Urban Texture III 🧩
城市质地 III 🧩
📷 Nikon F4E
🎞️ ERA 100, expired 1993
#filmphotography #Photography #blackandwhite
"Ohio’s largest utility pushes to slash rooftop solar compensation"
#US #USA #America #SolarPower
Home batteries are quietly becoming a game-changer for grid stability. As installations surge, utilities are tapping residential storage to manage peak demand during extreme weather—deferring costly upgrades while boosting resilience.
The key to scaling? Treat it like market development, not just tech deployment. Simple enrollment, risk-sharing models, and coordinated action between utilities and manufacturers can unlock massive participation.
Series B, Episode 08 - Hostage
BLAKE: You all right, Jenna?
JENNA: [Into bracelet.] Bring us up, Cally.
INGA: Come on, father.
[Surface of Exbar. Night. Travis is walking disconsolately and stumbles into a mutoid and Servalan.]
https://blake.torpidity.net/m/208/714 B7B4
Selling Privacy in Blockchain Transactions
Georgios Chionas, Olga Gorelkina, Piotr Krysta, Rida Laraki
https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.08096 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.08096 https://arxiv.org/html/2512.08096
arXiv:2512.08096v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We study methods to enhance privacy in blockchain transactions from an economic angle. We consider mechanisms for privacy-aware users whose utility depends not only on the outcome of the mechanism but also negatively on the exposure of their economic preferences. Specifically, we study two auction-theoretic settings with privacy-aware users. First, we analyze an order flow auction, where a user auctions off to specialized agents, called searchers, the right to execute her transaction while maintaining a degree of privacy. We examine how the degree of privacy affects the revenue of the auction and, broadly, the net utility of the privacy-aware user. In this new setting, we describe the optimal auction, which is a sealed-bid auction. Subsequently, we analyze a variant of a Dutch auction in which the user gradually decreases the price and the degree of privacy until the transaction is sold. We compare the revenue of this auction to that of the optimal one as a function of the number of communication rounds. Then, we introduce a two-sided market - a privacy marketplace - with multiple users selling their transactions under their privacy preferences to multiple searchers. We propose a posted-price mechanism for the two-sided market that guarantees constant approximation of the optimal social welfare while maintaining incentive compatibility (from both sides of the market) and budget balance. This work builds on the emerging line of research that attempts to improve the performance of economic mechanisms by appending cryptographic primitives to them.
toXiv_bot_toot
{testthat} is great for automatic testing. Here are some tricks for the heavy user: #rstats
"Finland adds 227 MW of utility-scale solar in 2025"
#Finland #SolarPower #Energy #Renewables…
Moody Urbanity - Relations II 👥
情绪化城市 - 关系 II 👥
📷 Minolta Hi-Matic AF
🎞️ Shanghai GP3 400 Pan
#filmphotography #Photography #blackandwhite