatial behavior which due to its complexity can be difficult to visualize. Such behaviors of interest include not only overall movement patterns but also being able to understand which player or team is exerting control over an area to inform decision-making. Map control can, however, be challenging to quantify. In this paper, we propose a method for calculating frontlines and first efforts towards a visualization of them. The visu…

Polynomial Expectation Property for Max-Polymatrix Games
Howard Dai
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.01343 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2506.01343…

Polynomial Expectation Property for Max-Polymatrix Games
We address an open question which addresses the computability of correlated equilibria in a variant of polymatrix where each player's utility is the maximum of their edge payoffs. We demonstrate that this max-variant game has the polynomial expectation property, and conclude that there indeed exists a polynomial correlated equilibrium scheme.

I have not played Remtach. This review is really interesting describing this as a team fighting game with soccer as more of a theme. And for the moment to moment game play that sounds great.
But it is funny that in another way that's just soccer. TBH this game is way more soccer then FIFA is where you control a whole team.
Personally I don't love these multiplayer games. I could like this with a single player mode and imagine doing a whole career!

Raiders’ Contender for Comeback Player of the Year https://www.si.com/nfl/raiders/las-vegas-maxx-crosby-pro-bowl-pete-carroll

Online Competitive Information Gathering for Partially Observable Trajectory Games
Mel Krusniak, Hang Xu, Parker Palermo, Forrest Laine
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.01927

Online Competitive Information Gathering for Partially Observable Trajectory Games
Game-theoretic agents must make plans that optimally gather information about their opponents. These problems are modeled by partially observable stochastic games (POSGs), but planning in fully continuous POSGs is intractable without heavy offline computation or assumptions on the order of belief maintained by each player. We formulate a finite history/horizon refinement of POSGs which admits competitive information gathering behavior in trajectory space, and through a series of approximations,…

Doing calculus and checking my results with o3 feels a lot like Jernau Gurgeh talking to the ship about the progress of his game in Player of Games.

Approximating fixed size quantum correlations in polynomial time
Julius A. Zeiss, Gereon Ko{\ss}mann, Omar Fawzi, Mario Berta
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.12302

Approximating fixed size quantum correlations in polynomial time
We show that $\varepsilon$-additive approximations of the optimal value of fixed-size two-player free games with fixed-dimensional entanglement assistance can be computed in time $\mathrm{poly}(1/\varepsilon)$. This stands in contrast to previous analytic approaches, which focused on scaling with the number of questions and answers, but yielded only strict $\mathrm{exp}(1/\varepsilon)$ guarantees. Our main result is based on novel Bose-symmetric quantum de Finetti theorems tailored for constrai…

Slavic Techniques for Hat Guessing Algorithms
I. M. J. McInnis
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.21487 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.21487

Slavic Techniques for Hat Guessing Algorithms
2023 undergraduate thesis on a deterministic "hat game." For a digraph $D$, each player stands on a vertex $v$, is assigned a hat from $h(v)$ possible colors, and makes $g(v)$ guesses of her hat's color based on her out-neighbors' hats. If there exists a collective strategy that guarantees a correct guess for any hat assignment, the game is winnable. Which games $(D,g,h)$ are winnable? Two much-studied parameters: $μ(D)$ is the maximum integer $k$ such that $(D,1,k)$ is winnable, and $\hatμ(D…

Some intermittent thoughts about 4E as I review it after not having run a game in like 8 years.
1. going from playing almost entirely super rules light NSR games to this has made me greatly underestimate how much prep is involved.
2. I'm also a lot worried about teaching new people this.
3. I don't like what they did about alignment, but I never liked D&D alignment. I do like the deieties as a shorthand for the player's values and I like the amount of emphas…

Two-Person Cooperative Games with delta-Rationality
Fang-Fang Tang, Yongsheng Xu
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.16465 https://arxiv.org/p…

Two-Person Cooperative Games with delta-Rationality
A player's payoff is modeled as consisting of two parts: a rational-value part and a distortion-value part. It is argued that the (total) payoff function should be used to explain and predict the behaviors of the players, while the rational value function should be used to conduct welfare analysis of the final outcome. We use the Nash demand game to illustrate our model.

