"In truth, no Number fully insulates anyone from life’s vicissitudes. Markets crash, health fails, taxes rise, wars and pestilence break out...."
So, pay your taxes and invest in a welfare safety net, is the unspoken part.
The absurdity of bankers’ retirement fund targets - https://on.ft.com/4o2NNbV
When people can’t tell what’s real, it can blur their understanding of animal behavior, welfare, and conservation needs. It can also divert attention – and support – away from organizations doing the real work to protect wildlife.
https://scz.org/blog/the-reality-of-ai-animal-content
Was at an event this weekend where https://safehavenpfoa.org/ had a table advertising their animal shelter and selling merch.
But I'm not sure how much I'd want a PFOA towel... Do they have a PFAS free version? :p
ReformUK and their ilk keep claiming it is easy for asylum seekers. Like if they eventually get settled status, the Home Office immediately makes them homeless. So easy for them, our beneficent welfare system. That's after living on a pittance while awaiting a decision, so no spare money to put down for a deposit.
Andy Burnham makes demand after claims government policies creating homelessness - Manchester Evening News
Moody Urbanity - Relations IV 🧶
情绪化城市 - 关系 IV 🧶
📷 Minolta Hi-Matic AF
🎞️ Shanghai GP3 400 Pan
#filmphotography #Photography #blackandwhite
Social Welfare Function Leaderboard: When LLM Agents Allocate Social Welfare
Zhengliang Shi, Ruotian Ma, Jen-tse Huang, Xinbei Ma, Xingyu Chen, Mengru Wang, Qu Yang, Yue Wang, Fanghua Ye, Ziyang Chen, Shanyi Wang, Cixing Li, Wenxuan Wang, Zhaopeng Tu, Xiaolong Li, Zhaochun Ren, Linus
https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.01164
Is your mailbox or PO box often filled to its limit (or beyond) by ULINE catalogs and promo mailings?
Do you wonder at the increasing cost of US Postal service, especially, for anything thicker than an few pages or an SD card (USB flash drives are too thick and get bumped into the parcel post price range)?
Are you tired of brand-R $billionaires complain of welfare queens and government giveaways to the "woke".
Well, meet Richard and Elizabeth Uihlein, owners of UL…

ULINE - Shipping Boxes, Shipping Supplies, Packaging Materials, Packing Supplies
Uline stocks over 43,000 shipping boxes, packing materials, warehouse supplies, material handling and more. Same day shipping for cardboard boxes, plastic bags, janitorial, retail and shipping supplies.
Digital ID – The New Chains of Capitalist Surveillance
[…] From passports to colonial passbooks, from welfare cards to border regimes, the apparatus of identification has always been tied to domination. Digital ID is simply the latest iteration of this long history, but with a scale and sophistication that makes its dangers even more profound. […]
👷
Reagan's "Welfare Queen" rhetoric was a dog whistle. The whole "southern strategy" was full of dog whistles. Every time Republicans talked about gay marriage as a "states rights" issue, those were dog whistles. Naming a government agency "the Department of Homeland Security" was a dog whistle. Trump's speeches leading up to his first term were full of dog whistles.
Nazis have total control of all branches of government. They've cut off funding to all but the most oppressive elements of the government. There are concentration camps, both in client states (CECOT, among others) and in the US (Alligator Auschwitz, among others). They're actively carrying out ethnic cleansing.
When DHS puts out some Nazi shit, it's not a dog whistle. It's a vuvuzela. They're not trying to signal their intent without any of the "normies" noticing. They actively doing what they wanted to do. It's not a signal because there's nothing to signal. It's a celebration.
#USPol
"Quite how Schrodinger’s Russian army, currently moving at a snail’s pace across the Ukrainian plains, can simultaneously present an existential threat to Starmer’s Camden constituency remains to be explained but the Premier chose the British/US arms giant BAE Systems’ Clydeside shipyard to insist that military spending should be prioritised over welfare and public services."
Dangerous times threaten as Labour’s militarism expands | Morning Star
We joined with some friends this morning for a greyhound walk in Bedfont Lakes. I didn't have a hound to bring because the only one I can borrow now is Violet and she's too old to walk that distance. The three people we met up with had 5 dogs between them though, so Lynn let me keep hold of her boy Freddie.
I didn't take any photos because it was really cold and my hands were full! But here's a recent photo of Freddie.
