Tootfinder

ILCL: Inverse Logic-Constraint Learning from Temporally Constrained Demonstrations
Minwoo Cho, Jaehwi Jang, Daehyung Park
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.11000 …

ILCL: Inverse Logic-Constraint Learning from Temporally Constrained Demonstrations
We aim to solve the problem of temporal-constraint learning from demonstrations to reproduce demonstration-like logic-constrained behaviors. Learning logic constraints is challenging due to the combinatorially large space of possible specifications and the ill-posed nature of non-Markovian constraints. To figure it out, we introduce a novel temporal-constraint learning method, which we call inverse logic-constraint learning (ILCL). Our method frames ICL as a two-player zero-sum game between 1) …

Solving Zero-Sum Games with Fewer Matrix-Vector Products
Ishani Karmarkar, Liam O'Carroll, Aaron Sidford
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.04426 https://arxiv…

Solving Zero-Sum Games with Fewer Matrix-Vector Products
In this paper we consider the problem of computing an $ε$-approximate Nash Equilibrium of a zero-sum game in a payoff matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ with $O(1)$-bounded entries given access to a matrix-vector product oracle for $A$ and its transpose $A^\top$. We provide a deterministic algorithm that solves the problem using $\tilde{O}(ε^{-8/9})$-oracle queries, where $\tilde{O}(\cdot)$ hides factors polylogarithmic in $m$, $n$, and $ε^{-1}$. Our result improves upon the state-of-the…

On Zero-sum Game Representation for Replicator Dynamics
Haoyu Yin, Xudong Chen, Bruno Sinopoli
https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.21299 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2508.…

On Zero-sum Game Representation for Replicator Dynamics
Replicator dynamics have widely been used in evolutionary game theory to model how strategy frequencies evolve over time in large populations. The so-called payoff matrix encodes the pairwise fitness that each strategy obtains when interacting with every other strategy, and it solely determines the replicator dynamics. If the payoff matrix is unknown, we show in this paper that it cannot be inferred from observed strategy frequencies alone -- distinct payoff matrices can induce the same replica…

Optimization of Latent-Space Compression using Game-Theoretic Techniques for Transformer-Based Vector Search
Kushagra Agrawal, Nisharg Nargund, Oishani Banerjee
https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.18877

Optimization of Latent-Space Compression using Game-Theoretic Techniques for Transformer-Based Vector Search
Vector similarity search plays a pivotal role in modern information retrieval systems, especially when powered by transformer-based embeddings. However, the scalability and efficiency of such systems are often hindered by the high dimensionality of latent representations. In this paper, we propose a novel game-theoretic framework for optimizing latent-space compression to enhance both the efficiency and semantic utility of vector search. By modeling the compression strategy as a zero-sum game b…

Time for another "review". This one's hard. While the book was quite interesting, it required me to be quite open-minded. Still, I think it's worth mentioning:
Robert Wright — Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny
The book basically focused on a thesis that both biological evolution and cultural evolution are a thing, they are directional and this directionality can be explained together using game theory — as eventually leading to more non-zero sum games.
It consists of three chapters. The first one is is focused on the history of civilization. It features many examples from different parts of the world, which makes it quite interesting. The author argues that the culture inevitably is evolving as information processing techniques improve — from writing to the Internet.
The second chapter is focused on biological evolution. Now, the argument is that it's not quite random, but actually directed towards greater complexity — eventually leading to the development of highly intelligent species, and a civilization.
The third chapter is quite speculative and metaphysical, and I'm just going to skip it.
The book is full of optimism. Capitalism creates freedom — because people are more productive when they're working for their own gain, so the free market eliminates slavery. Globalisation creates networks of interdependence that make wars uneconomic. Increased contacts between different cultures makes people more tolerant. And eventually, the humanity may be able to unite facing a common "external" enemy — the climate change.
What can I say? The examples are quite interesting, the whole theory seems self-consistent. Still, I repeatedly looked at the publication date (it's 1999), and wondered if author would write the same thing today (yes, I know I can search for his current opinions).
#books #bookstodon @…

Reducing the complexity of computing the values of a Nash equilibrium
Debtoru Chatterjee, Girish Tiwari, Niladri Chatterjee
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.22819 https://

Reducing the complexity of computing the values of a Nash equilibrium
The Colonel Blotto game, formulated by Emile Borel, involves players allocating limited resources to multiple battlefields simultaneously, with the winner being the one who allocates more resources to each battlefield. Computation of the Nash equilibrium, including of two person, zero sum, mixed strategy Colonel Blotto games have encountered issues of scalability and complexity owing to their PPAD completeness. This paper proposes an algorithm that computes the same value as the Nash equilibriu…

Operator-Theoretic Methods for Differential Games
Craig Bakker, Adam T. Rupe, Alexander Von Moll, Adam R. Gerlach
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.02203 https://…

Operator-Theoretic Methods for Differential Games
Differential game theory offers an approach for modeling interactions between two or more agents that occur in continuous time. The goal of each agent is to optimize its objective cost functional. In this paper, we present two different methods, based on the Koopman Operator (KO), to solve a zero-sum differential game. The first approach uses the resolvent of the KO to calculate a continuous-time global feedback solution over the entire domain. The second approach uses a discrete-time, data-dri…

Quickest Detection of Adversarial Attacks Against Correlated Equilibria
Kiarash Kazari, Aris Kanellopoulos, Gy\"orgy D\'an
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.24040

Quickest Detection of Adversarial Attacks Against Correlated Equilibria
We consider correlated equilibria in strategic games in an adversarial environment, where an adversary can compromise the public signal used by the players for choosing their strategies, while players aim at detecting a potential attack as soon as possible to avoid loss of utility. We model the interaction between the adversary and the players as a zero-sum game and we derive the maxmin strategies for both the defender and the attacker using the framework of quickest change detection. We define…

Finite-Horizon Partially Observable Semi-Markov Games with Risk Probability Criteria
Xin Wen, Li Xia, Zhihui Yu
https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.17791 https://ar…

Finite-Horizon Partially Observable Semi-Markov Games with Risk Probability Criteria
This paper studies partially observable two-person zero-sum semi-Markov games under a probability criterion, in which the system state may not be completely observed. It focuses on the probability that the accumulated rewards of player 1 (i.e., the incurred costs of player 2) fall short of a specified target at the terminal stage, which represents the risk of player 1 and the capacity of player 2. We study the game model via the technology of augmenting state space with the joint conditional di…

Thresholds for sensitive optimality and Blackwell optimality in stochastic games
St\'ephane Gaubert, Julien Grand-Cl\'ement, Ricardo D. Katz
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.18545

Thresholds for sensitive optimality and Blackwell optimality in stochastic games
We investigate refinements of the mean-payoff criterion in two-player zero-sum perfect-information stochastic games. A strategy is Blackwell optimal if it is optimal in the discounted game for all discount factors sufficiently close to $1$. The notion of $d$-sensitive optimality interpolates between mean-payoff optimality (corresponding to the case $d=-1$) and Blackwell optimality ($d=+\infty$). The Blackwell threshold $α_{\sf Bw} \in [0,1[$ is the discount factor above which all optimal strat…