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.20770 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csGT_…

Learning to Steer Learners in Games
We consider the problem of learning to exploit learning algorithms through repeated interactions in games. Specifically, we focus on the case of repeated two player, finite-action games, in which an optimizer aims to steer a no-regret learner to a Stackelberg equilibrium without knowledge of its payoffs. We first show that this is impossible if the optimizer only knows that the learner is using an algorithm from the general class of no-regret algorithms. This suggests that the optimizer require…

Raiders' Contender for Comeback Player of the Year https://www.si.com/nfl/raiders/las-vegas-maxx-crosby-pro-bowl-pete-carroll

Turnpike properties in linear quadratic Gaussian N-player differential games
Asaf Cohen, Jiamin Jian
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.11632 https://

Turnpike properties in linear quadratic Gaussian N-player differential games
We consider the long-time behavior of equilibrium strategies and state trajectories in a linear quadratic $N$-player game with Gaussian initial data. By analyzing convergence toward the corresponding ergodic game, we establish exponential convergence estimates between the solutions of the finite-horizon Riccati system and the associated algebraic Riccati system arising in the ergodic setting. Building on these results, we prove the convergence of the time-averaged value function and derive a tu…

Learning with Episodic Hypothesis Testing in General Games: A Framework for Equilibrium Selection
Ruifan Yang, Manxi Wu
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.23149 https://

Learning with Episodic Hypothesis Testing in General Games: A Framework for Equilibrium Selection
We introduce a new hypothesis testing-based learning dynamics in which players update their strategies by combining hypothesis testing with utility-driven exploration. In this dynamics, each player forms beliefs about opponents' strategies and episodically tests these beliefs using empirical observations. Beliefs are resampled either when the hypothesis test is rejected or through exploration, where the probability of exploration decreases with the player's (transformed) utility. In general fin…

Democratizing Game Modding with GenAI: A Case Study of StarCharM, a Stardew Valley Character Maker
Hamid Zand Miralvand, Mohammad Ronagh Nikghalb, Mohammad Darandeh, Abidullah Khan, Ian Arawjo, Jinghui Cheng
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.13951

Democratizing Game Modding with GenAI: A Case Study of StarCharM, a Stardew Valley Character Maker
Game modding offers unique and personalized gaming experiences, but the technical complexity of creating mods often limits participation to skilled users. We envision a future where every player can create personalized mods for their games. To explore this space, we designed StarCharM, a GenAI-based non-player character (NPC) creator for Stardew Valley. Our tool enables players to iteratively create new NPC mods, requiring minimal user input while allowing for fine-grained adjustments through u…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.14547 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csGT_…

GUARD: Constructing Realistic Two-Player Matrix and Security Games for Benchmarking Game-Theoretic Algorithms
Game-theoretic algorithms are commonly benchmarked on recreational games, classical constructs from economic theory such as congestion and dispersion games, or entirely random game instances. While the past two decades have seen the rise of security games -- grounded in real-world scenarios like patrolling and infrastructure protection -- their practical evaluation has been hindered by limited access to the datasets used to generate them. In particular, although the structural components of the…

BSDE Approach for $\alpha$-Potential Stochastic Differential Games
Xin Guo, Xun Li, Liangquan Zhang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.13256 https://

BSDE Approach for $α$-Potential Stochastic Differential Games
In this paper, we examine a class of $α$-potential stochastic differential games with random coefficients via the backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) approach. Specifically, we show that the first and second order linear derivatives of the objective function for each player can be expressed through the corresponding first and second-order adjoint equations, which leads to rigorous estimates for $α$. We illustrate the dependence of $α$ on game characteristics through detailed a…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.24171 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_eco…

A note on the diversity Owen values
Béal et al. (Int J Game Theory 54, 2025) introduce the Diversity Owen value for TU-games with diversity constraints, and provide axiomatic characterizations using the axioms of fairness and balanced contributions. However, there exist logical flaws in the proofs of the uniqueness of these characterizations. In this note we provides the corrected proofs of the characterizations by introducing the null player for diversity games axiom. Also, we establish two alternative characterizations of the …

