At 5:49 p.m., air traffic controllers told pilots over the Caribbean that a SpaceX Starship rocket had exploded.
All planes were ordered to avoid an area where the Federal Aviation Administration estimated debris would fall
launches exploded at unexpected points on their flight paths,
Last year, three of Starship’s five launches exploded at unexpected points on their flight paths,
twice raining flaming debris over congested commercial airways and disrupting flights. …
I was certain my Index was about to die and it just... fixed itself? What.
I've been seeing random pixels all over the screens (especially in dark areas) for a while now. This was the reason I had to replace the cable once, as right after this it got a lot worse and it straight up started to malfunction, cut the audio, flip the screens, crash, etc, so I thought I was cooked.
Robust equilibria in continuous games: From strategic to dynamic robustness
Kyriakos Lotidis, Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Nicholas Bambos, Jose Blanchet
https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.08138 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.08138 https://arxiv.org/html/2512.08138
arXiv:2512.08138v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: In this paper, we examine the robustness of Nash equilibria in continuous games, under both strategic and dynamic uncertainty. Starting with the former, we introduce the notion of a robust equilibrium as those equilibria that remain invariant to small -- but otherwise arbitrary -- perturbations to the game's payoff structure, and we provide a crisp geometric characterization thereof. Subsequently, we turn to the question of dynamic robustness, and we examine which equilibria may arise as stable limit points of the dynamics of "follow the regularized leader" (FTRL) in the presence of randomness and uncertainty. Despite their very distinct origins, we establish a structural correspondence between these two notions of robustness: strategic robustness implies dynamic robustness, and, conversely, the requirement of strategic robustness cannot be relaxed if dynamic robustness is to be maintained. Finally, we examine the rate of convergence to robust equilibria as a function of the underlying regularizer, and we show that entropically regularized learning converges at a geometric rate in games with affinely constrained action spaces.
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Different Corners VII ▶️
不同的角落 VII ▶️
📷 Nikon F4E
🎞️ Fujifilm NEOPAN SS, expired 1993
#filmphotography #Photography #blackandwhite
We're admitting PhD students! (Possible co-PIs include @… @… if interests align.) Here's what we're excited about pursuing with new students:
Beyond Revenue and Welfare: Counterfactual Analysis of Spectrum Auctions with Application to Canada's 3800MHz Allocation
Sara Jalili Shani, Kris Joseph, Michael B. McNally, James R. Wright
https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.08106 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.08106 https://arxiv.org/html/2512.08106
arXiv:2512.08106v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Spectrum auctions are the primary mechanism through which governments allocate scarce radio frequencies, with outcomes that shape competition, coverage, and innovation in telecommunications markets. While traditional models of spectrum auctions often rely on strong equilibrium assumptions, we take a more parsimonious approach by modeling bidders as myopic and straightforward: in each round, firms simply demand the bundle that maximizes their utility given current prices. Despite its simplicity, this model proves effective in predicting the outcomes of Canada's 2023 auction of 3800 MHz spectrum licenses. Using detailed round-by-round bidding data, we estimate bidders' valuations through a linear programming framework and validate that our model reproduces key features of the observed allocation and price evolution. We then use these estimated valuations to simulate a counterfactual auction under an alternative mechanism that incentivizes deployment in rural and remote regions, aligning with one of the key objectives set out in the Canadian Telecommunications Act. The results show that the proposed mechanism substantially improves population coverage in underserved areas. These findings demonstrate that a behavioral model with minimal assumptions is sufficient to generate reliable counterfactual predictions, making it a practical tool for policymakers to evaluate how alternative auction designs may influence future outcomes. In particular, our study demonstrates a method for counterfactual mechanism design, providing a framework to evaluate how alternative auction rules could advance policy goals such as equitable deployment across Canada.
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The New York Times, AP, RCFP, and other media organizations back an effort to block a new Texas law requiring app stores to verify users' ages (Wendy Davis/MediaPost)
https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/411151/new-yor…
New global map shows where sharks and rays most need protection https://news.mongabay.com/2026/02/new-global-map-shows-where-sharks-and-rays-most-need-protection/
The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators
Kevin Vallier
https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.07901 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.07901 https://arxiv.org/html/2512.07901
arXiv:2512.07901v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: This paper develops the Theory of Strategic Evolution, a general model for systems in which the population of players, strategies, and institutional rules evolve together. The theory extends replicator dynamics to settings with endogenous players, multi level selection, innovation, constitutional change, and meta governance. The central mathematical object is a Poiesis stack: a hierarchy of strategic layers linked by cross level gain matrices. Under small gain conditions, the system admits a global Lyapunov function and satisfies selection, tracking, and stochastic stability results at every finite depth. We prove that the class is closed under block extension, innovation events, heterogeneous utilities, continuous strategy spaces, and constitutional evolution. The closure theorem shows that no new dynamics arise at higher levels and that unrestricted self modification cannot preserve Lyapunov structure. The theory unifies results from evolutionary game theory, institutional design, innovation dynamics, and constitutional political economy, providing a general mathematical model of long run strategic adaptation.
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