"
Reps. Luna, Valadao, and Garbarino declare the rebranded EATS Act a threat to family farmers and a legislative invitation to foreign-owned factory farms."
Republican Lawmakers Declare Opposition to Legislation to Overturn the States’ Most Important Farm Animal Welfare Laws - Legal Reader
https://www.legalreader.com/republican-lawmakers-declare-opposition-to-legislation-to-overturn-the-states-most-important-farm-animal-welfare-laws/
Sonnet 118 - CXVIII
Like as, to make our appetite more keen,
With eager compounds we our palate urge;
As, to prevent our maladies unseen,
We sicken to shun sickness when we purge;
Even so, being full of your ne'er-cloying sweetness,
To bitter sauces did I frame my feeding;
And, sick of welfare, found a kind of meetness
To be diseased, ere that there was true needing.
Thus policy in love, to anticipate
The ills that were not, gre…
Beyond Revenue and Welfare: Counterfactual Analysis of Spectrum Auctions with Application to Canada's 3800MHz Allocation
Sara Jalili Shani, Kris Joseph, Michael B. McNally, James R. Wright
https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.08106 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.08106 https://arxiv.org/html/2512.08106
arXiv:2512.08106v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Spectrum auctions are the primary mechanism through which governments allocate scarce radio frequencies, with outcomes that shape competition, coverage, and innovation in telecommunications markets. While traditional models of spectrum auctions often rely on strong equilibrium assumptions, we take a more parsimonious approach by modeling bidders as myopic and straightforward: in each round, firms simply demand the bundle that maximizes their utility given current prices. Despite its simplicity, this model proves effective in predicting the outcomes of Canada's 2023 auction of 3800 MHz spectrum licenses. Using detailed round-by-round bidding data, we estimate bidders' valuations through a linear programming framework and validate that our model reproduces key features of the observed allocation and price evolution. We then use these estimated valuations to simulate a counterfactual auction under an alternative mechanism that incentivizes deployment in rural and remote regions, aligning with one of the key objectives set out in the Canadian Telecommunications Act. The results show that the proposed mechanism substantially improves population coverage in underserved areas. These findings demonstrate that a behavioral model with minimal assumptions is sufficient to generate reliable counterfactual predictions, making it a practical tool for policymakers to evaluate how alternative auction designs may influence future outcomes. In particular, our study demonstrates a method for counterfactual mechanism design, providing a framework to evaluate how alternative auction rules could advance policy goals such as equitable deployment across Canada.
toXiv_bot_toot
Amidst all the talk of capping welfare, it's vital to recognise that
- Over 7 million households are missing out on benefits they are entitled to.
- £24 billion of support is unclaimed.
Missing Out 2025 | Policy in Practice https://policyinpractice.co.uk/publicatio…
Pretty good analysis from @… but subtleties make it difficult to translate Danish model elsewhere. It's a PR system, so always coalitions many different flavours to vote for; Danish Peoples Party are left on welfare but not on immigration
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/nov/22/danish-model-centre-left-parties-labour-doesnt-work
Replaced article(s) found for q-fin.RM. https://arxiv.org/list/q-fin.RM/new
[1/1]:
- Optimal risk sharing, equilibria, and welfare with empirically realistic risk attitudes
Jean-Gabriel Lauzier, Liyuan Lin, Peter Wakker, Ruodu Wang
It seems progressive and social democratic politicians are at a loss over how to win elections and gain popularity, so here are my tips.
1. Increase taxes for the rich.
2. Stop subsidies to companies making huge profits.
3. Invest in social welfare programmes like education, health care, and the like.
4. Stop investing in war criminals like the Israeli government.
5. Enact policies to stop the climate crisis.
6. Subsidise working families to protect them from t…
Selling Privacy in Blockchain Transactions
Georgios Chionas, Olga Gorelkina, Piotr Krysta, Rida Laraki
https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.08096 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.08096 https://arxiv.org/html/2512.08096
arXiv:2512.08096v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We study methods to enhance privacy in blockchain transactions from an economic angle. We consider mechanisms for privacy-aware users whose utility depends not only on the outcome of the mechanism but also negatively on the exposure of their economic preferences. Specifically, we study two auction-theoretic settings with privacy-aware users. First, we analyze an order flow auction, where a user auctions off to specialized agents, called searchers, the right to execute her transaction while maintaining a degree of privacy. We examine how the degree of privacy affects the revenue of the auction and, broadly, the net utility of the privacy-aware user. In this new setting, we describe the optimal auction, which is a sealed-bid auction. Subsequently, we analyze a variant of a Dutch auction in which the user gradually decreases the price and the degree of privacy until the transaction is sold. We compare the revenue of this auction to that of the optimal one as a function of the number of communication rounds. Then, we introduce a two-sided market - a privacy marketplace - with multiple users selling their transactions under their privacy preferences to multiple searchers. We propose a posted-price mechanism for the two-sided market that guarantees constant approximation of the optimal social welfare while maintaining incentive compatibility (from both sides of the market) and budget balance. This work builds on the emerging line of research that attempts to improve the performance of economic mechanisms by appending cryptographic primitives to them.