Using Psychophysiological Insights to Evaluate the Impact of Loot Boxes on Arousal
Gianmarco Tedeschi, Rune Kristian Lundedal Nielsen, Paolo Burelli
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.04906

Using Psychophysiological Insights to Evaluate the Impact of Loot Boxes on Arousal
This study investigates the psychophysiological effects of loot box interactions in video games and their potential similarities to those recorded during gambling interactions. Using electrodermal activity (EDA) measurements, the research examines player arousal during loot box interactions and explores the relationship between Internet Gaming Disorder (IGD) severity and loot box interactions from a psychophysiological perspective. The study employs a custom-designed game to control experimenta…

Thresholds for sensitive optimality and Blackwell optimality in stochastic games
St\'ephane Gaubert, Julien Grand-Cl\'ement, Ricardo D. Katz
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.18545

Thresholds for sensitive optimality and Blackwell optimality in stochastic games
We investigate refinements of the mean-payoff criterion in two-player zero-sum perfect-information stochastic games. A strategy is Blackwell optimal if it is optimal in the discounted game for all discount factors sufficiently close to $1$. The notion of $d$-sensitive optimality interpolates between mean-payoff optimality (corresponding to the case $d=-1$) and Blackwell optimality ($d=+\infty$). The Blackwell threshold $α_{\sf Bw} \in [0,1[$ is the discount factor above which all optimal strat…

Nash equilibria in semidefinite games and Lemke-Howson paths
Constantin Ickstadt, Thorsten Theobald, Elias Tsigaridas, Antonios Varvitsiotis
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.11940

Nash equilibria in semidefinite games and Lemke-Howson paths
We consider an algorithmic framework for two-player non-zero-sum semidefinite games, where each player's strategy is a positive semidefinite matrix with trace one. We formulate the computation of Nash equilibria in such games as semidefinite complementarity problems and develop symbolic-numeric techniques to trace generalized Lemke-Howson paths. These paths generalize the piecewise affine-linear trajectories of the classical Lemke-Howson algorithm for bimatrix games, replacing them with nonline…

Solving Zero-Sum Convex Markov Games
Fivos Kalogiannis, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Ian Gemp, Georgios Piliouras
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.16120

Solving Zero-Sum Convex Markov Games
We contribute the first provable guarantees of global convergence to Nash equilibria (NE) in two-player zero-sum convex Markov games (cMGs) by using independent policy gradient methods. Convex Markov games, recently defined by Gemp et al. (2024), extend Markov decision processes to multi-agent settings with preferences that are convex over occupancy measures, offering a broad framework for modeling generic strategic interactions. However, even the fundamental min-max case of cMGs presents signi…

Markov Perfect Equilibria in Discrete Finite-Player and Mean-Field Games
Felix H\"ofer, H. Mete Soner, Atilla Y{\i}lmaz
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.04540

Markov Perfect Equilibria in Discrete Finite-Player and Mean-Field Games
We study dynamic finite-player and mean-field stochastic games within the framework of Markov perfect equilibria (MPE). Our focus is on discrete time and space structures without monotonicity. Unlike their continuous-time analogues, discrete-time finite-player games generally do not admit unique MPE. However, we show that uniqueness is remarkably recovered when the time steps are sufficiently small, and we provide examples demonstrating the necessity of this assumption. This result, established…

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types
Jakub T{\l}uczek, Victor Villin, Christos Dimitrakakis
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15887 ht…

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types
Fairness is desirable yet challenging to achieve within multi-agent systems, especially when agents differ in latent traits that affect their abilities. This hidden heterogeneity often leads to unequal distributions of wealth, even when agents operate under the same rules. Motivated by real-world examples, we propose a framework based on repeated principal-agent games, where a principal, who also can be seen as a player of the game, learns to offer adaptive contracts to agents. By leveraging a …

Infinite lexicographic products of positional objectives
Antonio Casares, Pierre Ohlmann, Micha{\l} Skrzypczak, Igor Walukiewicz
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.14544

Infinite lexicographic products of positional objectives
This paper contributes to the study of positional determinacy of infinite duration games played on potentially infinite graphs. Recently, [Ohlmann, TheoretiCS 2023] established that positionality of prefix-independent objectives is preserved by finite lexicographic products. We propose two different notions of infinite lexicographic products indexed by arbitrary ordinals, and extend Ohlmann's result by proving that they also preserve positionality. In the context of one-player positionality, th…