toXiv_bot_toot
Replaced article(s) found for econ.TH. https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new
[1/1]:
- Optimal risk sharing, equilibria, and welfare with empirically realistic risk attitudes
Jean-Gabriel Lauzier, Liyuan Lin, Peter Wakker, Ruodu Wang
The Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Additional Succinct Bidders
Frederick V. Qiu, S. Matthew Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.06585 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.06585 https://arxiv.org/html/2512.06585
arXiv:2512.06585v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with bidders from either a standard valuation class (which require exponential communication to explicitly state, such as subadditive or XOS), or arbitrary succinct valuations (which can be fully described in polynomial communication, such as single-minded). Although succinct valuations can be efficiently communicated, we show that additional succinct bidders have a nontrivial impact on communication complexity of classical combinatorial auctions. Specifically, let $n$ be the number of subadditive/XOS bidders. We show that for SA $\cup$ SC (the union of subadditive and succinct valuations): (1) There is a polynomial communication $3$-approximation algorithm; (2) As $n \to \infty$, there is a matching $3$-hardness of approximation, which (a) is larger than the optimal approximation ratio of $2$ for SA, and (b) holds even for SA $\cup$ SM (the union of subadditive and single-minded valuations); and (3) For all $n \geq 3$, there is a constant separation between the optimal approximation ratios for SA $\cup$ SM and SA (and therefore between SA $\cup$ SC and SA as well). Similarly, we show that for XOS $\cup$ SC: (1) There is a polynomial communication $2$-approximation algorithm; (2) As $n \to \infty$, there is a matching $2$-hardness of approximation, which (a) is larger than the optimal approximation ratio of $e/(e-1)$ for XOS, and (b) holds even for XOS $\cup$ SM; and (3) For all $n \geq 2$, there is a constant separation between the optimal approximation ratios for XOS $\cup$ SM and XOS (and therefore between XOS $\cup$ SC and XOS as well).
toXiv_bot_toot
Structuring Collective Action with LLM-Guided Evolution: From Ill-Structured Problems to Executable Heuristics
Kevin Bradley Dsouza, Graham Alexander Watt, Yuri Leonenko, Juan Moreno-Cruz
https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.20412
Invariant Price of Anarchy: a Metric for Welfarist Traffic Control
Ilia Shilov, Mingjia He, Heinrich H. Nax, Emilio Frazzoli, Gioele Zardini, Saverio Bolognani
https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.05843 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.05843 https://arxiv.org/html/2512.05843
arXiv:2512.05843v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a standard metric for quantifying inefficiency in socio-technical systems, widely used to guide policies like traffic tolling. Conventional PoA analysis relies on exact numerical costs. However, in many settings, costs represent agents' preferences and may be defined only up to possibly arbitrary scaling and shifting, representing informational and modeling ambiguities. We observe that while such transformations preserve equilibrium and optimal outcomes, they change the PoA value. To resolve this issue, we rely on results from Social Choice Theory and define the Invariant PoA. By connecting admissible transformations to degrees of comparability of agents' costs, we derive the specific social welfare functions which ensure that efficiency evaluations do not depend on arbitrary rescalings or translations of individual costs. Case studies on a toy example and the Zurich network demonstrate that identical tolling strategies can lead to substantially different efficiency estimates depending on the assumed comparability. Our framework thus demonstrates that explicit axiomatic foundations are necessary in order to define efficiency metrics and to appropriately guide policy in large-scale infrastructure design robustly and effectively.
toXiv_bot_toot
Replaced article(s) found for cs.GT. https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new
[1/1]:
- Optimal Type-Dependent Liquid Welfare Guarantees for Autobidding Agents with Budgets
Colini-Baldeschi, Klumper, Kroll, Leonardi, Sch\"afer, Tsikiridis