Resource-Splitting Games with Tullock-Based Lossy Contests
Marko Maljkovic, Gustav Nilsson, Nikolas Geroliminis
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.13853 https://…

Resource-Splitting Games with Tullock-Based Lossy Contests
This paper introduces a novel class of multi-stage resource allocation games that model real-world scenarios in which profitability depends on the balance between supply and demand, and where higher resource investment leads to greater returns. Our proposed framework, which incorporates the notion of profit loss due to insufficient player participation, gives rise to a Tullock-like functional form of the stage payoff structure when weighted fair proportional resource allocation is applied. We e…

Protocols for Verifying Smooth Strategies in Bandits and Games
Miranda Christ, Daniel Reichman, Jonathan Shafer
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.10567 https://…

Protocols for Verifying Smooth Strategies in Bandits and Games
We study protocols for verifying approximate optimality of strategies in multi-armed bandits and normal-form games. As the number of actions available to each player is often large, we seek protocols where the number of queries to the utility oracle is sublinear in the number of actions. We prove that such verification is possible for sufficiently smooth strategies that do not put too much probability mass on any specific action. We provide protocols for verifying that a smooth policy for a mul…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.15483 has been replaced.
link: https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=a

Strategy Complexity of Büchi Objectives in Concurrent Stochastic Games
We study 2-player zero-sum concurrent (i.e., simultaneous move) stochastic Büchi games and Transience games on countable graphs. Two players, Max and Min, seek respectively to maximize and minimize the probability of satisfying the game objective. The Büchi objective is to visit a given set of target states infinitely often. This can be seen as a special case of maximizing the expected $\limsup$ of the daily rewards, where all daily rewards are in $\{0,1\}$. The Transience objective is to vis…

Coalitions on the Fly in Cooperative Games
Yao Zhang, Indrajit Saha, Zhaohong Sun, Makoto Yokoo
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.11883 https://

Coalitions on the Fly in Cooperative Games
In this work, we examine a sequential setting of a cooperative game in which players arrive dynamically to form coalitions and complete tasks either together or individually, depending on the value created. Upon arrival, a new player as a decision maker faces two options: forming a new coalition or joining an existing one. We assume that players are greedy, i.e., they aim to maximize their rewards based on the information available at their arrival. The objective is to design an online value di…

Value-Set Iteration: Computing Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Infinite-Horizon Multi-Player Stochastic Games
Jiarui Gan, Rupak Majumdar
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.07186

Value-Set Iteration: Computing Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Infinite-Horizon Multi-Player Stochastic Games
We study the problem of computing optimal correlated equilibria (CEs) in infinite-horizon multi-player stochastic games, where correlation signals are provided over time. In this setting, optimal CEs require history-dependent policies; this poses new representational and algorithmic challenges as the number of possible histories grows exponentially with the number of time steps. We focus on computing $(ε, δ)$-optimal CEs -- solutions that achieve a value within $ε$ of an optimal CE, while al…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.02520 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csGT_…

Branch-and-Cut for Mixed-Integer Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems
Generalized Nash equilibrium problems with mixed-integer variables form an important class of games in which each player solves a mixed-integer optimization problem with respect to her own variables and the strategy space of each player depends on the strategies chosen by the rival players. In this work, we introduce a branch-and-cut algorithm to compute exact pure Nash equilibria for different classes of such mixed-integer games. The main idea is to reformulate the equilibrium problem as a sui…

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.07932 has been replaced.
initial toot: https://mastoxiv.page/@arXiv_csGT_…

Feint Behaviors and Strategies: Formalization, Implementation and Evaluation
Feint behaviors refer to a set of deceptive behaviors in a nuanced manner, which enable players to obtain temporal and spatial advantages over opponents in competitive games. Such behaviors are crucial tactics in most competitive multi-player games (e.g., boxing, fencing, basketball, motor racing, etc.). However, existing literature does not provide a comprehensive (and/or concrete) formalization for Feint behaviors, and their implications on game strategies. In this work, we introduce the firs…